Tag: Trinidad

Preparing for the worst – Some implications of a major earthquake on Trinidad & Tobago

Earthquake damage in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Photo courtesy BBC.
Earthquake damage in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Photo courtesy BBC.

We have all looked on in horror at the scenes of destruction and human suffering, experienced by our Caribbean neighbours in Haiti as a result of the strong earthquake on 12th January. Coming after the horror and attempts to assist, my mind shifted to the possibility of such a disaster in our country. That prompted me to attend the seminar organized by the Association of Professional Engineers of T&T (APETT) and the T&T Contractors’ Association (TTCA) at Crowne Plaza on Wednesday 3rd February. The seminar was excellent and such was the content that this week I am setting aside the other important matters with which I have been dealing.

The Structural situation

We heard several presentations from engineers and the President of the TTCA which set out the structural situation. Some of the main points emerging there were that we are at significant risk because –

  • “An approved national building code does not exist at this time, designers use building codes with which they are familiar,” Darryl Thomson, a standards officer at the Trinidad and Tobago Bureau of Standards (TTBS), said during his presentation.
  • “I would think generally we are not (prepared) and we need to seriously look at what we are doing and change the way we do business where the built environment is concerned,” President of TTCA, Mikey Joseph said.
  • Past-President of APETT, Mark Francois, told us of estimated multi-billion dollar damage to buildings if a natural disaster were to hit our main cities. “Potential building economic loss … in Port of Spain was of the order of US$5 billion and in San Fernando US$6 billion” Francois said. Francois went on to make 3 other important points – firstly, as a former British colony, our professionals had used British Standards up until the late 1960s, with the risk to us being that, since the British Isles are not prone, those standards did not take account of earthquakes. As a result, he stated that major parts of our civil infrastructure, upon which we would rely in a disaster, were not designed or built to withstand earthquakes. His example of the POS General Hospital being one such structure was sobering. Secondly, he stated that building plans are being certified by engineers who do not posses the necessary qualifications in structural work and that he had done assignments to re-design some of those ‘certified’ plans. Thirdly, he dealt with the well-known practice of engaging personnel employed with the regulatory authorities to draw plans for buildings and obtain permission. This begs the question as to how could a public employee on such a ‘PJ’ fail to pass their own plans.

These quotes were drawn from the Trinidad Express story on Friday 5th February – http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=161591595 .

The Seismic situation

The speaker on this aspect was Dr. Walter Salazar, Senior Research Fellow at the Seismic Research unit at UWI. The three main points from his presentation were firstly, that our country is indeed at similar risk as Haiti in terms of a strong earthquake. Secondly, the most likely areas for the strongest earthquakes are Tobago and the north-west peninsula of Trinidad, particularly Chaguaramus. Thirdly, we are now overdue for that strong earthquake.

The disaster-preparedness situation

The head of our Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management (ODPM), Col. George Robinson has confirmed, in light of natural public concerns, that our systems are in place to deal with such an earthquake. Knowing the individual, there is little doubt in my mind that the necessary diligence has been applied to developing solid systems.

What is the likely financial impact?

My concerns as to our level of earthquake-preparedness are rooted elsewhere and that is at the level of the ‘financial safety-net’ upon which we would rely in the event of such a disaster. Our low national savings rates have long been a concern of economists/financial experts. We do not save enough money, in the view of these experts, to propel our country’s journey to the next level of national development. My concern is the implied question of how we would cope with a destructive earthquake.

Add to that the fact that only a small fraction of our buildings are properly insured and a worrying element to the disaster-preparedness picture starts to emerge.

Aside from the structural concerns and seismic risks as outlined above, there is a question as to the nature and extent of our financial safety-net. Where will we find the money to rebuild? Our lending institutions need effective systems to ensure that the properties they hold as security are properly insured.

Such an earthquake would also damage our infrastructure – roads, water and electrical distribution systems, drains and so on.

As a consequence, even if your own property is undamaged or properly-insured, you could also suffer from the wider damage. If your entire neighbourhood is severely-damaged, apart from the issue of loss of life and physical injury, there would be a negative effect on the value of your property.

This issue affects everyone.

Some suggestions

I am suggesting that this is an issue which needs our urgent attention and that the private sector can take the lead. The Association of Trinidad & Tobago Insurance Companies (ATTIC) and the Bankers’ Association of Trinidad & Tobago (BATT) can take a leadership position here. One way forward could be for the insurance and banking sectors to agree, in their self-interest, a minimum code for design and construction with APETT and the TTCA. That would be one way to set a benchmark in terms of proper standards for all financed or insured construction going forward.

In terms of existing privately-owned building owners, the Central Bank should consider adding a component on the importance of proper insurance to their National Financial Literacy Programme.

The other urgent requirement is the retro-fitting of our major public buildings to meet the challenge of these overdue earthquakes.

Thank you to APETT and the TTCA for organising this important intervention.

VIDEO: First Up Simulcast Interview – 21 January 2010

VIDEO: First Up Simulcast Interview – 21 January 2010

Fazeer Mohammed and Jessie May Ventour interview Afra Raymond on the simulcast of First Up on Talk City 91.9 FM radio and C Television on the topic, “What’s the Deal with CL Financial” touching on the continued silence of the professional class, politicians and labour unions on the ongoing debacle of the CL Financial bailout. Video courtesy Caribbean New Media Group Limited.

  • Programme Date: Thursday, 21 January 2010
  • Programme Length: 0:37:53

End-notes on the Uff Commission

The Uff Commission ended its hearings last week, amidst even more ‘amazing scenes’.

There are so many examples to draw on, but here are a few choices –

  • Dr. Keith Rowley, MP. Photo courtesy the Trinidad Guardian
    Dr. Keith Rowley, MP

    Cleaver Heights missing money – The entire reason this HDC project was included on the Uff Commission’s agenda is PM Manning’s $10M question to his former Housing Minister, Dr. Keith Rowley ‘Where the money gone?’ After months of evasion, the purging of an HDC Board, the resignation of the HDC’s CEO and the rustication of the UK-based expert, Gerry McCaffrey, the truth is out.  No money missing. Simple so. Given the denials by Noel Garcia, the then-CEO of the HDC, and his principal assistants, the question remains who informed the PM of that missing money. I do not expect our PM to either apologise to or re-appoint Dr. Rowley.

  • Cleaver Heights contract type – Another point which emerged recently is that Cleaver Heights started off as a Design, Finance and Construct and became a modified Design/Build contract without a financing component, seemingly without a corresponding adjustment in the contract sum.  If that is the case, it would be grounds for serious concern.
  • Carl Khan – The ‘surprise witness’, Carl Khan was unchallenged by either Calder Hart’s or UDeCOTT’s attorneys.  They adopted the ambiguous course of trying to cast doubt on that testimony, but yet declining to cross-examine Mr. Khan.  It seems that these attorneys are so ‘bright’, they want to have their dinner ‘both boiled and fried’.  We not so easy to destabilise.  We too have eyes.
  • The new creature – Lastly, it is interesting to consider the new creature all of this has laid bare.  There is now a species of Super State Enterprise, who seem to enjoy an exemption from the rules, norms and guidelines which would apply.  A State Enterprise which can mount a legal challenge to a Cabinet decision and the President of the Republic.  Imagine that.

More questions than answers – The open process adopted by this Enquiry was refreshing, so much so that it has yielded a real ‘windfall’ in terms of public awareness.  Even the least-interested or most-loyal citizens are now aware that something huge is wrong here.  We now see that our PM dismissed a Cabinet Minister on grounds which have all proven baseless, yet continues to publicly defend one of his key lieutenants, whose behaviour is now revealed to be questionable.  That outcome would have been entirely unthinkable to the government at the outset of this bizarre year.  It is a prime example of the Law of Unintended Consequences.

‘Who is Calder Hart?’

Calder Hart. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
Calder Hart

Calder Hart is Executive Chairman of UDeCOTT, Chairman of the Home Mortgage Bank, Trinidad & Tobago Mortgage Finance, the National Insurance Board (NIB) and the National Insurance Property Development Company (NIPDEC).  He obviously enjoys the highest level of trust from the government.  So consider this extract from Calder Hart’s cross-examination, under oath, at the Enquiry on Wednesday 28th January 2009.  Hart is being questioned by Gilbert Peterson SC, attorney for Dr. Keith Rowley –

Continued Cross-Examination By Mr. Peterson:
Q.      Mr. Hart, I am examining your CV.  I see that you attended St. Francis Xavier University.  What degree did you obtain from that University?
A.       Bachelor of Arts in Economics.
Q.      Bachelor of Arts in Economics.  And I also see that you attended a course at MIT?
A.       That’s correct.
Q.      What was the scope of that course?
A.       Well, I think it’s down there as Urban Economics and Public Policy.
Q.      What was the duration of that course?
A.       I think it was either two or three weeks.
Q.      And the one at Alberta?
A.       The University of Alberta I gained managing human resources; the same amount of time, two or three weeks.
Q.      You would not describe yourself as a financial expert, would you?
A.       No, I would not describe myself as a financial expert.  But I would describe myself as a person with a body of experience.
Q.      Yes.  But your lawyers misdescribed you in these proceedings as a financial expert.  You would not agree with that description?
A.       I would not describe myself as an expert of anything.

That cross-examination can be found at page 53 of that day’s transcript – http://www.constructionenquiry.gov.tt/getattachment/6f957486-f0f4-4aad-b585-d644f3212806/COE-Construction-Industry-20090128-Merged-doc.aspx.

‘UDeCOTT’s accounts’

We have repeatedly been told that UDeCOTT is an exemplary and highly-efficient State Enterprise.  In light of those assertions, coming from the PM and his colleagues, we are entitled to be concerned as to their lack of financial transparency.  On 28th January 2009, Calder Hart was cross-examined, also under oath, by Alvin Fitzpatrick SC, attorney for the JCC.  Consider his testimony on the specific issue of UDeCOTT’s audited accounts –

Continued Cross-Examination By Mr. Fitzpatrick

Q.      Now, rather than go through all of them, would you accept that in respect of the audited accounts for the periods which are due at 31st December of each year and the all the accounts from 2003 to 2006 were signed off by your external auditors prior to the end of March of the following year?
A.       That’s correct.
Q.      That’s correct.  And your external auditors are Price Waterhouse?
A.       Yes.
Q.      Now, I notice that there are no audited accounts for the period ending December 2007?
A.       That’s correct.
Q.      Now, that is close to two years ago they are overdue.  Is that so?
A.       Just one year.
Q.      Just one year.
A.       Not quite a year.  Normally they would have been due in March.
Q.      They would have been due in March and they are now overdue?
A.       Yes.
Q.      Now, the period 2007 would have included a number of costs related to the Brian Lara Cricket Academy?
A.       Yes.
Q.      Would you agree that external auditors will not sign off on statements where they are not satisfied with the records or they have some concerns about the records?
A.       No, that’s not my understanding at all.  My understanding is that there were issues surrounding the notes to the accounts in terms of some of the areas where they wanted to change some of the interpretation of what we had been doing.  So there was a long discussion.  I think some of the problems had to do with getting all of the information reconfigured.  So my understanding is that probably before the end of next week we shall have our 2007 accounts.
Q.      I will be very glad to hear that.  So what you are saying is that the accounts have not been signed off by your external auditors, because they did not agree with the existing configuration of some of the figures?
A        Well no, I mean, you have to understand that PWC have been doing our accounts from day one.  But I think that what they wanted to do was to deal with some of the notes as well as the manner in which the structure of our operations—I think what has happened is that as we have moved to expand our financing in the international markets.  My understanding is that they are obviously ensuring that international standards are followed and in looking at them they want to restate some of the elements in it.
And my understanding is that has all been agreed between the accountants.  There were some issues surrounding some of the information and that sort of thing which they have now been satisfied with.  And we are expecting it obviously within the next couple weeks.
Q.      Let me see if I can summarize that.  It was quite a mouthful.  PWC have not signed off because there were some unresolved issues which have now been resolved?
A.       As I understand it, yes.
Q.      And, of course, PWC will not sign off on any financial statements unless they are satisfied that all the issues remain unresolved (sic)?
A.       Mr. Fitzpatrick, let me assure you, there is no flight of fantasy eh.
Q.      Thank you.  Well, I assume before we resume on the next occasion we will have those audited accounts?
A.       Yes.

This part can be found at pages 37 to 39 of the same day’s transcript.

No accounts yet for 2007, none for 2008 and we are near to the end of 2009.  If this is exemplary performance, what next?

Afra Raymond is Managing Director of Raymond & Pierre Limited and President of the Institute of Surveyors of Trinidad & Tobago.  Comments can be sent to afra@raymondandpierre.com.

The Uff Commission – The Final sitting

John Uff. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
John Uff
The controversial Uff Commission is to start the final round of its hearings tomorrow. Please click here for the timetable. This Commission of Enquiry was established to examine and report on the Public Sector Construction Industry, with particular reference to UDeCOTT and the HDC’s Cleaver Heights housing project in Arima.

The huge sums of money involved and the egos of the parties all combined with irregular practices in this matter. The combination produced an unflattering and unforgettable picture of our nation’s leading players under the bright lights of the Uff Commission.

The legal challenge against and resulting resignation of Israel Khan as a Commissioner was just one outcome of the bold stance taken by the UDECOTT Board in this matter. The continuing legal challenges mounted by UDeCOTT against the Uff Commission have greatly diluted the credibility of this government, even in the eyes of its most loyal followers.

The failure to gazette the Enquiry was yet another strange aspect of the matter and, although that lapse has now been rectified, we are yet to hear a cogent explanation as to who was responsible and what was the reason for the failure. On this count alone, we are nurturing irresponsible behaviour by allowing this to pass quietly.

The Commission of Enquiry can only make findings based on the evidence which is properly submitted to it and that is where my concern is rooted. We are down to the final few days of hearings and it is my view that the proposed agenda for the final week of hearing is deficient since it leaves some seminal issues outstanding.

These are key points which could be addressed, even at this late stage, by the Commission issuing the necessary legal notices to have these items placed in evidence.

In order of importance, the outstanding issues are:

  1. UDeCOTT’s missing accounts – The main subject of the enquiry is the operation of UDeCOTT and we have not had their audited accounts for 2007 or 2008. The Performance Monitoring Guidelines for State Enterprises, published by the Investment Division of the Ministry of Finance, requires that these should have been published by now. UDeCOTT’s Executive Chairman, Calder Hart, while testifying to the Commission under oath on 28th January, stated that all the outstanding issues with the audit had been resolved and that those accounts would be published in “…a week or two…”. That testimony can be accessed from the CoE website at http://www.constructionenquiry.gov.tt/getattachment/6f957486-f0f4-4aad-b585-d644f3212806/COE-Construction-Industry-20090128-Merged-doc.aspx on page 43. For any Enquiry into the operation of UDeCOTT to make sound findings, those accounts need to be published now. At the least, UDeCOTT should write to explain the breach of the guidelines issued by its shareholder and the undertaking, given under oath by its high-performing Executive Chairman. Again, I ask, “Is UDeCOTT insolvent?”
  2. Bob Lindquist’s missing report – The original concern on the Cleaver Heights housing project arose when the Prime Minister raised concerns as to ‘Where the Money gone?’ and much was made of $10M or $20M which was said to be missing. The PM used the Budget debate in Parliament last year to ask the question of the former Minister of Housing – Dr. Keith Rowley. We were told that the Housing Development Corporation had appointed the respected forensic accountant, Bob Lindquist, to probe the project in question. The Minister of Planning, Housing and the Environment was reported to be silent on details when questioned on the results of that probe by reporters. [See – ‘Not me and the bacchanal’ published in Newsday on August 29th 2009 – http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,106338.html That is simply not good enough and the Commission needs to get Mr. Lindquist’s findings into evidence. We cannot have a satisfactory Enquiry if the government is able to control the flow of evidence.
  3. Housing Development Corporation’s output deficit – The Uff Commission’s terms of reference include ‘project delivery’ and the HDC has failed to account for this chronic deficit in satisfying its prime objective – Housing Development. The entire time spent by this Enquiry on housing has been only in respect of the Cleaver Heights project, but the HDC has never produced more than 50% of its target output in terms of the numbers of new homes built each year. The question remains as to whether the HDC is aware of the reasons for this continuing shortfall. This is a flagship state policy and the shortfall in numbers of new homes produced is itself deserving of proper attention from this Enquiry and the responsible State Enterprise. I submitted a series of written questions on this to the Enquiry and one would hope that some written response is forthcoming from the HDC or the Ministry.

The remaining Commissioners can take steps to preserve their reputations and have the key elements of outstanding information put into evidence. We await with interest.

Afra Raymond is Managing Director of Raymond & Pierre Limited and President of the Institute of Surveyors of Trinidad & Tobago. Comments can be sent to afra@raymondandpierre.com.

Freedom of Information request for MOU between CLF and the State

FOI ApplicationThis is my application, under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, for publication of the second MoU between CL Financial and the State.  At CMMB’s Budget Breakfast on 10th September, I asked the Minister of Finance when this would be published and she replied that there was no intention to publish it.  I followed up with an email to her on 19th September.  That email was the subject of a telephone call from one of the Minister’s staff to advise that a written reply was being finalised for me in the next few days.  Having had no reply, or any explanation of the delay, I published the Open letter to the Minister of Finance on 5th October in the Trinidad & Tobago Review.  This application is made in the belief that the public deserve to know the details of this arrangement.  The bailout is supposedly being conducted for our benefit and indisputably at our expense, yet there is now an open position that its details are to deemed ‘confidential’.  We, the taxpaying public, need to know who exactly are the beneficiaries of the bailout and what are the terms on which those benefits are being obtained.  Anything less than full and immediate publication is a recipe for utter confusion and corruption.

Nothing but the truth

Basdeo Panday
Basdeo Panday, MP

The Leader of the Opposition, Basdeo Panday, recently laid a motion in Parliament seeking for HCU depositors to be granted a ‘bailout’ of the kind given to those who had invested with the failed CL Financial group. On Friday 30th October, the Minister of Finance made a major statement to Parliament, seeking to defend the government’s actions in the cases of these two failed Financial Institutions.

In terms of race, politics and finance, that statement by the Minister deserves our most sober consideration.

Before going further I need to make two things clear – firstly, I am not intervening on behalf of Mr. Harry Harnarine or the HCU. I am not a supporter of that cause. Not at all. Secondly, I do not support the bailout of either group – CL Financial or HCU. The idea that State resources should be deployed to assist investors who have lost money is a dangerous one. As a matter of principle, the concept of moral hazard has real weight in economic behaviour. The idea that investors should be rescued without paying the consequences of their choices is inimical to proper development. That general principle has been done violence by the CL Financial bailout.

As I have stated in my previous articles on this bailout, the record of the government in terms of separating the interests of depositors, policy-holders and shareholders is turbid.

The Minister’s rationale was set out in two limbs – the first being that the HCU dealings were not straightforward – indeed, one newspaper carried the headline ‘Devious HCU’– and secondly, that the CL Financial dealings were marked by “…tangible co-operation…”. This bailout is an extremely serious act being carried out by the government in breach of fundamental principle and we deserve nothing but the truth.

There are deep contradictions on every single point cited by the Minister to support the actions taken.

Here is what the Minister is reported to have said, together with the contradictions –

  1. Ample collateral – The Minister is reported to have said that HCU failed to offer ample collateral to the State. The Central Bank Governor is reported to have said, on 7th April, that all of CL Financial’s assets were otherwise committed – This was reported at http://guardian.co.tt/business/business/2009/04/08/govt-left-empty-handed-cl-financial-bailout.
  2. The Ernst & Young report – The Minister is also quoted as saying that “The auditors’ assessment was that the Hindu Credit Union was facing not a liquidity problem, but a solvency problem and all its assets were overestimated in value and encumbered.” As a rationale for the government’s actions, that is completely at odds with the 7th April statement of the Central Bank Governor. In fact we were told that the CL Financial group and various of its parts were being examined by Ernst & Young, KPMG and Bob Lindquist, the renowned forensic accountants. To date, no results of those accountants’ work have been released. We are being told that the CL Financial chiefs showed “…tangible co-operation…” in their dealings, so where are the audits? Why has the 2008 audit of the CL Financial group by PriceWaterhouseCoopers not been published?
  3. “…What is the Government to do? You dealing with…the major players, and they are not levelling with you…” That was the Minister’s statement about HCU, made in apparent exasperation. As I wrote in my column ‘Who is Who and What is What’ published here on 30th April – “At the beginning of this process we were led to believe that CL Financial was being pro-active and cooperative in their dealings with the State. Indeed the Governor even made this point directly in his prepared remarks at the 30th January press conference “…I would like to acknowledge the high level of cooperation that we have received from Mr. Duprey…” Since then CLF has now been exposed as paying dividends after requesting the State bailout, challenging the injunction obtained by the State over their assets with a powerful legal team and, to top it all, pledging the same assets twice. The Governor spoke on 23rd April – ‘If you ask me whether CL Financial did everything that was honourable and beyond reproach, the answer is no! The answer is no!’”

Obviously, some one of the major players is not levelling with us.

SIDEBAR

So the government bails out policyholders and depositors of the CL Financial group. That is widely welcomed, except for a few objectors, like myself. It seems to me that the interests of the CL Financial shareholders have been promoted in preference to those of the taxpayer. I am subject to correction, but if that is so, it would be a monumental mis-allocation of public funds and a seriously questionable act. The terms of the bailout are now being deliberately concealed from public view, although it is at our expense and supposedly being carried out for the benefit of the public.

That secrecy is toxic to notions of transparency, accountability and modernity. I will return to that secrecy issue.

Suffice to say that the terms of the bailout, the subsequent revelations and the concealment of the second MoU have combined with the Minister’s contradictory statement to yield a very unhealthy series of precedents.

The unspoken question at this moment is ‘Who is next?’. Last week’s BG View editorial highlighted some pertinent concerns as to the health of private pension plans and the strength of the regulatory process.

No one knows if CL Financial is just the first in a chain-reaction or simply a ‘one-off’. The burning question is, if there is another collapse of a large investment house – ‘Will they also be bailed-out?’ and, if yes, ‘On what terms?’

Duprey’s Fate

The Business Guardian editorial of 15th October raised the topical question as to ‘Will Lee Chin avoid Duprey’s fate?‘  http://guardian.co.tt/business/business-guardian/2009/10/15/will-lee-chin-avoid-duprey-s-fate

Michael Lee Chin. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
Michael Lee Chin
Of course, one interesting feature of this entire affair is the fact that these two groups were headed by Black Caribbean men.  That is exceptional, as a matter of fact and it required a serious break from our past to develop the required levels of investor confidence.

But the differences are even more interesting than the similarities – for example, it seems that AIC Finance has declared the true position and alerted its stakeholders properly as to its exit strategy.

The characterisation of this situation as being ‘Duprey’s fate’ made me smile.  Quite frankly, that phrase seemed to be a device to create some public sympathy for Duprey when the facts are of another type altogether.

If the terms of the CL Financial bailout are examined, they are truly remarkable, even by our declining national standards.  The principal terms are –

  1. Amount – The amount of public money to be advanced is unspecified. Despite various official statements, this did not form part of the first MoU.  The press release on the second MoU of 12th June 2009 was also silent as to the amount of money to be advanced in this CL Financial bailout.
  2. Collateral – The original MoU specified that certain assets were to be disposed of to repay the funds advanced from the Treasury.  That position was soon overtaken by reality when the Central Bank Governor announced on 7th April that all of CL Financial’s assets were already pledged – http://guardian.co.tt/business/business/2009/04/08/govt-left-empty-handed-cl-financial-bailout. The second MoU and recent statements by Mariano Browne, Minister in the Ministry of Finance, make it clear that no fire sale of assets will be undertaken.  To quote the Minister, speaking on 15th October – “One needs to be judicious in terms of the managing of the assets at CL Financial Group, given the depressed state of the market both here and internationally. There is certainly no intentions (sic) of selling the assets. The position is to manage them and manage them well” http://guardian.co.tt/business/business/2009/10/16/browne-no-plans-govt-increase-shares-rbl.  If we are to believe the Central Bank Governor and the Minister, there being no good reason to doubt either one, it seems that these advances are taking place without security.
  3. Interest rate – The first MoU and the press release on the second MoU are both silent as to the interest rate charged.
  4. Payback period – There is no stated period for repayment of the public funds advanced.  There have been recent announcements as to the government taking over management of the CL Financial group for 3 years.
  5. What fate? – Having arranged an urgent package of rescue financing on those terms, it seems that the shareholders of CL Financial have not had their equity position diluted and further, that Mr. Duprey has been allowed to keep all his personal assets. That is Duprey’s fate.

That summary is the best I can give, based on the limited information available to me.  If it is an accurate one, the CL Financial bailout is tantamount to a huge injection of public funds to bolster the private interests of only 325 shareholders, the main one being Lawrence Duprey.

That is a real shame, given the state of our nation’s finances.   The greater pity is that this is all taking place without proper public accountability or transparency.  So far the Minister of Finance has not replied to my various attempts to get further information on these matters.  But how much blame can we place on our rulers?

Our society is shaped by our collective aspirations, attitudes and actions.  But the notion of collective values is an increasingly doubtful one in this arena.  Insofar as the national economy is concerned, do we actually possess collective values and if so, who can say with certainty what those are?  More and more, it seems that the real question is ‘Whose values will prevail as we go forward’?  The progressive people in the society have a duty to make their voices heard, if we are to have a chance of influencing others.  If we influence others to improve standards, then that is a positive move towards the inescapable future.

This CL Financial fiasco has been marked by the silence of the responsible people in the society.  The nation seems to have been so heavily invested in the CL Financial group that the bailout was greeted with widespread relief.  So much relief, that we seem to have taken our critical eyes ‘off the ball’.  On 19th October I wrote an Open letter to the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Trinidad & Tobago (ICATT) to seek their involvement in calling for greater transparency and accountability in this entire bailout.  That letter can be found at www.afraraymond.com.  The week 19th to 23rd October was Accountants’ Week.  The President of the ICATT, Anthony Pierre, writing to open that Week, stated that ‘We have the opportunity to raise the bar on new standards in corporate governance, accounting, auditing and ethics” and “We do so mindful of our continued responsibility to contribute to the further development of our people, our institutions and our country”.

I also intend to seek the involvement of other civic society organizations in promoting the calls for greater transparency and accountability in this entire bailout process.

Afra Raymond

This series on the CL Financial bailout can be viewed or readers’ comments made at www.afraraymond.com.

Property Matters – Property Taxes 2010

I have included my new series of articles on the proposed property tax here on my website. You can access the articles on it page by clicking the “Property Matters” stub above or by clicking the Title links to retrieve article.

Title Abstract
#1 – An overview The recent proposals for a revision of property taxes have met with a heavy round of criticism. Apart from the government, there have been few supporters for this new tax.

#2 – The Challenge for the TTRA The challenge for the newly-founded Trinidad & Tobago Revenue Authority (TTRA) is considerable, given the depth of criticism against the proposed review of property taxes.

#3 – The proposed 2010 Review This week the actual proposals of the Ministry of Finance are examined. The proposed review is formally set out in the Property Tax Bill 2009, which is to be tabled for debate.

#4 – The Central role of Local Government reform This week I am drawing some conclusions on the property tax proposals, together with a presentation of the corrected data.

Continue reading “Property Matters – Property Taxes 2010” →

Open letter to the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Trinidad & Tobago

Anthony Pierre
Anthony Pierre, president of ICATT

From: Afra Raymond <afra@tstt.net.tt>
Date: Sun, Oct 18, 2009 at 4:19 PM
Subject: ICATT and the CL Financial bailout
To:  Anthony Pierre, President

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to you, as President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Trinidad & Tobago, to urge your involvement in the calls for greater transparency and accountability in the bailout process involving the CL Financial group.

Anthony, on the many occasions on which we have interfaced, I developed considerable respect for your integrity and sense of purpose.  Most recently, I took note of your critical intervention on the proposed new regulatory regime for the credit union movement.

I am of the view that we citizens and civil society organisations, such as ICATT, need to be active in promoting higher standards of professional and public conduct.  I know that those are values within which we can find common ground, because in so many respects we can do better.  Yes, we can.

As you know, I have been publishing a critical review of the CL Financial bailout in the pages of the Business Guardian and that now forms the core of my blog at www.afraraymond.com.  The collapse of the CL Financial group is certainly the largest financial crisis to beset our nation and the first MoU of 30th January 2009 was widely welcomed as offering relief to depositors and policyholders.  I expressed doubts on the grounds that we seemed to be ignoring moral hazard.

The second MoU, signed on 12th June 2009, has now apparently been deemed ‘confidential’.  That designation is inimical to vital concepts such as transparency and good governance, both of which form important themes of ICATT’s work generally and in this Accountants’ Week in particular.

I appreciate that your time is very limited, so there are only two articles to which I would invite your attention, both available on my website – ‘Finding the Assets‘ (published on 23rd August) and ‘Open letter to the Minister of Finance‘ (published on 5th October and also in that issue of the Trinidad & Tobago Review).  For ease of reference, I have attached copies of these articles.

My specific questions to the Minister of Finance, on which I am here lobbying for ICATT’s support and involvement are:

  1. CL Financial 2008 Audited Accounts – When are these to be published? What is the reason for the delay in doing so?
  2. The second MoU with CL Financial – The first MoU was published on the Ministry of Finance website on 9th April, 9 weeks after it was signed.  Using even that slow timetable, the new MoU is overdue for publication.  Some 18 weeks have now elapsed.  What is the reason for its omission from the Ministry’s website?  The second MoU creates new and onerous commitments for the country and its publication must no longer be delayed.  I emailed the Minister of Finance on 19th September to request clarification on this, but there has been no reply.
  3. Forensic Audits – We have seen various official reports of forensic audits being carried out at CL Financial and some of its subsidiaries.  Have these been completed?
  4. The interest rate – What is the interest rate being charged to CL Financial for this open-ended financial assistance?
  5. Status Reports – We have had no interim reports as to the disbursement of State funds or the disposal of CL Financial Assets.  When does the Ministry of Finance intend to start providing regular reports on the progress of the bailout to the public?
  6. The equity position – How is the equity position of the shareholders being adjusted in this deal?  Has their shareholding been diluted to reflect the position?  Has the State now taken an equity position in the group?  If not, what is the upside for the State in all this?

For the avoidance of doubt, given the recent confusion amongst our learned friends, please note that this is being published to my website.

Afra Raymond

Open letter to the Minister of Finance on The CL Financial bailout

Honourable Minister,

This government agreed a bailout of the CL Financial group and announced that on 30th January 2009.

It was an historic step and the stated reasons for so doing were to ensure the stability of the national/regional financial system.  The size of the CL Financial group at some $100Bn, as well as the sheer reach of its activities, were cited as part of the rationale for the bailout.  The interests of depositors and policyholders were to be safeguarded by this State intervention.

Since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on 30th January 2009, several serious concerns have come to light and those have been highlighted in the press.

This letter is intended to form part of the formal record in this matter.  Its principal concern is the actual size of the bailout commitment.  According to your statement to Parliament on Wednesday 4th February 2009, the Executive Chairman of CL Financial estimated its assets as being worth $23.914Bn.  That statement is taken from page 628 of Hansard and can be accessed at http://www.ttparliament.org/hansards/hh20090204.pdf.  Mr. Duprey’s estimate was stated by you to form part of his letter of 13th January, as Executive Chairman of CL Financial, to the Governor of the Central Bank.

What possible justification could there be for repeatedly stating that the CL Financial group had about $100Bn of assets, if Mr. Duprey estimated the figure to be $23.914Bn?

There are 3 possibilities here –

  1. Firstly, PWC’s Consolidated Balance sheet for the CL Financial group is accurate in disclosing an Asset Value of $100.666Bn.  CL Financial’s Consolidated Balance Sheet is at page 23 of their Annual Report 2007 ‘The Next Wave of Growth’ – http://www.clico.com/pdf/AR07/CL%20Financial%20Annual%20Report%202009.pdf.  Those audited accounts, as at 31st December 2007, were published on 18th November 2008.
  2. Secondly, CL Financial’s letter of 13th January 2009 to the Governor of the Central Bank, signed by its Executive Chairman, Lawrence Duprey, is accurate in disclosing an asset value of $23.914Bn.
  3. Thirdly, if we accept that the first and second statements are both correct, we would have to somehow account for the dramatic decline in the CL Financial Asset values.

In his prepared address to the 30th January press conference to announce the CL Financial bailout, the Central Bank Governor was clear in his appreciation of Mr. Duprey’s stance in the matter “..I would like to acknowledge the high level of cooperation that we have received from Mr. Duprey in our efforts to address what must be a very difficult period for the CL Financial Group.”  It is reasonable to assume that the high level of cooperation referred to by the Governor would have been accompanied by levels of frankness, good faith and full disclosure.  It is therefore all the more puzzling when one considers the Governor’s statement, made in that very address –

“…For the record, ladies and gentlemen, the CL Financial Group has an imposing presence with potentially systemic consequences for the financial sector and the economy of Trinidad and Tobago and the entire region.

For example,

  1. The Group controls over ($100) billion of assets in at least 28 companies located throughout the Region and the world.
  2. The Group’s financial interests cover several industry sectors including banking and financial services, energy, real estate and manufacturing and distribution. The four largest financial institutions in the Group manage assets of over $38 billion, over 25 per cent of the country’s GDP.”

How can one possibly reconcile that official account, made to justify the bailout, with Duprey’s letter, clearly stating that the assets are worth $23.914Bn?

What could have caused such a dramatic decline in CL Financial’s asset values?  The intervening period could either be 12 months and 13 days or 56 days, according to how you count it.  Either way, it is a tremendous decline.  Our Treasury is now committed to restoration of asset values – as per the Angostura Notice to Shareholders of July 2009 – we must understand the reasons for the decline in asset values.

The audited accounts of the CL Financial group for 2008 are now easily overdue and it would be instructive to consider the Balance Sheet as at 31st December 2008.  That would be a mere 13 days before Mr. Duprey wrote to the Central Bank Governor.  Has CL Financial’s audit for 2008 been completed?  If not, why not?  If yes, why the delay in its publication?
This is an aspect of the fiasco which has not been discussed in public, so far.

Your urgent and public response is now needed on these important points –

  1. CL Financial 2008 Audited Accounts – When are these to be published?  What is the reason for the delay in doing so?
  2. The second MoU with CL Financial – The first MoU was published on the Ministry of Finance website on 9th April, 9 weeks after it was signed.  Using even that slow timetable, the new MoU is overdue for publication.  Some 16 weeks have now elapsed.  What is the reason for its omission from the Ministry’s website?  The second MoU creates new and onerous commitments for the country and its publication must no longer be delayed.  I emailed you on 19th September to request your clarification on this, but there has been no reply.
  3. Forensic Audits – We have seen various official reports of forensic audits being carried out at CL Financial and some of its subsidiaries.  Have these been completed?
  4. The interest rate – What is the interest rate being charged to CL Financial for this open-ended financial assistance?
  5. Status Reports – We have had no interim reports as to the disbursement of State funds or the disposal of CL Financial Assets.  When do you intend to start providing regular reports on the progress of the bailout to the public?
  6. The equity position – How is the equity position of the shareholders being adjusted in this deal?  Has their shareholding been diluted to reflect the position?  Has the State now taken an equity position in the group?  If not, what is the upside for the State in all this?

Afra Raymond