CL Financial bailout – DoubleThink

doublethink
Illustration © David Cave

‘…Doublethink is the ability to hold two completely contradictory beliefs at the same time and to believe they are both true…’
—from George Orwell’s ‘1984’

On 25 January 2017 the annual Corruption Perceptions Index report was published by Transparency International, with the results reflecting poorly on our country. T&T’s score fell from 39 in the previous year to 34 in 2016 – this scale measures greater perceptions of public sector corruption as declining scores, with the countries seen as least corrupt having the highest score. As a result of the declining score, our ranking fell from 72nd out of 168 countries to 101st out of 176. That decline in perception was a serious one and really little surprise to the attentive citizen, none whatsoever. Of course perceptions take some time to change, so the question is whether the post-September 2015 regime can improve those poor perceptions.

I believe that there is now an outbreak of tragic ‘doublethink’ within our country’s leadership, in relation to the CL Financial bailout. That must be challenged if we are to ever see any improvement in our nation’s fortunes, not to mention the slide in terms of perception of corruption. Continue reading “CL Financial bailout – DoubleThink”

CL Financial bailout – Bitter Brew

CORRECTION: On the issue of interest due on Public Money advanced for the CL Financial bailout

I have been stating that the Public Money advanced for this CL Financial bailout has been interest-free and that was a clear indication of the most-favoured status of the borrowers. With apologies to my readers, I now accept that 4.75% was charged on the first tranche of $5Bn which was lent in 2009, so my prior claim needs to be withdrawn – see comments below. Yes, interest was charged on the bailout monies but at such a paltry rate as to leave my fundamental point undisturbed, as explained below.

The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is a metric used to show what is the average cost of the capital raised by a company. It is a vital tool in strategic management and allows the company’s leaders to make effective borrowing decisions. For example, a company which had borrowed half of its capital at 10% and the other half at 14%, would have a WACC of 12%.

If we apply this approach to the CL Financial bailout the answer is instructive. So, we can assume that the total advanced is $25Bn – there are many estimates floating out there, but $25Bn is recurs quite frequently – with only 4.75% being charged on the first $5Bn and no interest on any more of the Public Money advanced to CLF. According to my calculations, given that only 20% of the CLF bailout pays interest at 4.75% and the other 80% is at zero-percent, the WACC is .95%, less than 1% is the interest due from the CL Financial chiefs for this epic loan. I tell you. It really looks like those insurance and investment gurus had it right, eh…party political investment is really the best insurance policy.

Having said that, the two questions arising are still of high importance –

  1. firstly, why was no interest charged on the rest of the Public Money advanced?
  2. Secondly, why was the low rate of 4.75% charged on that first tranche?

That rate is significantly less than the mortgage rate at that time, so how and why did a distressed borrower qualify for that kind of favour?

Lawrence Duprey. Photo courtesy the T&T Review

The return of Lawrence Duprey was the Sunday Express lead story on 15th January 2017 – ‘Rebirth of Duprey‘. This is one of those times when one is really sorry that an original suspicion was true.

We seem to be striding straight toward a precipice with no clear information at all about why, or how. The largest-ever special interest deal now seems set to return CL Financial to Lawrence Duprey and his cohort, which will be hugely detrimental to the public interest.

These bailout conditions in no way resemble the Wall St examples, despite the comical claims of its defenders that it was the same thing. There are three important differences –

  1. the CL shareholders kept their shares;
  2. the massive loan of over $20 Billion to the Caribbean’s wealthiest individual was made at a zero interest rate, that’s right, zero;
  3. the CL Financial chiefs were never required to give a public explanation of what caused this massive collapse.

Those terms were agreed by the Cabinet in January 2009. It is a real ‘sweetheart deal’ to assist Mr Duprey and his cohorts to a soft recovery so they could get back control of the companies when things improved. We are now reaping what our rulers sowed, hence the title of this article. Continue reading “CL Financial bailout – Bitter Brew”

Open letter to Central Bank Governor on CL Financial bailout

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Central Bank Governor, Dr Alvin Hilaire

30th January is the anniversary of the infamous 2009 CL Financial bailout, so I collaborated on this open letter to the Central Bank Governor, Dr Alvin Hilaire, to raise some urgent and important questions on the Central Bank’s management of this situation.

Our letter was sent on 31st January 2017 and was signed by David Walker, Disclosure Today and I.

Please read this and spread the word…

Remember that –

Silence is the Enemy of Progress!

Board Games again

boardgames2
Illustration © 2017 David Cave

SIDEBAR: The EFCL issue

The Board of EFCL was reported to have dismissed its CEO after he failed/refused to comply with their directions in a certain matter. There are allegations reported that the Cabinet attempted to direct the EFCL Board, which raises the perennial issue of the nature and extent of Cabinet authority over State Enterprises.

From both the Companies Act and the recent High Court/Appeal Court rulings in the eTECK matter, it seems clear to me that the Board of Directors have fundamental responsibility for the direction and control of the company. That is the legal position, but it seems that our fundamental political culture and conduct is in real conflict with notions of independent professional responsibility.

The State Enterprise sector is once again the subject of public concern on the good governance issues of accountability and transparency. Where does the power lie?

The two most striking issues emerging recently are the declaration of new accountability targets for State Enterprises and that the ‘EFCL Board fires CEO‘, reportedly in defiance of Cabinet directions.

The Accountability and Transparency Deficit is the first issue and it needs to be put into a timeline to illustrate the reality. Continue reading “Board Games again”