Property Matters – Procuring State Housing – Part 2

Some concerns have emerged on the concentration of a large number of land agencies and, of course, the newcomer, LandMarkTT Properties Ltd, into the portfolio of Land and Legal Affairs Minister Saddam Hosein. While it is true that there are now a large number of state agencies under this Minister’s control, I balance that against two perspectives.

Firstly, Trinidad and Tobago has always had severely oversized Cabinets, given our modest size, so as a point of principle, a large number of agencies under one Minister is not in itself offensive to good order. That would really depend, in my view, on the quality of the various Boards and Officials of those agencies.
Secondly, the OPR has a statutory role in ensuring compliance with the Public Procurement & Disposal of Public Property Act, which Minister Hosein expressly affirmed when explaining how these agencies will work together. See Govt clarifies Landmark TT housing model amid criticism – Trinidad Guardian.

According to its own website, LandMarkTT Properties is expressly catering to ‘…the growing demand for high-quality, unsubsidized housing…‘ see Home – LandmarkTT Properties Limited – GovNeTT Digital Experience Platform.

Under the OPR rules, LandMarkTT Properties is required to publish all contracts awarded, but reportedly did not do so for that ‘Allamby’ contract until after the OPR’s formal request. That is the ‘thing’, but what is the ‘meaning of the thing’? Was it that those public officials knew of the legal requirement and just ignored it, or was it that those officials were simply unaware of that requirement? More to the point, which of those alternatives is worse? So why can’t this ‘Allamby’ contract be published now?

Just consider Minister Hosein’s statements to Parliament on Friday 15^th May 2026 that no Public Money is being spent on this ‘Allamby’ project –

“…the State is not required to seek financing for any of these housing projects, as no public funds will be used for the construction of those houses…”

“…The developers will be required to fund the entire construction and infrastructural cost of the projects…”.
(both citations are from pg 7 of that day’s Hansard)

Two questions need to be answered –

Firstly, what is the area and value of the State lands committed to this project?
Secondly,the ‘Allamby’ Contract sum is disclosed as $129,283,650.00 at the Contracts Awarded – LandmarkTT Properties Limited – GovNeTT Digital Experience Platform website. So, if ‘no public funds will be used’ on this project, what does the reported figure of $129.3M refer to?

Moving beyond ‘Allamby’, if we accept the express statements on LandMarkTT Properties along with the disclosed contract sum, these are investments of public resources in a part of the housing market already served by the private sector. That is ‘crowding-out’ of private sector developers, which really only ought to be done if there are strong externalities to justify the action.

To my mind, there does not seem to be any visible difference between the programs of the HDC and LandMarkTT Properties.

The LandMarkTT Properties’ contract, now under OPR review, and the HDC’s intended award of eleven contracts totalling $3.48 Billion to create 3,700 new homes are a continuation of the misguided public housing program under the 2002 National Housing Policy. That Policy finds statutory expression in the HDC Act (No 24 of 2005) at Section 13(1)(a), which mandates HDC to create affordable housing for low and middle income applicants.

Just consider the basic arithmetic, which shows us that those new HDC contracts would produce housing at a contract sum averaging $940,000.

[$3,480,000,000 ÷ 3,700 = $940,540].

Please remember that the land is never included in these announcements, so those sale prices would be in the $1.0M range, which would require monthly mortgage payments in the $7,000 range and a monthly household income in excess of $21,000. The most recent CSO research was the 2011 census, which showed that 70% of our households have a monthly income of less than $9,000. So, what are we really doing?

The issue here is that most of the HDC applicants cannot qualify for a mortgage, simply because they are too poor. At least 95% of those HDC applicants are in that predicament, while getting news of these huge new projects with no provision for any poor families. None for them. Despite the self-serving press statements and the utter abuse of the word ‘affordable’, the entire new program comprises new homes for sale. Not one new home for rent. There is an undeclared ‘cozy consensus’ between our political parties on this important issue, at least insofar as remaining silent on new homes for our neediest citizens.

That undeclared consensus can embolden public officials to make entirely bizarre statements. Just consider Minister Hosein’s reported statement to Parliament (p.6) on Friday, 15 May 2026:

“Under the PPP model, the State shall make lands available to private-sector investors and developers who shall, in turn, construct fully planned housing communities targeted at mid-to-upper income earners. These housing units will be situated in gated communities, with modern design and amenities to cater for the working class.”

So, ‘mid to upper income earners’ are now being openly portrayed as ‘the working class’. Well, I tell you eh.

Going further, there is a pregnant issue when one considers the intersection between these Housing Policy issues and the Public Procurement and the Disposal of Public Property Act (PPDPPA). The established learning is that Public Money is to be managed and accounted for to a higher standard than Private Money. That is fundamental in understanding the importance of high standards of Public Sector Governance. Our Housing Policy and its statutory root require that HDC dedicate itself to creating affordable housing for low- and middle-income applicants. Alongside those obligations in its originating statute, HDC is also required to comply with the PPDPPA and the OPR regulations. The PPDPPA/OPR mandates that every project, before it is advertised, must have satisfied a Needs Assessment, which requires the deep consideration of these questions: What are we doing? and Why are we doing it?.

Interestingly enough, that process is part of the internationally accepted Procurement Cycle used in both the Public and Private sectors.

When one juxtaposes the demonstrated Housing Policy dysfunction with the legal requirement for a Needs Assessment, it is inconceivable that those projects, which do not at all conform to HDC’s legal requirements, could have satisfied any proper Needs Assessment. Of course, it is open to HDC to show us otherwise, after all we are paying for the whole exercise, not so?

Thus far, our reports and debates on these issues have been confined to the usual claims of connected contractors, politically favoured players and allegations of improper behaviour. None of those issues are unimportant and they must be treated with due seriousness, but what is emerging here is the far more serious implications of our entrenched practices. The PPDPPA established ‘Value for Money’ as being fundamental, but if we are to recognise the moment for what it is, what we now need to develop and advance is the notion of ‘Value for Public Money’. We must explicitly behave as if Public Money is more important than Private Money, there is no alternative. We have to advance these concepts to properly defend the Public Interest.

Given that ‘cozy consensus’ between the political parties, we cannot expect these critical issues to be raised by any of those. Issues of this kind ought to attract the attention of our scholars at UWI and UTT, but here we are. Between a rock and a hard place, what a disgrace.

Property Matters – Procuring State Housing – Part 1

*Conclusion of National Land Policy 1992*

This is the first part of my two-part analysis of some fundamental and large-scale issues of the State’s Land and Housing Policies and Programs. This first part deals with the background, while the second part will deal with the unfolding issues on the Trinidad and Tobago Housing Development Corporation (HDC) and LandMarkTT Properties programs. This analysis is based on the relevant policies, laws, official statistics, and published statements.

Showing Trinidad and Tobago A New Way Home

Our country actually has a National Land Policy (1992) and a National Housing Policy (2002), both of which have been effectively erased by successive political administrations. So that is why none of the officials busily commenting on land and housing ever refer to our existing national policies. If one were to try searching official websites for those policies, it would be fruitless, far less to actually request those policies from one of the responsible State Ministries or Agencies. Our public officials make bold public statements, while we are witness to huge public investments in this critical arena, all without regard to the approved national policies. That is the framing for the collective fix that we are in, and this has been the case for over 20 years now, since the official policies became inconvenient.

I will demonstrate how the official land and housing programs have unfolded in an increasingly contrary manner when compared to the objectives of the official policies. Policy Review is a normal procedure to ensure proper alignment between objectives and outcomes. The problem in this instance is that a policy review would have required a full statement of the facts in terms of both spending and performance, together with public consultations. Those practices are serially avoided by successive political administrations, so the solution was to simply ‘erase’ those national policies from view and carry on regardless. This is the detrimental sly erasure which has ensured that those beneficial policies are effectively concealed from the public it is intended to serve. That is the background to the ongoing silence on our National Land and Housing Policies. I have kept those Policies, hence my continuing series of challenges.

The Land for the Landless program, which is handled by the Land Settlement Agency (LSA), needs a significant adjustment to its rules, since although that program was intended for those applicants outside HDC criteria, its monthly income limit is $30,000, while the HDC’s monthly income limit is $25,000. (Click here for Frequently Asked Questions on HDC website). Quite frankly, apart from the re-establishment of an LSA limit which is lower than the HDC limit, both those monthly income limits need to be greatly reduced to reflect reality. We often hear of fact-based decision-making as a desirable approach to complex problems, so the qualification criteria for these State land and housing programs must be reconsidered in light of the most recent CSO research (2011 census) showing that 70% of our households have a monthly income of less than $9,000. That means that the monthly income limits for these programs are far too high if the intention is to address the dire situation of the neediest households.

The actual household income levels in our country are so low that over 95% of the applicants on the HDC’s waiting list cannot ever qualify for a mortgage, simply because they are too poor. We set these unrealistic maximum income levels for applicants, and the result is plain to see. Most applicants cannot afford to buy, and yet we have a state housing program supposedly intended to assist the neediest families, which almost exclusively focuses on homes for sale. The HDC is a Statutory Agency, established by Act No. 24 of 2005. It is a creature of Statute and therefore bound to follow that law. Section 13 (1) (a) of the HDC Act requires it to provide “affordable shelter and associated community facilities for low and middle income persons”. That sequence is no accident; the very HDC Act gives precedence to the low income persons, it’s in the law. The income profile amongst applicants and the text of the originating Act gives priority to HDC building homes for rent in preference to homes for sale. Yes, that is the law, so what is the actual result? My detailed research into the current 2002 Housing Policy shows that HDC has never built more than 21% of its new homes for rent. Those findings are from 2003 to now, so the lack of focus and sheer misallocation of vast sums of Public Money spans several political administrations. In this one thing at least, there is some kind of unusual consensus between supposed political rivals.

*Saddam Hosein, MP, Minister of Land and Legal Affairs*

Public Private Partnership (PPP) approaches to housing provision are now in vogue, but we need to consider the extent to which that model can deliver the decent housing so desperately needed by our poorest citizens. In addition, while we note the Minister of Land and Legal Affairs, Saddam Hosein’s declaration that no State monies are to be spent on these projects, two issues arise. Firstly, there is a long-term and detrimental blind spot in how projects are discussed in our country in that we never, ever mention the value of the lands being dedicated to these projects so that the only figure mentioned is the contract sum for the construction. That needs to change – the State needs to explicitly declare the value of the lands being dedicated to these projects if we are to have a clear picture of the total cost of these developments. Secondly, the PPP agreements I have seen all have provisions that effectively inoculate the private sector party from any losses if there should be a shortfall in the projected sales. In such cases, the State is in fact guaranteeing the return of the private sector by removing those risks, so one is entitled to wonder just what risk the private sector is bearing. If the answer is that the private sector is bearing no risks, that means that we have been pursuing a detrimental PPP model, thus far.

Minister Hosein’s statements that the State has not contracted to make any payments within those arrangements needs to be carefully scrutinised. Firstly, as I stated earlier, we need to include the value of the land in our consideration of these projects, it is not possible to appreciate the full scope of these projects if we continue to omit the land value. That is also ironic given that the ‘Land and Legal Affairs Minister’ is going to be playing a leading role in these arrangements going forward. Secondly, apart from disclosing those previously concealed land costs, we also need to acknowledge that these contracts commonly allow private developers to get paid by the State if the projected commercial outcomes are not met. Quite simply, I do not at all accept the notion that no Public Money is at risk in these projects. It all comes down to the difference between the cash and accrual approaches to accounting and that can be a challenging matter for some people.

Land for Everybody?

My letter to the Editor was published in the Trinidad Express on 3 June 2015 as “Protecting our patrimony.”

The Editor,

The government laid the State Land (Regularisation of Tenure) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill, 2015 in Parliament on Friday 29 May and I am reliably informed that it is due to be approved at today’s sitting (Wednesday 3 June 2015).

Given the continuing absence of the Opposition PNM from our Parliament and the sporadic coverage in the media, it is important that the main points of these new proposals be exposed –

Application date – formerly, persons who had illegally occupied State Lands up to January 1998 were entitled to be regularised – the new law would move that date to June 2014. That means that more persons will be regularised;
The numbers – There are serious questions arising about the numbers to be regularised in this process – the PM said recently that 30,000 were to be given Certificates of Comfort, Minister Seemungal is now saying that it is really 60,000, while the LSA website gives estimates of 250,000 persons. So, just what are we counting? Do these numbers represent inhabitants or is it the number of lots? We have no real clarity on just how much additional land is to to be allocated in this new process.
Where is the land? – The Schedule of the new law is an A to Z list of designated areas in every district of our country, so these are really expansive proposals. All areas will be affected.
The rationale – Minister Seemungal stated that there are extensive aerial surveys and other information being used to guide this process, but I think significant caution is necessary. The lack of an open process of policy review and formation in this important matter is proving very expensive for our collective interests. Have other State agencies and stakeholders been consulted?
Who benefits? – We do not have any open database on the allocation of public housing, state land or even all property. Which means that the real beneficiaries could remain unknown. Of course that is a recipe for the misallocation of State lands on an epic scale, so it is important to establish some transparent mechanism to examine what is happening.

Just remember that Minister Seemungal was the one who refused to provide details on the terms under which SIS occupied certain State lands at Couva, claiming that those details were private. The PM told the Parliament the next day that the Minister had denied making those televised statements. As I wrote recently in the ‘Our Land’ series, the new rules for the ‘Land for the Landless’ program, make it seem that the real name should be ‘Land for Everybody’.

We need to be alert to protect our patrimony, particularly in relation to property.

Afra Raymond
JCC President

Our Land – The Caroni case

EMDB Agricultural Development Site Map. Click this link to see a Google Earth Map of the EMBD Agricultural Development Sites.

Caroni (1975) Ltd, the loss-making sugar conglomerate which was also a State Enterprise, was closed on 1 August 2003. The Caroni estate has to be located within the wider context of our national Land Policy, if we are to make sense of what is happening.

“The now-defunct Caroni (1975) Limited includes lands the size of Tobago whose value has been under-stated and which now could fall prey to a land grab……The current Caroni Transformation Process is about converting national assets into private assets. In the main it is serving the interest of those who wish to generate private capital from public wealth stocks; for this reason the current process is exploitative and fraught with inequity.

“The historical model is being excruciatingly exacted on Caroni lands. The current transformation clones the historical model.” The Report criticised areas of the current restructuring process which echoed those of the exploitative historical model. It said: “The enterprise is conceived to control land space. To control land space especially prime property near the port is to control the socio-economic agenda. Land is leased on gratuitous terms, 99 years for example, without publication of the terms of the lease or tenure. This leaves the process open to political and economic opportunism and speculation…”

These extracts are from UWI’s Position Paper – ‘A Framework for National Development: Caroni Transformation Process’ dated July 2003 as reported in the Trinidad and Tobago Newsday.

At that time, my academic colleagues at UWI were placing on record their serious concerns at the implications of the procedures being adopted by the Manning government in relation to the Caroni lands.

How many of those concerns are justified today, with the Peoples Partnership government in office since May 2010?

The best estimates of the land area of the Caroni Estate at 2003 were in the 76,000 to 77,000 acre range, which would equate to about 6% of our country’s entire land area. The Caroni lands stretch from Orange Grove in the north – just south of Trincity – to the outskirts of Princes Town in south Trinidad. The lands belonging to Caroni (1975) Ltd also included property at Mayaro and ‘Down-the-Islands’.

The EMBD website states that it is responsible for the development of the former Caroni lands – some 7,500 residential lots are being prepared for ex-Caroni workers as part of their retrenchment package, with a further 8,400 agricultural leases of 2-acre parcels reportedly being processed. By my estimation, that means about 940 acres are to be used for the residential lots, with at least 16,800 additional acres to be used for the agricultural plots. The total land area to be used in these programs would therefore be of the order of 17,740 acres, which is just under a quarter (about 23%) of the estimated area of the Caroni lands.

There are significant struggles becoming evident in relation to the EMBD land distribution exercise, with these lands being allocated free to former Caroni workers as part of their retrenchment compensation.

The Trinidad Express reported that the Minister of Finance & the Economy, Larry Howai, announced a significant change in the original policy in the 2015 budget, in that the ex-workers receiving agricultural leases were now free to sell these lands. This announcement in September 2014 sparked a sharp response from Shiraz Khan, President of the Trinidad United Farmers’ Association, who labelled the new policy as ‘nonsensical‘ and ‘destructive to the agricultural sector.‘ One has to wonder if this important shift in land policy was discussed with the Farmers’ Association.

The split in positions became glaring with the swift response of Lily Herai, an ex-Caroni worker who is President of the Couva/Point Lisas Chamber of Commerce, who is reported to have “welcomed the move because it will add to the business development of the area.” Ms. Herai was also quoted as saying – “…We are in the Couva/Point Lisas area. There are a lot of service type business that have emerged recently and it keeps growing. It gives the leaseholders an opportunity to sell their lands…”

To my mind, the most startling statements on the EMBD lands came from Minister in the Ministry of Finance & the Economy, Rudranath Indarsingh, former President of the All Trinidad General Workers’ Trade Union (ATGWTU). His comments are reported in the Trinidad Express on 12 December 2014:

“…Despite being given permission to sell their lands on the open market, ex-Caroni (1975) workers were urged yesterday not to sell by Minister in the Ministry of Finance Rudranath Indarsingh.

Indarsingh, a former president of the All Trinidad General Workers’ Trade Union (ATGWTU), said the union worked hard to get the lands for the workers, and land value can only increase.

He was speaking yesterday at a ceremony in Couva to distribute more land leases to the ex-employees.

Speaking to the Express afterwards, Indarsingh said there were rumours Government ministers were preying upon the recipients, encouraging them to sell their recently received land…”
(The emphasis is mine.)

I tell you.

The State Agencies responsible for land

This is a listing of the key Ministries and the relevant State Agencies which manage our country’s lands. The sheer number of bodies with overlapping responsibilities makes understanding the land question a major challenge.

Ministry of Land and Marine Resources
Minister: Jairam Seemungal MP
Agencies
- Lands & Surveys Division
- Commissioner of State Lands
- Land Settlement Agency (LSA)
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development
Minister: Dr Roodal Moonilal, MP
Agencies
- Estate Management & Development Company Ltd (EMBD)
- Housing Development Corporation (HDC)
- Urban Development Corporation of T&T (UDECOTT)
- Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Committee (SILWC)
Ministry of Planning & Sustainable Development
Minister: Senator Dr Bhoendradatt Tewarie
Agencies
- Town & Country Planning Division (TCPD)
- Chaguaramas Development Authority (CDA)
- East Port-of-Spain Development Company Ltd.
Ministry of Food Production
Minister: Senator Devant Maharaj
Agencies
- Agricultural Development Bank
- Agricultural Society of T&T
- Cocoa & Coffee Industry Board of T&T
- Livestock & Livestock Products Board
- National Agricultural Marketing and Development Company (NAMDEVCO)
- Sugarcane Feeds Centre
Ministry of the Environment & Water Resources
Minister: Senator Ganga Singh
Agencies
- Environmental Management Authority (EMA)

Apart from this battle on the EMBD projects, we have to consider the ‘Land for the Landless’ program which is intended to provide some 3,000 to 4,000 residential lots each year. That is the strain being put onto the limited lands available in our country, as we fight for clarity on what is happening to our country’s lands.

The lack of the database proposed in the 1992 Land Policy means that we are operating in an information vacuum which appears to be deliberate.

Every public official is accustomed to the world of today, with the instantaneous access to detailed information on an astounding range of issues, worldwide. We all know that the banks and insurance companies have all the relevant details of many millions of accounts and transactions available at our virtual fingertips. We all know that, so why are we continuing to permit this rapid disposal of our country’s land without some public system to provide the details for our consideration?

As I wrote in May 2004 –

“…Our nation’s interest demands that we recognise that the Caroni lands are too big, too important and too valuable to be the preserve of any single group or political party…”

At that time, I was criticising the short-sighted policy of the Manning government in relation to the Caroni lands.

After one time, is two times.

Next, I will delve further into the EMBD situation and the features of the land/property information system we so urgently need.

AfraRaymond.net

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Tag: state land policy