The Colman Commission – Balancing the Scale

The Colman Commission into the failure of CLF Financial and the Hindu Credit Union is just about to move into its second round of Hearings and the public can expect to have further testimony on the losses suffered by people who deposited monies with CL Financial.

I have made several submissions to the Commission and have been invited to give evidence. I am reliably informed that there have been strong and unanimous objections to my participation in the Colman Commission. It would seem that only the Commission itself is interested in having my testimony go onto the record.

It is not surprising to me that objections of that sort would be arising now, but readers need to have a context.

The Colman Commission was established to find out how this fiasco occurred, recommend methods to stop a recurrence and also to identify responsible people who are apt for lawsuits or criminal charges. The main parties can be expected to give self-serving evidence, designed to exonerate themselves from any blame. We can also expect to hear more attempts to put the blame onto Wall Street, despite the claims in the CL Financial 2007 Annual Report– this is from the preamble –

…“The Next Wave of Growth” is the theme of this annual report, highlighting, to quote our Chairman, “that out of any crisis opportunities will emerge and our progress during the year under review prepares us to seize those opportunities and unlock value.” We have confidence in our ability to not only navigate this financial storm but to find fresh and profitable opportunities within it…

That Annual Report was published on 23 January 2009 – yes, that is 10 days after Duprey wrote to the Central Bank Governor for urgent financial assistance and one week before the bailout was signed on 30 January.

The Colman Commission is a Public Inquiry into a matter of major importance; it was approved by the Cabinet and installed by the President of the Republic. A Commission of Enquiry can only make findings on the evidence submitted to it, so it would be very important for some people to have certain evidence omitted.

One of the most outrageous aspects of the entire Uff Enquiry was the use of public money by UDECOTT to attempt to block certain documents coming into evidence. Those various attempts to limit the scope of the Uff Enquiry were disgusting to all right-thinking people and seemed to be a straight case of the ‘tail wagging the dog‘.

It is unacceptable that the Ministry of Finance could be taking a position which is seeking to exclude my evidence from the Commission. If that were so, it would mean that Ministry is acting in a manner which effectively dilutes the Commission and what is more, appears to be incompatible with the intention of the Cabinet to have a full public enquiry into this matter of national concern. In addition, the Central Bank is also reported to have objected.

The Colman Commission needs to be robust in getting at the truth of this financial disaster.

The new Bailout Plan

At the time of writing I have no details of the new bailout plan, proposed to be laid in Parliament for debate on Wednesday 14 September. According to a report in the Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, the proposed plan is in two limbs, the first includes the issuance of new bonds to raise monies for the payment of policyholders, while the second is the creation of a prohibition against lawsuits against the Central Bank.

The three concerns I have at this stage are –

Accounts– The last published audited accounts for the CL Financial group were for 2007, but despite the tremendous resources which have been deployed by the State in this matter there is no clue as to when accounts are to be brought up to date. Given that both the 2009 agreements – the MoU of 30 January 2009 and the CL Financial Shareholders Agreement of 12 June 2009– exist in a framework of State funds being paid to the group’s creditors and recovered by asset sales, this situation is totally unacceptable. What is more, there has never been any attempt to explain the delay in completing those accounts.
As a result we have two insurance companies operating in our country without any accounts, which is in breach of the very regulatory framework of the Central Bank.

The Finance Minister must address these relevant concerns if this proposal is to gain any support. It brings to mind the recent point made by Independent Senator Subhas Ramkhelewan, in debating the recent proposals to increase the State borrowing limits, that the Parliament needs proper details of the ways in which those monies are proposed to be spent, because no person could borrow money from a diligent lender without giving details. We need, as a country, to insist on these higher standards.

We need to move away from the black box and the magician’s hat, towards a more transparent situation in which large-scale public spending decisions are based on a solid series of rationales.
Colman Commission – The concern here is that the second limb of this proposal will prevent lawsuits against the Central Bank; at this point I am not sure if that only applies to CL Financial-related matters. The Terms of Reference of the Colman Commission state –

…2. To make such findings, observations ad (sic) recommendations arising out of its deliberations, as may be deemed appropriate, in relation to:

(i) whether there are any grounds for criminal and civil proceedings against any person or entity; whether criminal proceedings should therefore be recommended to the Director of Public Prosecutions for his consideration; and whether civil proceedings should be recommended to the Attorney General for his consideration;

It seems to me that the result of these proposals could be to thwart that part of the functions of the Colman Commission as they relate to the Central Bank.
Insurance Act – Finally, I am concerned that as we are on the eve of a possible ‘solution’ to the problems of the policyholders, there may be other fragile insurance companies with solvency issues. The fact that these matters are now so high on the public agenda means that we should not waste the opportunity to bring forward the new Insurance Bill, which has been drafted for some time, for discussion.

It is at moments like this that a responsible and long-term approach to these huge issues is in the interest of the entire nation.

CORRECTION

In this article, which was published on September 13th 2011, I stated that there were unanimous objections to my appearance as a witness at the Colman Commission. I wrote that on the basis of certain reports given to me by persons who were present at those meetings, but after receiving a challenge from the attorneys for the Trinidad & Tobago Securities & Exchange Commission (TTSEC), it was impossible to corroborate that aspect of the article – i.e. that the TTSEC had objected to my appearance.

This notice is to correct the record in that respect, I do regret any inconvenience or damage caused to the TTSEC by my publication of those allegations. – a Correction with similar effect was published in the Business Guardian of 18th November and I do regret the delay in publishing this one here for blog-readers.

Afra Raymond

Fifth submission to the Commission of Enquiry into the failure of CL Financial Limited, et al

9^th September 2011

Afra Raymond’s fifth submission to the

Commission of Enquiry into the failure of
CL Financial Limited
Colonial Life Insurance Company (Trinidad) Limited
Clico Investment Bank Limited
Caribbean Money Market Brokers Limited and
The Hindu Credit Union Credit Union Co-operative Society Limited

My name is Afra Martin Raymond and I am a Chartered Surveyor, being a Fellow of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. I am Managing Director of Raymond & Pierre Limited – Chartered Valuation Surveyors, Real Estate Agents and Property Consultants. I am also the President of the Joint Consultative Council for the Construction Industry (JCC), an umbrella organisation which represents the interests of Engineers, Surveyors, Architects, Town Planners and Contractors in this Republic.

This submission is being made in my personal capacity and does not represent the position of either Raymond & Pierre Limited or the JCC.

My work on this vital issue can be seen at www.afraraymond.com.

I am willing to give oral evidence before the Commission.

This submission is supplementary, providing an update on the work which I have published since the fourth 4^th July 2011.

The three articles in this submission are –

Date of Publication	Title	Abstract
6th July 2011	Colman Commission considerations	Questioning the reluctance of persons who lost monies in the CL Financial fiasco to appear as witnesses.
27th July 2011	Lessons from the Financial Crisis	Probing the causes and consequences of the crisis.
30th August 2011	The Colman Commission – Cloudy Concessions	The concession to allow witnesses’ statements as to the quantum of their investments to go unpublished is critiqued.

I do believe all the items in this submission to be true and correct.

……………………………………………..
Afra M. Raymond B.Sc. FRICS
http://www.afraraymond.com

Apt. #14, Highsquare Condominiums,
1a Dere Street,
Port-of-Spain
625 8168 (h)
678 9802/350 6215 (c)
625 6230 (d)
afraraymond@gmail.com

Property Matters – The EFCL Query part 4

On Friday 2 September, the EFCL’s attorneys delivered to my office this letter dated 8 August 2011.

That letter was written by Larry N. Lalla who warned me in his opening paragraph that EFCL was concerned at the tenor of my articles on their Confidentiality Policy. (Parts 2 and 3 here.)

The letter ended by warning me that EFCL would meet any defamatory statements with legal action…seeing that he never said “…further defamatory statements…” or identified any such, this appears to be yet another waste of taxpayers’ money in an attempt to avoid answering my five original questions.

The intention here seems to be intimidation.

It is sad and ineffective, let me tell you why.

Sad, because, according to clause d. of EFCL’s Staff Confidentiality Policy Statement which was sent to me, employees are forbidden to reveal the terms of the policy or even its very existence. Lalla’s letter states at 2. that EFCL’s Confidentiality Policy is “…consistent with what obtains in many companies…”. Both of those cannot be true, since it is simply not the norm that a normal commercial company forbids its employees from even disclosing the existence of a policy. Those provisions are not at all consistent with what obtains.

The sad part is that the only way to settle this is for EFCL to release its Confidentiality Policy, as I have been requesting. They have been reluctant to do so, for whatever reason.

EFCL prefers to spend money to obfuscate and intimidate rather than just answer these simple questions, originally contained in my email of 1 July –

Is there a new EFCL Confidentiality policy?
When did that come into effect?
Would you please provide a copy of that policy?
Was that policy approved by the Board of Directors?
Is the Ministry of Education aware of this new policy?

There seems to be an attempt to change the reality that all these State Enterprises are spending public money and therefore ought to be responsive to our reasonable requests.

Earlier today I made a request under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and we will see what happens next.

EFCL’s warning letter

efcl-lalla-letter Yes, Readers, I received this letter from Larry Lalla, attorneys for the Education Facilities Company Limited (EFCL).

The letter was hand-delivered to my office this morning, although it is dated 8th August – over three weeks ago.

I sent this email in immediate reply:-

From: Afra Raymond <afraraymond@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Sep 2, 2011 at 4:57 PM
Subject: EFCL’s Confidentiality Policy
To: kiran.shah@efcl.co.tt
Cc: ronald.phillip@efcl.co.tt, larry.lalla@gmail.com

Good Day to you, Mr. Shah,

A copy of EFCL’s attorneys’ letter dated 8th August was hand-delivered to my office earlier today and I will soon be replying to those points in public.

In particular, I noted the third point in that letter –

“3. EFCL remains at all times committed to the principles of transparency in all aspects of its operations.”

Accordingly, I am again requesting a copy of the EFCL’s Confidentiality Policy.

Of course I am publishing this, in keeping with our shared commitment to transparency.

Thank you.
Afra Raymond

Property Matters – Taking Stock

As part of this pre-budget series, I am going to ‘take stock’ of some recent, significant happenings in relevant areas.

Given the unstable situation in relation to the State and its operations, many examples of which have been set out in previous ‘Property Matters’ columns, it is very important that a critical stance be maintained. That said, it is also important that any progress be properly recorded and acknowledged.

The notable items were –

Housing Development Corporation (HDC)

I was very pleased to read of the success HDC was having in collecting the serious rent arrears owed by its tenants, reportedly in excess of $240M. Of course this is not the first time there has been an effort to rectify this situation, so hopefully this will be a sustained program as it is vital that housing be treated with proper responsibility. That responsibility would extend from the quality of the designs and construction, the treatment of contractors and suppliers all the way to housing policies which respond to the needs of the needy.

Last week, there was a report in this newspaper that the Housing and Environment Minister, Dr. Roodal Moonilal, disclosed a new housing policy. According to that report, the new policy will favour distribution of serviced lots, with foundation slabs, over the provision of new homes. I have been calling for a review of our housing policy for some time now, so it was very disappointing to read that Cabinet had recently approved this important new policy without some formal process of dialogue or seeking wider views, much less a thorough examination of the shortcomings of the 2002 policy. Yes, a new housing policy was sorely needed, but there are solid benefits to wider dialogue.

Housing is too important an element of our Welfare State to ever become solely a creature of Cabinet, whatever the credentials of the current crop of Ministers.

This leads directly into my point about the poor flow of basic information, which can be detrimental to the best intentions. The 2002 housing policy disappeared from the internet about 6 months ago, but despite several written requests I have had no success in having those links restored, for whatever reason. The new housing policy is also not available online. In contrast, last month the Ministry of Finance issued a revised State Enterprises Performance Monitoring Manual and that is available online, together with the 2008 Manual it replaced.

Building code

Dr. the Honourable Roodal Moonilal, Minister of Housing and Environment

The impending new Building Code is to be welcomed, having been developed in collaboration with key stakeholders. There needs to be a solid commitment by all parties to establishing proper enforcement of those critical standards. The Building Code will cover important areas such as earthquake and fire hazards as well as other quality issues.

The initiative is being piloted by Dr. Roodal Moonilal, Minister of Housing and the Environment. UDECOTT and the HDC both form part of his responsibilities, so that is a good fit. We will have to be vigilant to ensure that all State construction conforms to the new standards.

I can scarcely believe that the very Minister who understands the importance of collaborating with stakeholders on the new National Building Code, would state a week earlier that the new Housing Policy had been agreed by Cabinet, with no visible attempt at consultation. Incredible, but true.

A Culture of Consequence

I have consistently stated that the absence of consequence is inimical to any development and that consequence has to be restored to a proper place if we are to progress. Up to last Thursday, 11 August, I stated at a public meeting that I was unaware of any government in this country taking decisive action against its own appointees in the State Enterprises. The pattern has been one of charging people from the last political administration in what almost always looks like revenge.

Dawn Annamunthodo, former chairman of the National Schools Dietary Services Ltd. Photo © Trinidad and Tobago Guardian

The Sunday Guardian headline of 14 August ‘Cabinet fires Chairman of School-feeding Programme’ was as welcome as it was surprising. It was reported that the Cabinet had taken decisive action to fire a Chairman who had been appointed about 6 months before and that is a positive step, the first time any government in this country has done that, as far as I am aware.

According to that exclusive story, the fired Chairwoman of the National Schools Dietary Services Ltd (NSDSL)—Dawn Annamunthodo – had obtained extensive and expensive security guards for herself, due to some alleged death threats. There were also details of what seemed to be deceptive attempts by that individual to become a signatory to the bank accounts of that State-owned company. If those reports are true, there are two serious implications –

Firstly, it is extremely unlikely that this is the first time that this individual was involved in acts of that kind. Grown people do not just change their behaviour in a few months’ time, we all know that. My point being that this episode calls into question the screening which is carried out in relation to these appointments. Whatever screening processes now exist, will definitely have to be made stronger, together with ongoing reviews of Board performance.

Given that the Prime Minister is widely reported to have approved the Chairpersons of State Boards, that screening process needs to be reviewed urgently so as to preserve the integrity of that office.

Secondly, this individual is reported to have attempted to convince Republic Bank’s Ellerslie Plaza branch to make her a signatory and that matter must be promptly investigated by the Fraud Squad, with charges to follow if those allegations are true. It is an echo of the point I made here last week about a dutiful police officer allowing a motorist with a defective vehicle to just drive-off after a ticket is issued. Not good enough, if we are serious about road-safety. We have to restore a Culture of Consequence if White-Collar Crime is to be challenged.

But, even though no money appears to have been stolen in that School-Feeding episode, the saddest part was the bold-faced question that individual asked the Guardian reporter, when invited to give a comment

How did you get hold of those documents? Those are state documents. These questions are state business.

It reminded me very much of the response of Jewan Ramcharitar, former PriceWaterhouseCoopers partner, who suddenly resigned as eTeck Chairman almost a month ago. That entire affair remains mysterious, with Stephen Cadiz, the line Minister, stating that it was due to a ‘difference of opinion’ and the departed Chairman reportedly stating –

I am actually working on a project in the public service arena on a full-time basis and my time at eTeck is eroding the time and attention I pay to that.

“Just what that project is, he won’t say.”

I wonder if Ramcharitar would have found that dismissive answer to be acceptable when he was a partner at PWC? Probably not, yet we are continually beset by these evasive attitudes in public affairs. We need to hold our leaders to a high standard.

The latest twist is the sudden resignation of George Nicholas as Chairman of Caribbean Airlines and the opaque statement by the Minister of Transport, Devant Maharaj – “…Yes. I can confirm this. I am in receipt of his letter but I cannot say anything more…”

In the three cases, bare-faced conflation of State Business with Business which is private, personal or confidential.

Good steps are to be recognized and applauded, but we must always strive for better. We need to continue onward and upward. It would be good to have a statement from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Communications as to the governments’ commitment to a progressive policy in these important matters. The Housing policy needs to be published for comment and we also need to have a clear statement as to whether there can be any such thing as a confidential state policy.

Confidential State Policy may seem like an oxymoron, but readers will be aware of the reluctance of the Education Facilities Company Limited to publish its new Confidentiality Policy. I don’t want to say refusal, but when this budget season is over we will be continuing to examine those EFCL operations.

Property Matters – State Enterprise Accounts

State Enterprise Performance Monitoring Manual
In the next few weeks, this column will cover some of the issues which are likely to have a bearing on the 2012 Budget.

In my view the State and its Agencies must perform in an exemplary fashion if we are to progress. A good example is worth a thousand words.

At page 22 of the 2010-2011 budget statement, the Minister of Finance said –

…Mr. Speaker, no coherent, co-ordinated planning or strategy for state enterprises exists. As a result we have begun to rationalise the state enterprises, including the special purpose companies, which will incorporate a new accountability system that goes beyond the presently operating company ordinances. It is these loopholes in public accountability that resulted in the UdeCOTT scandal. This must never again happen in Trinidad and Tobago…

The Ministry of Finance has now published a new State Enterprises Performance Monitoring Manual 2011, it is over three times longer than the previous edition, so it will be something to consider in weeks to come.

Certainly, there are stricter requirements in relation to the filing of accounts – at pg 30 of the 2011 guidelines –

3.2.5 AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

State Enterprises are required to submit the following:

Audited Financial Statements (2 originals and 120 copies) to the Minister of Finance within four (4) months of their financial year end. These reports are to be laid in Parliament and subsequently submitted to the Public Accounts and Enterprises Committee for consideration;

Copies of their Management letters issued by Statutory Auditors…

At pg 16 of the 2008 edition –

1.3.10 Publishing of Financial Statements by State Enterprises

Government has agreed that State Enterprises be required to publish in at least one (1) major daily newspaper a summary of the audited financial statements within four (4) months to the end of their financial year and a summary of the unaudited half-yearly statements within two (2) months of the mid-year date.

Such summary statements must be in accordance with the requirements of the Securities Industry Act, 1995.

The new guidelines appear to be stricter, but the requirement to publish to the press seems to have been removed.

There are swirling issues on this –

No accounts for years – As I have pointed out before, some of the largest State Enterprises have published no accounts for years. UDECOTT and NHA/HDC are just two examples of this flagrant breach of the shareholders’ instructions as set out above. In the case of HDC, there is a greater concern in my view, since sections 18, 19 and 20 of the HDC Act require the audited accounts to be produced and published. Anyhow you try to spin it, those are terrible signs. For a private company to have no accounts, for even a few months, is indicative of poor performance at the very least. No accounts for years is unacceptable. One can only wonder how clearly could anyone plan if basic information is being obscured in this fashion. We expect better from the chiefs of these State Enterprises and certainly we expect better from the Peoples’ Partnership. In his preamble to the 2010-2011 budget, Minister Dookeran said –

…We must at all times remember who we work for. We must make Government work for the people. As our Prime Minister always says: serve the people, serve the people, serve the people…

Serious debts outstanding – There are continuing reports, despite some efforts, that contractors, consultants and suppliers are owed substantial monies by State Enterprises for extended periods. That has a disastrous effect on our local economy both on an immediate tangible level and in terms of the more subjective element of confidence.
Ambitious new projects continue to be announced, even as the basic accounts are incomplete and substantial bills remain unpaid.

Apart from the evident confusion, at the very highest levels of the State and Government, the unacceptable part is that there is not even an attempt to explain what is the hold-up or what areas of the accounts remain unresolved. The few times anyone in authority has attempted to explain the delays in those accounts, it has been a model of vagueness and ambiguity. That uncommunicative behaviour does not augur well. These State Enterprises are not building a wartime bunker or a new spy satellite, only new homes and offices.

But there is more, according to S. 99 (1) of the Companies Act 1995

every Director of a company shall in exercising his powers and discharging his duties act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the company; and
exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances.

Those provisions make mismanagement of a company an offence. It is literally impossible to manage or direct the affairs of a multi-billion dollar company in the absence of audited accounts. So there must be serious concerns as to how the Directors of those State Enterprises without accounts could have properly discharged their obligations under S. 99 (1).

SEC logo Apart from these points, there is now the fact that the SEC has made Orders in respect of Contraventions of the Securities Industry Act 1995 and the Securities Industry Bye-Laws 1997. Those Orders are in relation to the failure of these huge State-owned Enterprises to publish their accounts –

19th March 2010 against HDC, with fines totalling $121,000 – see http://www.ttsec.org.tt/content/pub100326.pdf.
15th June 2011 against UDECOTT, with fines totalling $120,000 – see http://www.ttsec.org.tt/content/Order-for-settlement-re-UDECOTT.pdf.
25th July 2011 against HDC, with fines totalling $400,000 – see http://www.ttsec.org.tt/content/Order-for-settlement-re-Trinidad-and-Tobago-Housing-Development-Corporation.pdf.

I was pleased to see the SEC taking this firm action against these offending State Enterprises, it is an important and necessary intervention. I am not at all sure what, if any, ongoing penalties are being applied. If there are no ongoing punishments or fines, this important regulator needs to take a tougher stand. It is simply not good enough in my view for the regulator to levy these fines and allow the companies to carry on with ‘business as usual‘. That would be like a dutiful policeman ticketing a motorist for smooth tires, no seatbelt and no headlights – issuing the ticket and then letting that motorist drive off. The SEC needs to consider heavy daily fines and banning orders against Directors of these companies in breach of the law, if such do not already exist.

The era of irresponsibility in high office needs to be brought to a close. The role of the Treasury in supporting this grossly irresponsible behaviour is questionable. The silence on the missing accounts is intolerable. The chapter of getting away with it needs to be ended.

Expenditure of Public money – Accountability – Transparency = CORRUPTION

Colman Commission considerations

This is a rapid look at some of the news coming out of the Colman Commission – the first live evidence was given on Monday 4th July.

That evidence has so far been into the Hindu Credit Union (HCU) and already some peculiar things are emerging. I do not follow it on TV and just read the newspaper reports –

Breach of Trust – It seems clear to me that the depositors had a seriously misplaced faith in HCU and Harry Harnarine, which itself raises certain questions as to who was really fooling who. It is basic and inescapable that a higher rate of return will mean a higher level of risk, which is why it is important to be more sceptical about high-return investments. My point being that as a Credit Union, one has to become a member to participate and therefore one has a stake in the success of the organisation – with access to the accounts and attendance at the AGM, one can only wonder what kind of dance existed between the HCU chiefs and its ordinary members. Yet, we are hearing from people who seem to have deposited their money at these incredible rates of return and adopted attitudes of complete trust. The witnesses need to be more seriously probed on what happened at those AGMs and so on – if they HCU conducted its AGMs anything like the CL Financial’s final AGM, it will be quite a story. We need to get past the various heartbreaking stories, to the nexus of responsibility which is where this entire game is played. I am sure there is plenty more to come out, plenty more.
Farid Scoon

Farid Scoon, Attorney-at-Law – Was expected to explain how he could be representing a group of HCU depositors and the former HCU chief, Harry Harnarine, at the same time.

There also seems to be a strange situation on CL Financial, since I am told that none of the affected people are willing to come forward to testify. I am not very surprised at that and it is yet another indication of the extent of that toxic ‘Code of Silence‘.

What a shame! 25,000 policyholders said to be affected by the failure of CL Financial, yet only one is willing to testify. Only One! I wrote before in this space about the probability that a high proportion of those EFPA monies had never been screened by rigorous Anti Money Laundering (AML) procedures. I suggested to the Minister of Finance that provisions be made in the payout agreements for the applicants for bailout monies to have the source of their funds vetted for compliance with VAT, PAYE, Income and Corporation taxes. The Minister did not adopt those proposals.

So, what we now have is the spectacle of the Colman Commission set up by the government to examine the causes of the collapse and finding that few want to speak, very few. I don’t know if it’s dirty money, or ‘keeping it in the family‘ or what…but I do hope that Colman takes a robust approach by using his powers to sub-poena people to appear and testify.

The Colman Commission needs to deploy more resources in getting info up onto its website in a timely fashion. Just as a simple example, the opening arguments which were heard last week have been posted onto the website in very erratic, delayed fashion. The session of Monday 27th June was posted on Tuesday 28th June, but the sessions of Wednesday 29th and Thursday 30th June were posted on Tuesday 5th July, no explanation given. If more resources are required those need to be deployed. The Colman Commission must not be allowed to become an orphan in our land of grandiose schemes and projects.

Of course we have seen the expected attempts by Lawrence Duprey to remove himself from being enquired into or even being required to answer questions. At this time those attempts appear to have been thwarted, but we can surely expect more spoiling tactics and not just from Duprey, either.

Setting the Standard

The PP government is establishing a ‘new normal’ insofar as ethics and acceptable standards of behaviour in public office are concerned. As with any real-time and complex situation, the signals are mixed, but from my point of view, the direction is a welcome one.

To me, the main positive signs were –

Coup Enquiry – The July announcement of the Commission of Enquiry into the 1990 attempted Coup, now underway, was most welcome. It seems certain that we would still be waiting in vain, if either Manning or Panday were still in power.
CL Financial bailout – Dookeran’s decision to review the payout to beneficiaries of the bailout was necessary and long-overdue. Dookeran has done his cause no favours by with-holding the accounts and seeming to suppress vital information, but the decision to revise the bailout terms was a sound one. On that occasion, he also took the steps of introducing relief for Hindu Credit Union depositors, which was a step in the direction of equity. Even those of us who did not support any bailout can concede that point.
On October 1, the Prime Minister resisted the temptation to use the PP’s Parliamentary majority to force through a new law to limit the legal rights of CLICO policyholders. The PM chose to set aside that legislative proposal and embark on an act of persuasion. That was a defining moment in our nation’s development of a democratic culture. The announcement of a Commission of Enquiry into the entire financial collapse (CL Financial and HCU) was another high point.
Nizam Mohammed’s removal as Chairman of the Police Service Commission was overdue in my view, but not because of his ‘last-ditch/red-herring‘ attempts to martyr himself. His primary and unpardonable offence, given his position, was his bold-faced abuse of power in that traffic police episode.
Mary King

Even Mary King’s removal from office earlier this week was a welcome sign despite the doubts over who knew what and when. That was a good move because it is the first time a Minister has been fired for acting in a manner which causes reasonable suspicion. Up until now in this country the rule followed by the various Ruling Parties has been the ‘wrong and strong‘ one, joined-up with the ‘do as I say and not as I do‘ one. To have moved away from those immoral practices is a big step in the right direction, despite the ragged edges.

Even when I consider the disastrous Reshmi-gate episode, that list adds up to substantial progress in the right direction. Democracy is a messy affair and coalition politics has particular challenges, so progress will be uneven, with some pauses along the way. But progress we must.

The Prime Minister reportedly commented that there was no pressure from COP to replace Mary King with another of its members, so that the replacement would be chosen on merit.

I am very concerned at the fact that the CL Financial collapse has cast a literal shadow over our country. Aside from the financial costs, there are significant areas of collateral damage which are now becoming visible. I referred in an earlier article to one of the main externalities in this episode being the fact that many of the CL Financial chiefs are deeply embedded in our political parties.

Even now, with this new government – their honeymoon will end on the first anniversary, I think – we are witnessing acts which can make one wonder if the CL Financial disaster ever really happened.

The official Terms of Reference for the Colman Inquiry into this financial fiasco were published in the Trinidad and Tobago Gazette of 17th November 2010 – No. 144 in Volume 49. Here is the first sentence in the second paragraph –

…And whereas the President on the advice of the Cabinet has deemed it advisable and for the public welfare that a Commissioner be appointed to enquire into the failure of CL Financial Limited, Colonial Life Insurance Company (Trinidad) Limited, CLICO Investment Bank Limited, British American Insurance Company (Trinidad) Limited, Caribbean Money Market Brokers Limited and the Hindu Credit Union Cooperative Society Limited with a view to ascertaining why such events occurred…

Caribbean Money Market Brokers (CMMB)
The first example is Robert Mayers, former Managing Director of CMMB up until 7 December 2008 – see here. Mayers is also a Deputy Political Leader of the Congress of the People (CoP), a leading element in the Peoples’ Partnership government. CMMB collapsed along with some of the significant companies in the CL Financial group – the Terms of Reference for the Colman Commission refer.

On 20 November, there were reports that Robert Mayers had been offered a position as a Director of our Central Bank. Mayers is reported to have declined that offer on the basis of a conflict of interest. The burning question has to be ‘What kind of process could produce such a recommendation?’

Consider this arresting headline ‘Investment pros set up new business‘ at page 10 of the Business Guardian of 9th December. It was reported that a new investment house, KSBM, was launched and it seemed that they were profiling.

Given that all four of KSBM’s Executive Directors are ex-CMMB chiefs, Robert Mayers among them, there are inescapable questions –

How come the former chiefs of CMMB, a financial institution which is known to have failed on this scale, can be permitted to open another one? We are acting as if we have no capacity to learn from our errors. Just carrying on as though nothing happened. What is the role of the SEC and the Central Bank in all this? Have we learned nothing?

Clico Investment Bank (CIB)
Mervyn Assam was the Chairman of CIB at the time of the collapse. Assam had been one of CIB’s founders in 1990 and was reportedly ‘cleaning house’ at the bank, which I do believe to be true.

But the picture is far from a simple one. On 22 January 2009, CIB hosted its inaugural Investment Seminar at the CL Duprey box at the Queen’s Park Oval – I spoke at that event, together with Professor Patrick Watson. Now, according to para 5 of the April 2010 affidavit submitted to the High Court by the Inspector of Financial Institutions, Carl Hiralal, in the CIB winding-up petition, the CIB liquidity problem was disclosed to him in a meeting on the 15 January. I have serious doubts as to the veracity of that statement, but yes, it is still a full week before the Investment Seminar.

Assam held 7,500 shares in CLF as at 7 February 2009.

Assam also launched a lawsuit to recover $1M he had deposited with CIB, that case went against him in January this year – see the judgment – and he is reported to have filed an appeal.

In October, Assam was appointed as Ambassador Extraordinaire and Plenipotentiary of Trade and Industry. He has served in the NAR period as High Commissioner to London and as a UNC Senator, both in Cabinet and during their recent spell in opposition.

CL Financial (CLF)
Dr Tewarie was a Director on the Board of the parent company, CLF, which wrote to the Central Bank, seeking a bailout, on 13 January 2009. On 16 January 2009, CLF paid dividends of $3.00 per share to its shareholders. According to the CLF Annual Return of 7 February 2009, Dr Tewarie held 1,171 shares.

As I write this, we are informed that Dr Tewarie has been sworn in, to replace Mary King.

To be perfectly clear, I am making no allegation of theft against Mayers, Assam or Dr. Tewarie.

Does the ‘fit and proper’ criteria apply to these CLF chiefs? Should those criteria apply to the holders of high office in our country? What do you think?

We need new politics like no time before in our country, but that must involve new thinking. The State must behave in an exemplary fashion if we are to uplift ourselves without civil disturbance and unnecessary confusion. The State needs to set the standard.

I trust that the Colman Commission will give the proper attention to these episodes.

State Enterprises and Public Procurement

procurement cycle State Enterprises were created to enhance the pace and quality of Public Procurement, yet they are now the scene of the most bedeviling paradoxes in the entire system of public administration.

Some of the key procurement issues which arise in this arena flow directly from the split character of the governance model.

The basic rationale for the existence of State Enterprises is they can be more effective because they are not bound by the strict rules which control the conventional civil service. The absence of those rules is supposed to allow more latitude in terms of hiring, borrowing and contracting. State Enterprises can hire professional staff at market rates, enter complex commercial arrangements and borrow on commercial terms, all of which should amount to significant improvements in public services.

The typical State Enterprise is owned by the State, with the shareholding held by the Corporation Sole, an exceptional legal creature which exists within the Ministry of Finance. Apart from its owner, the State Enterprise will sometimes have a ‘line Ministry’, which would be its sole or main client. For example, the Ministry of Housing & the Environment is the sole client of the Housing Development Corporation (HDC) and the Ministry of Education is the sole client of the Education Facilities Company Limited (EFCL).

State Enterprises can operate within the existing Companies Act or be established by a separate Act of Parliament, as is the case with the HDC. That legal framework ought to ensure that a satisfactory standard of corporate governance and accountability is maintained.

The fact is that many of the Directors and Officers of State Enterprises are political appointees, which puts the entire rationale onto a doubtful footing. Because the salaries and perks are so attractive, not to mention the commercial opportunities, the State Enterprises are prize targets for political appointments and favours.

Some of the main issues which arise when one is considering this sector are –

the number of State Enterprises – there needs to be a reduction in the number of State Enterprises.
If the politicians can instruct the State Enterprise, via the Permanent Secretary, on specifics, what is the purpose of the Board?
Given the preceding point, do the Board members of State Enterprises have the same duties under the Companies Act as in the case of other registered companies?
In terms of our proposed Public Procurement legislation, what is the boundary between the fiduciary responsibility of the Directors and the contracting powers of an ‘authorised officer’ – i.e. someone identified as having the power to enter certain contracts?

Proceeding along the Procurement Cycle and using the International Waterfront Centre (IWC) as an example –

Needs Identification – This is the first stage of the Procurement Cycle and it ought to be an objective assessment of needs. In this case, the IWC was part of a huge, disastrous boom in building new offices in POS – this is all detailed at ‘Capital Concerns – New Office Buildings’ – here. Before the boom started in 2005, there was 6.5M sq. ft. of offices in Greater POS, at the start of the boom some 3.2M sq. ft., or an additional 50% of the capital’s office supply was approved for construction. Please remember that Nicholas Tower, which took 5 years to fill, is only 100,000 sq. ft. Just under 2.8M sq. ft of new offices was actually built in POS in the last 5 years, with 2.3M sq. ft. of that space (82% of it) actually built by the State. Every State project identified at the outset was executed, but in stark contrast, virtually half the private sector projects stopped before construction began. The obvious consequence of that over-building by the State has been a collapse in the office rental levels in the capital, which is detailed in the next point.
Reconcile Needs with Funds – This is the stage at which a developer ought to consider critical questions such as the cost of funds, the cost of the project and the returns from it. That is sometimes called a feasibility test and this is where the IWC dissolves into utter confusion. When then PM Manning addressed the Senate on 13May 2008, he emphasized that every UDeCOTT project was approved by Cabinet and had been vetted by a Finance Committee on Financial Implications. That is the most important address if we are to see the depth of the problem with these State Enterprises – see here. The break-even point on such projects is the rent at which the project can repay its costs of construction – at minimum, those costs would have to include for land, design, construction and finance. On that ‘bare-bones’ basis, which makes no allowance for maintenance or periods when spaces are vacant, the break-even rent for the IWC is in the $30 per sq. ft. range. This is the largest single office building ever built in our capital and the best rents ever achieved for space of comparable quality is about half the break-even figure. There is no way that the IWC project could ever have satisfied any proper feasibility test. Every new office project started in our capital only increased the supply of offices, which reduced the market rent, which, in turn, increased the gap with the break-even rent. Under oath at the Uff Enquiry, Calder Hart tried to rationalize the confusion when he confirmed that only one of UDeCOTT’s projects had been subject to a feasibility test and that one was the IWC. He was even so bold-faced as to estimate a break-even rent in the $20 range, but, when pressed, had to admit that he had left the cost of the land out of the calculations! That is the extent of the deformed thinking which typified the best schemes of the leading State Enterprise. Only one of the State’s many office development projects tested for feasibility and in that case, the cost of the land is omitted, yet that same land is included as a part of UDeCOTT’s Assets at $224M in that very financial year. Political imperatives were allowed to pervert a process which exists to protect the public interest from this kind of empire-building. But it is in the next part that the full confusion comes to bear.
The rest of the procurement cycle – This is the stage at which tenders were invited for design-build and the winning bidder selected, the project built and the complex opened. According to UDeCOTT’s statements, the IWC project is its flagship and an outstanding success, having been built on time and within budget. Even if one accepts those assertions as being true, the IWC project is an example of the tragic consequences of a limited application of proper procurement processes.

As a result we have a completed project which is said to have been built on time and under budget, yet makes no economic sense and has a break-even point at some uncertain point in the future, if ever.

Some collateral damage needs to be noted, to quote one of the former PM’s notable phrases. Contrary to his statement to the Senate which is cited here, UDeCOTT did not publish its accounts since 2006, which is a breach of both the Companies Act and the Ministry of Finance guidelines. A total breach of the elementary norms of good corporate governance, which is the protection the private sector structure was supposed to give us taxpayers as a safeguard. Because of the political element in the operation, we can see clearly that UDeCOTT was carrying-out the instructions of the Cabinet and those Directors have not been punished or censured in any way, apart from their public dismissal. The consequence of those breaches being condoned at the largest State Enterprises – UDeCOTT and HDC – how does one get the smaller and less-visible State Enterprises to conform to good governance?

If the priest could play, who is we?

This is why we need a complete review of our procurement controls.

An Overview on the CIVIL SOCIETY submission to the Joint Select Committee on PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

This special publication is dedicated to the important issue of Public Procurement. It is written by the a private sector group, headed by the Joint Consultative Council for the Construction Industry (JCC). The JCC consists of:

Association of Professional Engineers of Trinidad & Tobago (APETT)
Trinidad & Tobago Institute of Architects (TTIA)
Board of Architecture of Trinidad & Tobago (BOATT) – observer status
Trinidad & Tobago Society of Planners (TTSP)
Trinidad & Tobago Contractors’ Association (TTCA)
Institute of Surveyors of Trinidad & Tobago (ISTT) comprising Land Surveyors, Quantity Surveyors and Valuation Surveyors.

The private sector group consisted of –

Joint Consultative Council for the Construction Industry
Trinidad & Tobago Chamber of Industry & Commerce
Trinidad & Tobago Manufacturers’ Association
Trinidad & Tobago Transparency Institute.

The members of that Private Sector group were part of the Working Party on the Public Procurement White Paper, which was published in August 2005 and laid in Parliament the following month.

The Peoples’ Partnership’s manifesto, at page 18, commits to –

Procurement

Prioritise the passing of procurement legislation and appropriate rules and regulations

Establish equitable arrangements for an efficient procurement system ensuring transparency and accountability by all government departments and state enterprises…

In keeping with those campaign promises, the Minister of Finance tabled two legislative proposals in Parliament on 25 June 2010. Those were a Bill to amend the Central Tenders’ Board Act (originally prepared in 1997, when Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj was Attorney General) and the Public Procurement Bill (originally prepared in 2006, after publication of the White paper). A Joint Select Committee (JSC) was established on 1 October 2010 to examine those proposals, invite submissions and make recommendations.

The stated target of the PP government is to have the new Public Procurement legislation in place by the first anniversary of their electoral victory – i.e. by 25 May 2011.

Our Private Sector/Civil Society group reconvened last year and made a joint submission to the JSC in December 2010 – it is available here from the JCC‘s website. Our Private Sector group has had several meetings with the JSC – which was chaired by Education Minister, Dr. Tim Gopeesingh – but the results of those are not featured in this publication.

This special publication is intended to inform readers of the necessity for new Public Procurement legislation in our country and to set out the objectives of our proposals.

The guiding Principles

These are –

Transparency
Accountability
Value for Money

The broad picture

One of the most serious findings of both the Bernard Enquiry (Piarco Airport Project) and the Uff Report (UDeCOTT and HDC) was the extent to which the largest State projects were being executed outside of any normal system of accountability. The very purpose of setting up these companies and procurement methods was to bypass the Central Tenders Board. The natural consequence of that way of proceeding being that if the CTB could be sidelined as a deliberate act of public policy, then other important elements of the regulatory framework are violated as a matter of course. In the case of both UDeCOTT and NHA/HDC, accounts were not filed for years – since 2006 for the former and 2002 for the latter – in flagrant violation of the rules and laws.

These were the largest State projects – often described as being the flagship or centre-piece of this or that government’s policy – yet they were breaking the main rules and getting away with it. The ‘getting away with it’ is the cloudy part of the picture, because we never hear of any penalty being sought against those State Enterprise Directors who broke the governance rules.

But that is the very centre of the puzzle and we need to understand it before we can try to unlock it. So, we are told, time and again, that the only way to really get important and urgent projects done in the correct fashion is to go outside the rules. The stated reasons are that the old rules are too cumbersome, slow etc… and yet, we end up, time and again, in the same mess.

Some of the features of these fiascos are –

Huge cost over-runs on virtually every project.
Unfinished projects which virtually no one can make sense of – to date there is no proper rationale for the huge and loss-leading International Waterfront Project, apart from Calder Hart’s bogus explanation to the Uff Enquiry.
A gross burden on our Treasury going forward – The continuing delay in completing the accounts for these State Enterprises shows how difficult it is to work out exactly what the State owes and to whom.

What all that tells us is that the existing rule-book seems to be blocking progress and the attempts to bypass it have done little better, if not far worse.

The dismal picture on public procurement is not limited to construction projects and can be found in all the other areas.

A new approach is needed and that is what is at the foundation of these legislative proposals.

What is Public Money?

Central to the new proposals is that any new Public Procurement system must be in full effect whenever Public Money is spent.

‘Public Money’ is defined at page 5 of our proposals as money which is either due to, or ultimately payable by, the State.

Our proposals are intended to form part of a financial management reform package to include for a National Audit Office and a Financial Management and Accountability Bill.

The intended move is towards a greater transparency and duty of care in terms of how taxpayers’ money is spent. Our citizens, particularly the unborn ones who will have to pay for some of the wasteful schemes which are littering the landscape, deserve no less.

The new equation confronting us is –

Expenditure of Public Money
minus Accountability
minus Transparency
equals CORRUPTION

We must fix that.

So, what is at stake here?

Our society is beset by large-scale corruption, which sustains wrong-headed decision-making. The wider social consequences of that toxic culture are now hatching, with a vengeance, in the naked violence and wily crimes which pre-occupy our head-space.

The killing-fields of East POS, the decimation of African urban youths, the URP and CEPEP gangs and the battle for turf are all part of this picture.

As long as our society continues to applaud and reward dishonest, corrupt behaviour, we will continue sliding downhill.

The structure of our economy is that most of the country’s foreign exchange is earned by the State in the form of oil & gas earnings. The rest of the society relies on the State and its organs to recycle those earnings for the benefit of those of us not directly engaged in the energy sector.

For that reason, the State casts a very long shadow in our country, far more so than in other places. Virtually every substantial business relies on the State and its organs for a significant part of its earnings. A healthy connection with the State is essential for good profits.

But that is where the particular problem is, since the conduct of the State and its organs is often found to be lacking in the basic ingredients of fairplay, accountability and transparency.

If the State is the biggest source of funds in the place and the State is not playing straight at all, a serious question arises – How can we hope to uplift our society?

The State has an over-riding duty to behave in an exemplary fashion in its policy and operations.

Due to its tremendous footprint, the State has to behave in that exemplary fashion if we are to move out of this mess. A positive shift in State conduct will have a salutary effect on the commercial culture and wider society, one that is long overdue.

So, who spends Public Money?

We have a vast, expensive and confusing array of organs, all of which are authorized to spend our money. For a country of about 1.4M people, we have 26 Ministries. Just consider that the UK, with a population of about 65 million, has 19 Ministries and the USA, with a population of about 300 million, has 16 Ministries. For a Caribbean example, Jamaica has twice our population and 16 Ministries.

Quite apart from the number of Ministries, there are two further layers of agencies which also have the power to spend – our country has 73 Government Bodies and 58 State Enterprises.

Given the vast range of operations undertaken by these agencies, any new system would have to be flexible in order to cover all those types of transactions.

The main features of the new system

Three new independent organs will be created –

The Procurement Regulator (PR), with the duty to create overall Guidelines and a common handbook to guide the public procurement process. The Regulator is appointed by the President in his own discretion and reports only to the Parliament. Agencies can create their own procurement handbooks, once these conform to the overall Guidelines, as approved by the Procurement Regulator.
The Public Procurement Commission (PPC) will be the investigative arm of the new apparatus to which complaints will be directed.
The National Procurement Advisory Council (NPAC) will be purely advisory and comprises 14 members from a broad range of named private sector/civil society organisations – the JCC, Manufacturers’ Association, Chamber of Commerce, Transparency Institute – as well as the Ministry of Finance and the Tobago House of Assembly.

All expenses are to be drawn on the Consolidated Fund, with the Procurement Regulator and Advisory Council required to report annually to Parliament.

A vital part of our proposals is that Cabinet, Government Ministers or politicians are prohibited from instructing or directing these new agencies in any way.

They are intended to be entirely independent of political influence, which conforms to the proposals in the White Paper.

That freedom from political influence was also specified in both the 1997 and 2006 draft legislation.

A Complaints Procedure

The proposed system will create clear rights to make complaints or report wrongdoing. Those rights are an important aspect of any modern procurement system and we propose three types of complaints/investigations –

Potential tenderers/suppliers can complain, in the first instance directly to the Agency with which the tendering opportunity resides, then, if that is not dealt with satisfactorily, they can complain to the Public Procurement Commission. Ultimately, the right to seek the protection of the High Court is preserved, once the established complaints procedure has been followed.
The Whistleblower – We are proposing that whistleblowers be given legislative protection and practical means to bring their complaints direct to the Public Procurement Commission.
The Public Procurement Commission can also, on its own initiative, start an investigation into an area of concern.

There are strict time-limits for acknowledgement and resolution of complaints.

Our proposal is for the Public Procurement Commission to have powers to punish both frivolous complainants as well as parties found to be in breach of the new system. Those can range from fines to embargoes, during which offending parties can be banned from tendering opportunities. Offending public officers can be subject to both fines and/or imprisonment.

The concern over the cost of the new apparatus

One of the most frequently expressed criticisms is that as critics of the rationale and operations of significant State Enterprises, we seem to be proposing a new series of state-funded agencies. Some people have pointed out that these offices are unlikely to be cheap, particularly the PPC, which is to be constituted as a standing Commission of Enquiry under those existing legal provisions.

Yes, there will be new agencies and yes, they will cost money.

Given the recent revelations as to the cost of the Uff Enquiry – already estimated to exceed $50M – there are genuine concerns that we could soon have three new state-funded agencies which could absorb maybe $100M a year.

The challenge here is to move beyond the obvious and factual observations so that we can consider the decisive factors. Our proposals have the promotion of Value for Money as one of its founding principles and that is good for the public. So, how can we measure the value for money of these proposals, at this stage?

The scale of public procurement spending

In the case of expenditures direct out of the Ministries, the 2011 Budget has an anticipated capital expenditure for the Ministries of $7.050Bn, as per para 8 at page 4 of the Public Sector Investment Program (PSIP).

Also in that Budget there is an anticipated capital expenditure for the State Enterprises of $6.725Bn, as per the Foreword at page 4 of the Supplementary Public Sector Investment Program (Supplementary PSIP). The combined figure of $13.775Bn is only for projects, so it excludes the salaries, rents and normal running expenses. Please note that other elements in public expenditure, beyond just capital projects, will be covered by these proposals. The guiding principle being that those activities involve the expenditure of Public Money.

There are very limited exemptions from the proposed provisions and those can be viewed at the JCC website.

I am also sure that there are other ways in which Public Money is being expended which are not shown in the national Budget, so the amounts are surely larger than that estimate.

The potential for savings

The scale of the public transactions, involving Public Money, which will come under the control of this new system is huge, at least $14Bn in size. Even if the new system only saves 5% of that sum every year, we can easily justify an annual running expense in the $100M range, as mentioned earlier. 5% of $14Bn is $700M.

In the next 30 days, we expect our Legislators to make the crucial decisions on this series of proposals and we all need to be vigilant to preserve the key points.

Those key points would include –

Heads of Independent organs to be appointed by the President
Separation of the Regulator from the Investigator
Regulations laid in Parliament for negative resolution, with no Ministerial or Cabinet approval required.
Independent Organs funded from the Consolidated Fund, with no requirement to seek a Ministerial approval or Budget vote.
Accountability is ensured by the requirement to report annually to Parliament.
Private Sector/Civil Society oversight via the National Procurement Advisory Council.
Proper provisions for complaints and Whistle-Blowers.

The ultimate question, given what we know now, is – Can we afford not to take this step?

At this unique and challenging moment in what has been a long, twisted journey, the prospects of more corruption and waste are grim.

For these proposals to succeed, the legislators will have to vote in favour of a new law which reduces their power and discretion. To some, that might be an impossible contradiction and an unreasonable thing to expect, but there will be considerable political credit to the account of those who make this change happen. Our citizens deserve no less.

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