This is the first part of my two-part analysis of some fundamental and large-scale issues of the State’s Land and Housing Policies and Programs. This first part deals with the background, while the second part will deal with the unfolding issues on the Trinidad and Tobago Housing Development Corporation (HDC) and LandMarkTT Properties programs. This analysis is based on the relevant policies, laws, official statistics, and published statements.

Our country actually has a National Land Policy (1992) and a National Housing Policy (2002), both of which have been effectively erased by successive political administrations. So that is why none of the officials busily commenting on land and housing ever refer to our existing national policies. If one were to try searching official websites for those policies, it would be fruitless, far less to actually request those policies from one of the responsible State Ministries or Agencies. Our public officials make bold public statements, while we are witness to huge public investments in this critical arena, all without regard to the approved national policies. That is the framing for the collective fix that we are in, and this has been the case for over 20 years now, since the official policies became inconvenient.

I will demonstrate how the official land and housing programs have unfolded in an increasingly contrary manner when compared to the objectives of the official policies. Policy Review is a normal procedure to ensure proper alignment between objectives and outcomes. The problem in this instance is that a policy review would have required a full statement of the facts in terms of both spending and performance, together with public consultations. Those practices are serially avoided by successive political administrations, so the solution was to simply ‘erase’ those national policies from view and carry on regardless. This is the detrimental sly erasure which has ensured that those beneficial policies are effectively concealed from the public it is intended to serve. That is the background to the ongoing silence on our National Land and Housing Policies. I have kept those Policies, hence my continuing series of challenges.

The Land for the Landless program, which is handled by the Land Settlement Agency (LSA), needs a significant adjustment to its rules, since although that program was intended for those applicants outside HDC criteria, its monthly income limit is $30,000, while the HDC’s monthly income limit is $25,000. (Click here for Frequently Asked Questions on HDC website). Quite frankly, apart from the re-establishment of an LSA limit which is lower than the HDC limit, both those monthly income limits need to be greatly reduced to reflect reality. We often hear of fact-based decision-making as a desirable approach to complex problems, so the qualification criteria for these State land and housing programs must be reconsidered in light of the most recent CSO research (2011 census) showing that 70% of our households have a monthly income of less than $9,000. That means that the monthly income limits for these programs are far too high if the intention is to address the dire situation of the neediest households.

The actual household income levels in our country are so low that over 95% of the applicants on the HDC’s waiting list cannot ever qualify for a mortgage, simply because they are too poor. We set these unrealistic maximum income levels for applicants, and the result is plain to see. Most applicants cannot afford to buy, and yet we have a state housing program supposedly intended to assist the neediest families, which almost exclusively focuses on homes for sale. The HDC is a Statutory Agency, established by Act No. 24 of 2005. It is a creature of Statute and therefore bound to follow that law. Section 13 (1) (a) of the HDC Act requires it to provide “affordable shelter and associated community facilities for low and middle income persons”. That sequence is no accident; the very HDC Act gives precedence to the low income persons, it’s in the law. The income profile amongst applicants and the text of the originating Act gives priority to HDC building homes for rent in preference to homes for sale. Yes, that is the law, so what is the actual result? My detailed research into the current 2002 Housing Policy shows that HDC has never built more than 21% of its new homes for rent. Those findings are from 2003 to now, so the lack of focus and sheer misallocation of vast sums of Public Money spans several political administrations. In this one thing at least, there is some kind of unusual consensus between supposed political rivals.

Public Private Partnership (PPP) approaches to housing provision are now in vogue, but we need to consider the extent to which that model can deliver the decent housing so desperately needed by our poorest citizens. In addition, while we note the Minister of Land and Legal Affairs, Saddam Hosein’s declaration that no State monies are to be spent on these projects, two issues arise. Firstly, there is a long-term and detrimental blind spot in how projects are discussed in our country in that we never, ever mention the value of the lands being dedicated to these projects so that the only figure mentioned is the contract sum for the construction. That needs to change – the State needs to explicitly declare the value of the lands being dedicated to these projects if we are to have a clear picture of the total cost of these developments. Secondly, the PPP agreements I have seen all have provisions that effectively inoculate the private sector party from any losses if there should be a shortfall in the projected sales. In such cases, the State is in fact guaranteeing the return of the private sector by removing those risks, so one is entitled to wonder just what risk the private sector is bearing. If the answer is that the private sector is bearing no risks, that means that we have been pursuing a detrimental PPP model, thus far.

Minister Hosein’s statements that the State has not contracted to make any payments within those arrangements needs to be carefully scrutinised. Firstly, as I stated earlier, we need to include the value of the land in our consideration of these projects, it is not possible to appreciate the full scope of these projects if we continue to omit the land value. That is also ironic given that the ‘Land and Legal Affairs Minister’ is going to be playing a leading role in these arrangements going forward. Secondly, apart from disclosing those previously concealed land costs, we also need to acknowledge that these contracts commonly allow private developers to get paid by the State if the projected commercial outcomes are not met. Quite simply, I do not at all accept the notion that no Public Money is at risk in these projects. It all comes down to the difference between the cash and accrual approaches to accounting and that can be a challenging matter for some people.