Tag: construction industry

Housing policy imperatives – part 1

Proper housing is an essential part of decent human rights and the development of a just society.  For those of us who have proper housing, we can be virtually blind to the plight of those who do not.

Dr. the Honourable Roodal Moonilal, Minister of Housing and Environment
Dr. the Honourable Roodal Moonilal, Minister of Housing and Environment

We now have a new government – the People’s partnership (PP) – and given  the swirling claims and counterclaims around State housing, it is important to re-open this discussion.

The first aspect of housing policy to be considered would have to be the basic model – ‘What is it?’

The main housing policy of the first UNC government was to provide serviced lots – i.e. land was acquired and developed with infrastructure (roads, drainage, electricity and water supplies etc.) before being distributed.  That approach is based on the notion that it allowed the State to have a positive impact on the housing shortage with the use of limited resources.  Between 1995 and 2001, that policy yielded a modest result, since only about 2,200 serviced lots were sold, with 376 new homes built.

Showing Trinidad and Tobago A New Way HomeThe current national housing policy, entitled “Showing Trinidad and Tobago a New Way HOME” was initiated in September 2002 by then Minister Danny Montano with the stated goal being 100,000 new homes to be built in a decade.  The annual  target was soon reduced to 8,000, with those new homes to be sold to applicants.  The aim was to increase the quantity and quality of housing available to those who were unable to afford housing in the open market.  That program never achieved its targets and there was a consistent pattern of over-stating its achievements.  The last claims we heard were that the total output had been adjusted (downward, of course) from 26,000 to only 15,394 new homes in the 7-year period from 2003 to 2009.

In terms of gross output, the PNM policy easily outstripped the UNC’s, even if, in terms of its own targets, it was a signal failure.  From the aspect of output versus target numbers, the results are so mixed that it is difficult to settle the question of which policy was the more successful one.

For me, a key test of a housing policy’s success would have to be the number of people who have benefitted from an improvement in the quality of their housing.  In that case, the existing policy is seriously wanting, since, despite the output of 15,394 new homes, most of those remain in the hands of the Housing Development Corporation (HDC).  Just like with the actual numbers built, there has been a pattern of cover-up, shifting figures and plain dishonesty.  Despite my efforts, I am unable to locate a published record of how many of these new homes have been given out.

Dr. Moonilal, we need a clear statement of just how many new, empty homes the HDC has on its hands.

“Rent control is a thorny housing policy issue, but it deserves a second thought, since so many of our needy citizens occupy rented housing”

I went to the 2007 conference of the Caribbean Association of Housing Finance Institutions (CASHFI) and the PS of the Ministry of Housing said that a major issue was the fact that about 90% of the people on their waiting-list could not qualify for a mortgage.  If the objective of the existing model is to promote home ownership in preference to rental units and 90% of the applicants cannot afford to buy, there is a clash between those policies and the reality of the needy.

New forms of housing finance were devised to overcome that hurdle and those included mortgages –

  • at 2%;
  • with zero-percent deposits;
  • even 100+% models which allowed the new home owner to spread the cost of appliances and furnishings over the period of the mortgage.

We need to re-consider our housing policy in fundamental terms –

  • What is the extent of housing need in our country? In last week’s ‘BG View’, there was a call for the national pensions proposals to be based on the results of the 2010 census – see http://guardian.co.tt/business/business-guardian/2010/06/17/pension-promises-deferred .  The review of national housing policy must be based on realistic housing need data and that should also emerge from the census later this year.  In “A critique of State Housing Policy‘, published here on 2nd August 2007 – see http://www.raymondandpierre.com/articles/article35.htm – I proposed that our country has a 5-part housing market.  In my view the task would be to determine the numbers occupying each parts and which of them we intend to provide for.
  • Is large-scale construction the only way to assist those in housing need? Another aspect which needs review is the matter of rent-control, since that is a cheap way of assisting those in housing need without spending vast sums of taxpayers’ dollars.  The reality is that although rent-control legislation remains on our law-books, the rent control boards which regulate that area of civic affairs have been allowed to wither and die.  Rent control is a thorny housing policy issue, but it deserves a second thought, since so many of our needy citizens occupy rented housing.
  • Are we at realistic limits in terms of tenure? To make a simple contrast, in 1992, when US President Bill Clinton launched his expansionary proposals to ramp-up home-ownership, about 62% of the homes in the US were owner-occupied.  At the end of 2008, after a massive and disastrous experiment intended to increase home-ownership, about 68% of US homes were owner-occupied.  Our current home-ownership percentage is about 76%.  Given the poverty of those on the waiting-list, does it really makes sense to keep on building new homes for sale to poor people.  Are we at the ‘Limits to growth’ where home-ownership is concerned?
  • What types of homes should we build? Large swathes of agricultural land have been ‘paved-over’ to build these  new homes, which is to the permanent detriment of our food security, to name just one obvious concern.   The fact is that we do not have enough land in this country to continue that pattern of large-scale development.

Next week, the focus shifts to issues of build quality, allocations policy, land grabbing and value-for-money aspects.
Related reading:

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 18 May 2010

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 18 May 2010

Afra Raymond sits down with Jessie May Ventour and Derek Ramsamooj for a discussion of matters pertaining to the construction industry prior to the national elections. Topics include UDeCOTT, the controversial Guanapo church and the Uff Commission Report.

  • Programme Air Date: Tuesday, 18 May 2010
  • Programme Length: 0:40:33

Learning the Lessons: Part 4

Last week I promised readers some details of the scale of the failure at the HDC and UDeCOTT.

The failure is systemic and exists at every level.

“That is nothing less than scandalous and deceptive behavior from those we trusted with our national wealth. It is like doing a business plan to open a ‘Chicken and Chips’ outlet and leaving-out the cost of the chicken. Bogus.”

The Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) were established to achieve a more rapid rate of national development.  The idea was that we, the public, would benefit from the ‘best of both worlds’, so to speak, in that the ‘best practice’ of the private sector would be used in the SPEs to satisfy the requirements of the public for better roads, housing or other goods or services.

Starting at the level of underlying purpose of these SPEs –

  1. HDC was established in 2005 as the successor agency to the NHA.  The target set in the 2002 National Housing Policy is for 100,000 new homes to be built in a decade, but that annual target was reduced in the first year to 8,000.housinginside

    In the seven years between 2003 and 2009, there should have been an output of 56,000 new homes, but the total output claimed was repeatedly given by the PM and the Minister of Planning, Housing and the Environment as being about 26,000.  In March, I publicly challenged the accuracy of those claims and the new MD of the HDC, Jearlean John, released revised figures – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/politics/2010/03/28/unc-claims-hdc-voter-padding-opposition-strongholds-marginals – which showed a total of 15,394 new homes built in the period.  An annual average of about 2,200 new homes, about a quarter of the reduced target.

    That is at least 10,000 less new homes than the HDC’s chiefs had been claiming.  What trouble is this?!  Now, at the same time as we thanked Ms. John for setting the record straight, just try to imagine the record-keeping and integrity of an organization which could repeatedly overstate its achievements in this fashion.

    That is the scale of the problem.

  2. UDeCOTT’s mission is to develop the structures that form part of Vision 2020 and which “…will be achieved in accordance with…commercially viable principles…” – see http://www.udecott.com/index.php/cc/cc_sub_level/C6.  Those claims are equally baseless, since Calder Hart admitted under my cross-examination that only one of UDeCOTT’s many projects had been the subject of a feasibility test.  Only one.  That was the International Waterfront Complex and my further questioning revealed that the value of the land had been omitted from the equation.  That is nothing less than scandalous and deceptive behavior from those we trusted with our national wealth.  It is like doing a business plan to open a ‘Chicken and Chips’ outlet and leaving-out the cost of the chicken.  Bogus.  Our PM went to great lengths when he addressed the Senate on 13th May 2008 to point out that UDeCOTT’s projects were all approved by Cabinet, after a thorough review process – see http://www.ttembassy.org/051308.htm.  Additional claims were also made as to the ways in which Cabinet monitored UDeCOTT’s operations.  As I wrote in this column, early in my critique of UDeCOTT – There is either a sobering naivete or a lack of rectitude in the highest chambers in our Republic.

    That is the scale of the problem.

In both cases, we are witness to fundamental dishonesty on a huge scale.

Moving on to the findings of the Uff Report –

Looking at the controversial Cleaver Heights project, at para 25.30, the Report states

“…The absence of a written contract was put in context in the cross-examination of Minister Dick-Forde when she confirmed advice from HDC to the effect that none of their large projects and none of the small projects either had a signed contract .   It was subsequently confirmed that as at January 2009 HDC had 64 large projects ongoing and 591 small projects, none of which had a signed contract. Large projects were those over $50m in value. Thus, while there appeared to be no good reason why a formal contract was not signed between NHA and NHIC, it seems clear that to have done so would have been a highly unusual step and one which was presumably regarded, both by NHA and HDC, as unnecessary.…”

Not one HDC contract has been formally drawn up or executed.    Not one.

My colleague, Ken Ali, put out a hard-hitting exclusive on the ‘HDC’s Silent Projects’, published in last Monday’s Guardian at http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2010/04/26/capacity-firms-weak-non-existent.

UDeCOTT was also involved in its own widespread and unconventional practices, namely ‘back-fitting’ of data, as described in the sidebar.

On the blighted Brian Lara Cricket Academy (BLCA), being built by Hafeez Karamath Ltd. (HKL), we are told –

  • Para 16.16 – referring to advance payments to the contractor –

    “…As a result money was advanced in circumstances which do not appear to have been governed by any ascertainable rules and amounted effectively to very substantial loans to HKL. Such a procedure is quite unique in the experience of the Commissioners. It calls for explanation but none has been offered…”

  • Para 16.17 – referring to UDeCOTT’s accounting system –

    “…UDeCOTT’s administration and recording of the payment process was “appalling” and required a great deal of detective work to get to the bottom…”

  • Para 16.21 – referring to UDeCOTT’s attempts to explain its management of the BLCA –

    “…does not by any means explain why UDeCOTT staff had gone to such extraordinary lengths to ensure that HKL was paid as soon as the money became available; why UDeCOTT was seemingly so anxious to make payments substantially beyond the value of work carried out (and in circumstances where the contractor was already in default such that TAL had long since recommended termination); and why UDeCOTT chose to disregard the opinions of the appointed engineer (TAL)…”

  • Para 12.45, citing the work of MacCaffrey –
    1. Of 79 Certificates issued for advance payments, 39 were wrong in relation to the sum for payment of advance payment, 60 were wrong in relation to the amount of advance payment made to date and only 4 out of 79 correctly recorded the advance payment and the amount of repayment.
    2. UDeCOTT’s contemporaneous reporting of advance payment is materially wrong (i.e. under-reported) by tens of millions of TT$ for the vast majority of the duration of the project.
    3. UDeCOTT decided to back-fit Payment Certificates in February 2008. Those back-fitted Certificates also materially under-reported the amount of advance payments made. All the back-fitted Certificates have been endorsed by at least two signatories and in some cases three.

Little wonder that UDeCOTT’s audited accounts have not been published since the end of 2006.

The Cancerous Cozy Consensus

Given the scale of the bobol revealed in this single Enquiry, one can only wonder what else is taking place at other SPEs.  The relationships are so cozy that one seldom, if ever, hears of anyone being made to repay the monies stolen or even face the Courts.  I am repeating my call that it is time for us to review the performance and proper role of the SPEs.

It might also be useful at this stage, for those of us who exist in the ‘comfort zone’ of private sector superiority to reflect on how seldom, if ever, we act against ‘White-collar’ crime.

SIDEBAR: ‘Back-Fitting’ of Financial Documents

One of the hidden practices of UDeCOTT which was revealed in the Uff Report was that of ‘back-fitting’ of payment certificates so that various erratic and unsupported payments could continue, all under the veil of accountability.  For readers who are unfamiliar with this sort of practice or surprised that such could be the practice at the ‘best-performing SPE’, they might find it easier to understand if the colloquial phrase is used…Yes, ‘Ratchefee”…

Learning the Lessons of the UDeCOTT fiasco: Part 3

The reflections continue this week, by drawing heavily on the text of the Uff Report and the transcripts of the Uff Commission, to set some of the scandalous facts into context.  This is for those who are still wondering ‘What was it all really for?’

Last week I wrote that the State must behave in an exemplary fashion.  It is also important to know that the State has a responsibility beyond the moral plane.  On an entirely practical level, it is clear that the State controls the majority of economic activity in our nation. As such, it is responsible for the majority of construction projects in the country.  If we exclude the exceptional projects built for the energy sector, over 75% of the construction in the country is carried out by the State.

Apart from statutory undertakers – like TTEC, WASA, TSTT etc. – the State carries out most of its capital investment via various SPEs.  Those would include:
SPE logos

  • National Infrastructure Development Co. (NIDCO)
  • Housing Development Corporation (HDC)
  • Urban Development Corporation of T & T (UDeCOTT)
  • University of Trinidad & Tobago (UTT)
  • Evolving TecKnologies and Enterprise Development Company Limited (e TecK)
  • Education Facilities Co. Ltd (EFCL)

The conduct of the State is therefore fundamental to the conduct of a huge slice of the business activity in our country.  If the behaviour in the majority of our commercial relationships is improper, that is good reason for the cynical attitudes and poor standards which flourish.

Yes, there is considerable ambiguity in the term ‘improper’ and I am therefore going to illustrate.

  • The role of Boards of SPEs – As I said when warning against the appointment of Michael Annisette as an Independent Senator – see https://afraraymond.wordpress.com/2010/04/22/2008/01/12/an-unhealthy-choice/ – speaking of “…Directorships in significant State-owned enterprises…it is a widely-held view that such appointments, especially to those who are not experts in the relevant fields, are only offered to those in political favour.  To put it plainly, one would hardly expect to see UNC or COP members, however expert, on State Boards under a PNM administration…”  Despite the fact that there are many excellent and hardworking Directors of SPEs, that is the background to those appointments.  Just to make sure, given the ‘silly season’ we have entered, I am equally convinced that when UNC was last in power they also allocated those SPE Directorships in a similar fashion.
  • The role of the Executive Management – Suffice to say that there is little difference in the considerations when making those appointments.
  • The role of consultants and contractors – It is impossible to say who these stakeholders support, apart from themselves.

One of the perennial questions is ‘How come State projects are almost always overbudget and late?’   That is a truly universal question and the problem, if only the main element is isolated for discussion, is that the parties are too close.

The typical contractual and managerial controls of budgets, accounting systems, independent professional advice and penalty clauses were all violated wantonly.  Our Treasury has been plundered.  See the sidebar for an extract from the Uff Report.

UDeCOTT and the HDC are the State’s two main agencies in the move to physical development, they are both under the Ministry of Planning, Housing and the Environment.

We are now clear that both have been failures when measured against the goals set for them.  The sheer scale of the failure will be set out next week in this space, again with extracts from the published record.

We need to ask what has to happen differently?  Can we make the change?

SIDEBAR: What is ‘Good Governance?’

Governance is one of the vexed aspects of this discussion on the purpose and performance of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs).  Whether we are looking at the HDC or UDeCOTT, the concerns are similar.

At the national level, we can have a broad description of good governance which includes elements such as – equity, participation, accountability, transparency and conforming to the rule of law.  Of course, when we focus on the SPEs, there is a narrower definition of good corporate governance being the rules which are followed by a Board of Directors to achieve fairness, accountability and transparency in the relations with the company’s stakeholders.

When one considers that the SPEs were introduced to overcome the delays of the old civil service rules, their corporate governance rules are key in achieving those elusive levels of performance.

  • Extract from the Uff Report – Paras 62 and 63 at pages 33/34.

    “Holding to account

    62. We have observed, in the context of contractual issues as well as regulatory matters that there exists a culture of non-enforcement which appears to operate on a mutual basis. Contractors seem reluctant to issue proceedings for payments overdue or to enforce claims and employers in turn refrain from enforcing time obligations which are routinely not complied with.  In regard to delay issues, the point was demonstrated by the fact that no witness or representative appearing at the enquiry was able to quote any case in which a contractor had actually been required to pay or had been debited with liquidated damages. In the wider field there was a tacit acceptance that regulatory approvals, particularly as to planning, were rarely given in a final form before the work was performed, this coupled with an expectation that such approval would be forthcoming retrospectively.

    63. At the same time we had the impression that one contractor who made a habit of enforcing contractual rights, if necessary by formal proceedings, was regarded as being “confrontational”.  Such an attitude does not sit well with the careful drawing up of commercial agreements; nor with competitive tending, which is carried out on the basis that contracts will be enforced.  It is also inconsistent with the clear duty of directors of companies and public bodies to enforce the contracts they negotiate and enter into.  If there is a desire to promote the timely and proper performance of public sector contracts, this will only be achieved by holding parties to account for any breaches of contracts freely entered into; as well as enforcement of legal duties in regard to regulatory matters. Enforcement must also be assured through efficient and timely processes of courts and other tribunals.”

The emphases are mine.

Learning the Lessons of the UdeCOTT fiasco

Former UDeCOTT Board
Former UDeCOTT Board, (l-r) Dr. Krishna Bahadoorsingh, Sen. Michael Annisette, Mr. Anthony Cherrie, Mr. Wendell Dottin

The leaking of the Uff Report, the delayed dismissal of the remaining, ‘squeaky-clean’ UdeCOTT Board members and the dissolution of Parliament are all part of a major distraction operation. The fallout from suppressing the Uff Report would have been huge and unpredictable, so the name of the game was spin. That spin is what we have been getting from government ever since we entered the end-game. The ultimate attempt to distract us was of course the dissolution of the Parliament by FAX on Thursday 8th April.

The strategy seems to be an attempt to provide the media and the population with even more interesting talking points, so that the Uff Report slips into obscurity. I expect that if the incumbent party is returned to office, there will be attempts to claim that the ‘mandate’ granted by that vote is a justification for the matters revealed in the Uff Report. Already a large slice of attention has been shifted to the impending elections, as expected.

I have no intention of allowing those distractions to take hold. I will continue to write on the lessons of the UdeCOTT fiasco.

This entire series of revelations is historic in that finally we have a Report by a Commission of Enquiry published. The second note for us is that it raises once again sobering governance issues, including matters of professional integrity and Directors’ responsibility. Those are aspects into which Property Matters will delve in the coming series.

Some main points for us to consider –

  • Cleaver Heights – The Uff Report makes it clear that there is no missing money. None. There are other serious concerns addressed in the Report as to the change in the form of contract and the fact that some $140M was paid to the contractor without title having passed to the State. I do agree that those are matters worthy of further investigation. To be clear, the questions would have to be whether any undue benefit was enjoyed by the contractor and, if so, how did the HDC’s checks and balances fail to detect and arrest this? Please note that the entire contract sum was never estimated to exceed $150M for this project. That said, we still have two mysterious parts of the puzzle to figure out – firstly, now that, under cross-examination, everyone has denied doing so, ‘Who told the Prime Minister that blatant untruth about ‘missing money’? Secondly, the renowned Forensic Accountant, Bob Lindquist, has been investigating the Cleaver Heights project for some considerable time now, so what are his findings? Note well that I am not asking for his report, since some ‘bright’ person would be quick to say that he never submitted his report or that it is incomplete. I am asking for his findings, even the interim ones, before we spend more money on more investigations.
  • The non-gazetting of the Uff Commission – We were all shocked to learn, at the end of August 2009, that the Enquiry had not been properly set-up, due the failure to ‘Gazette’. A special, one-man Enquiry into that episode was launched by the AG, with a final report handed into the AG on 9th December 2009 by retired Judge, Anthony Lucky – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/politics/2009/12/10/lucky-report-goes-cabinet-today-lead-pg3. What are the findings of the Lucky Report, Mr. AG? I think that we need to know and now, please.
  • Was there any evidence of criminal wrongdoing by UdeCOTT? – According to Para 14.41 of the Uff Report – “…there should be an investigation by an appropriate criminal law Authority into the award of the MLA contract to CH Development to include the role of Mr. Calder Hart and the conduct of the Board in not ensuring that an enforceable guarantee was given by the parent company of CH Development….”
  • Calder Hart – Was Calder Hart a good executive manager, who may have just ‘over-reached’ his authority in an effort to meet his demanding targets? According to Para 12.55 of the Uff Report – “…We have noted the apparent absence of any note of criticism or dissent within the UdeCOTT staff and the dominant influence of the Executive Chairman, Mr. Calder Hart. To the extent the failure of senior staff and directors to raise any voice in opposition to the level of financial irregularity found on the Brian Lara Project amounts to loyalty, such loyalty is clearly misplaced…”
  • That UdeCOTT Board – It was a relief to see the dismissal of these Directors. In fact, the more one considers their bizarre and reckless statements, the more obvious it was that this was indeed a large corporation in crisis. Problem was, that it was our money they were wasting and worse yet, failing to publish audited account for three years. A sad example of wrong and strong. The AG said, on 1st April as he announced that the Uff Report would be published in full, that Calder Hart was just ‘an ordinary citizen’. It seems to me that Calder Hart enjoyed benefits far beyond those extended to the ‘ordinary citizen’. I have never heard of the PM tipping off anyone else under serious investigation. The other UdeCOTT Board members were not given the ‘tip’ to resign and have had to be fired. There must be a lesson in there, somewhere.
  • The Model – This colossal failure is such as to prompt a serious re-examination of the idea that the Special Purpose Entity (SPE)is the preferred vehicle for our national development. The continued down-sizing and sidelining of Ministries and the promotion of SPEs have continued apace, most recently in the TTRA proposals. I am saying that it is time to soberly re-examine these ideas against the actual results, so that we can chart a better way forward.

Next, I will be examining the implications of the SPE model and its effects on the nation.

An overview of the Uff Report

Professor John Uff. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
Professor John Uff

The Attorney General announced at the Post Cabinet press briefing on Thursday 1st April that the full Uff Commission Report will be laid in the Senate on Tuesday 6th April – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/politics/2010/04/02/uff-report-senate-tuesday.  I was pleased to hear that, but there remained a widespread attitude of skepticism as to the outcome of the AG’s promise.  One can hardly blame people for having those feelings since, as TTTI’s President, Victor Hart, has recently reminded us, PM Manning broke his promise to publish the report of the Bernard Commission into the Piarco Airport project.  That was over 6 years ago and still no Bernard Report yet.

I received a copy of the Uff Report in my email on Saturday and several other concerned citizens as well, so it seems that some publicly-minded person wanted to ensure that it was not either suppressed or edited.  Thank you, whoever you are.

The Uff Report is 512 pages long and contains 91 recommendations, so its sheer volume and the limited time available mean that I am unable to give a detailed review.  This week’s column will therefore comprise an overview of the main concerns raised in the Enquiry and the way in which the Report has handled those.

CORRUPTION

Q – Does corruption exist in the manner alleged by the government’s critics?

A – At para 59. the Uff Report states that “…It is accepted that corruption is a problem of serious proportions in Trinidad & Tobago…to which the construction industry is particularly prone…”

Was there actually something corrupt or wrong at UDeCOTT?
Q – Is there good reason for concern at UDeCOTT’s operations, or is it a case of politically-motivated attacks?

A – Para 14.36, from the Commission’s discussion of the Ministry of Legal Affairs Tower/CH contract, is a classic of understatement – “…UDeCOTT’s application of its own rules discloses a worrying lack of transparency as well as inconsistency…”

Para 14.37 states – “…the appearance of Mr. Calder Hart’s fax number on the notepaper, which was no doubt hurriedly printed by CH Development, remains unexplained…”

Para 14.41 –“…there should be an investigation by an appropriate criminal Law Authority into the award of the MLA contract to CH Development, to include the role of Mr. Calder Hart and the conduct of the Board in not ensuring that an enforceable guarantee was given by the parent company of CH Development…”

LOCAL VS FOREIGN

Q – Are local contractors being unfairly replaced by foreign contractors or do the foreigners really deliver better performance?

A – Para 6.18 states that – “…no convincing comparison has yet been presented from which reliable conclusions can be drawn as to the relative performance of local and foreign contractors or consultants…”

PROCUREMENT

Q – Is it better for the government to try using Design and Build or should they stick with the traditional Design and Tender method of procurement?

A – Para 7.20 states that – “…there is no single system of procurement which should be preferred in all circumstances…”

The Hart legacy –
According to Para 12.55 – “…We have noted the apparent absence of any note of criticism or dissent within the UdeCOTT staff and the dominant influence of the Executive Chairman, Mr. Calder Hart.  To the extent the failure of senior staff and directors to raise any voice in opposition to the level of financial irregularity found on the Brian Lara Project amounts to loyalty, such loyalty is clearly misplaced…”

The Property Matters critique of UDeCOTT started in 2008 on the theme ‘A considerable concentration of power’, which attempted to draw lessons from the Cadbury Commission as to the perils of the Executive Chairman.

The role of UDeCOTT’s Board and its Executive Chairman came in for heavy criticism, with the Report calling for full investigations into the Ministry of Legal Affairs Tower and the Brian Lara Cricket Academy.  Furthermore, there is a recommendation that the roles of Chairman and CEO should be separated.

The Rowley saga –

Q – Was there really any money missing at Cleaver Heights?

A – Para 27.11 – “…the entirely erroneous addition of $10,000,000…”

SIDEBAR: Notes to Jearlean John

Jearlean John. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
Jearlean John, Chairman UDeCOTT

On Tuesday 16th March, I spoke at a JCC press conference and took the opportunity to issue two calls to Ms. Jearlean John – the MD of the Housing Development Corporation and newly-appointed Chairwoman of UDeCOTT.  See http://www.caribdaily.com/article/267861/publish-udecott-accounts/.

On the question of the HDC’s fundamental role and its performance, I again raised the issue of their output.  In the course of the Enquiry and in this column, I have pointed out the serious output shortfall of the HDC, the primary function of which is contained in its name.  Housing Development.  At the press conference I was openly skeptical about the often-repeated figure of 26,000 new homes built by the HDC in the execution of the present national housing policy (implemented in 2003) which set a target of 100,000 new homes in a decade.  I doubted that even half that amount had actually been built and requested that Ms. John should publish a list of where and how many new homes were completed.  On Sunday 28th March, this newspaper carried a two-page ‘Special Report’ on UNC claims of voter-padding and that included the requested information.  The article was probing another aspect of the housing riddle, but the two figures which struck me were ‘15,394 housing units constructed by the government in 2003-2009’ and the table detailing the locations and unit numbers with a closing total of 13,677 units.  Either way, the total is far less than that claimed thus far and using the upper figure equates to an average of just about 2,200 new homes per year.  That is a far cry from the original annual target of 10,000 new homes and even the revised target of 8,000.  One can only wonder where the wrong, inflated figure came from and, those having been fed into the budget process, how accurate is our planning?  It is all reminiscent of the outstanding query from the Uff Commission as to the Cleaver Heights housing project and the false claims as to missing money – Who told the PM that false information for him to have made those baseless and misleading statements to the Parliament?  No one ever admitted to that in the course of the Uff Commission.

Thank you for releasing that info, Ms. John, even if it was in response to another call.  Given our persistent culture of secrecy, especially in public matters, it is a welcome change.

My second call to Ms. John at that press conference was to publish the UDeCOTT accounts without further delay.  As I put it – ‘Ms. John, if you want to be noted for integrity and transparency, you must publish the UDeCOTT accounts without delay.  UDeCOTT has published no audited accounts since the end of 2006 and I was pleased to see the Ms. John’s positive response to those calls.  See – http://www.caribdaily.com/article/268401/john-udecott-will-publish-accounts/.

Ms. John was reported to have been appointed and met with UDeCOTT’s Board on 25th March – See http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2010/03/26/udecott-pushes-complete-priority-jobs.  That report in this newspaper concluded with a telling quote from the Deputy Chairman – “Bahadoorsingh said John was an excellent chairman, “Highly competent, very knowledgeable, no nonsense and to the point and very friendly, a pleasure to work with. “It’s a new era with this new chairman. I’m very impressed,”

We are waiting for either the prompt publication of UDeCOTT’s Annual Report, accompanied by audited accounts, or some cogent public explanation for the unacceptable delay in so doing.  For all this time to pass, with neither of those events to taking place, can only deepen the atmosphere of distrust.  We, the taxpaying public, expect better from you, Ms. John.

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 17 March 2010

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 17 March 2010

Afra Raymond sits with Fazeer Mohammed and Jessie May Ventour to discuss, among other things, the “battle” between the Government & the construction industry in Trinidad and Tobago. Video courtesy CNMG

  • Programme Air Date: Wednesday, 17 March 2010
  • Programme Length: 0:38:03

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VIDEO: First Up Interview – 09 March 2010

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 09 March 2010

Afra Raymond sits with Fitzgerald Hinds and Jessie May Ventour to discuss an updated in-depth look at UDeCOTT subsequent to the resignation of its Executive Chairman, Calder Hart. Video courtesy CNMG

  • Programme Air Date: Tuesday, 9 March 2010
  • Programme Length: 0:43:23

The UDeCOTT finale

Calder Hart. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
Calder Hart

The resignation of Calder Hart as Executive Chairman of UDeCOTT and all four other major Boards he chaired is no surprise to me. None whatsoever. I had already noted in this space the consistent false claims and bogus rationales emerging from that individual.

One of the main ones is the ‘Anancy-story’ that all these new buildings would reduce the rents paid by government for offices. Those false claims of savings to the public purse were often repeated by the PM and his then Minister of Planning and Development, Camille Robinson-Regis, but they were withdrawn when challenged to let us have some figures. By my calculations, the UdeCOTT offices will cost this country about 3 times MORE per square foot than the space now occupied. Hart has consistently declined/refused or ignored my several requests for information on the touted savings.

We need to locate this moment firmly in context, so that we are not fooled, again, into seeing these issues too narrowly. Some main issues are –

  • Rationale – If we are to do better with our limited resources, we need to behave differently. Before we can behave differently, we need to think differently. This entire UDeCOTT/Calder Hart/JCC/Imbert/Rowley/Uff scene has been useful in that huge areas, previously hidden, have now been revealed. It is an opportunity for us to learn from our mistakes. In my view, the weak spot in the link is that we have no proper system for project origination, selection and ranking. We need to start asking the essential questions – ‘What are we proposing?’ and ‘Why are we proposing that?’
  • Cabinet-Approved? – We need to be mindful of the PM’s address to the Senate on 13th May 2008 – see http://www.ttembassy.org/051308.htm – in which he emphasised that all UDeCOTT’s projects were carried out with proper Cabinet approval – after a thorough process – and that that organisation enjoyed his full confidence. One is now bound to reflect on the implications of the doctrine of Cabinet solidarity – one for all and all for one. Does the Cabinet as a whole share in the political cost of Mr. Manning’s vote of confidence? If Mr. Hart’s actions were indeed Cabinet-approved, why the need for him to resign? If he is guilty of ‘going too far’, does the doctrine of collective responsibility apply here? Do his fellow Board Directors share in that responsibility? How far does the stain spread? Are the other companies Hart chaired OK?
  • UDeCOTT’s procedures – For example, UDeCOTT was shown at the Uff Commission to have separate tendering rules from those applicable to other State Enterprises. Even with that special approval in hand, UDeCOTT found it necessary to breach its own tender procedure. Other shocking evidence of improper practices emerged at the Uff Commission, so one can understand their strong attempts to derail that enquiry. The public should brace for a critical report with many unpleasant revelations. The report of the Uff Commission must be published without delay or dilution.
  • UDeCOTT’s board – On Monday morning, I was disgusted, but not surprised, to read about the flat refusal of the other UDeCOTT directors to step down. Some real predictable alibis there – ‘Innocent until proven guilty’, ‘needing more information before a statement could be made’ and, of course, the classic one, ‘squeaky-clean’. The most worrying aspect of UDeCOTT’s shambles is the steadfast silence on its audited accounts. I published End-notes on the Uff Commission in this space on 17th December 2009 – that article highlighted Hart’s opaque explanation for the lack of accounts for UDeCOTT. UDeCOTT is the largest State Enterprise and, at the Uff commission, its attorneys stated it to be a $20Bn + company. We have all heard over and over from the PM that it is the best-performing State Enterprise. The lack of audited accounts since 2006 is shocking. No accounts for 2007, 2008 or 2009 and that could never be exemplary or squeaky-clean. It is obvious, to anyone with a shred of sense, that a company which was unable or unwilling to publish audited accounts for three years has serious issues, none of them likely to be positive. I doubt that the Unit Trust would buy, or continue to hold, shares in a company which had failed to publish accounts for three years. I doubt that any prudent or proper investment house would do so. What is worse, UDeCOTT has offered no cogent explanation for its failure to publish accounts. The difference with UDeCOTT is that we are constitutionally unable to divest ourselves of those shares. It seems to me that the contemptuous attitude of those at the top is informed by this reality.
  • Hart’s testimony – Calder Hart, under oath, denied the allegations made by Carl Khan as to the link between the owners of CH Limited and himself. Given what has transpired here, is Hart guilty of lying to the Commission? Is that a criminal offence? Readers need to note that the instant Calder Hart’s and UDeCOTT’s attorneys refused to question testimony of Carl Khan, it was tantamount to an admission of the truth. That refusal to cross-examine Carl Khan was almost 6 months ago, so this trusted civil servant was given time to prepare before his resignation. Not everyone is offered that sort of courtesy and consideration, as Dr. Rowley’s case shows. It is a clear case of double-standards. Calder Hart appears to have enjoyed a most favoured status, for whatever reason.
  • Manning’s judgement – This entire sorry episode casts a shadow of doubt over the quality of judgement exercised by our Prime Minister. Consider that since Carl Khan filed his evidence in May, Calder Hart must have known that his days were numbered. Did Hart tell Manning that there was truth to the accusations? Yes or no? Did Manning ask him? Did they just keep on with the relationship long after a wise person would have broken it off?

Finally, we need to deal with the widespread belief that after all is said and done, the country is better off as we have gotten many new buildings for our money, even if a few things went wrong, or too far. I do not support those views, for three reasons –

  1. Firstly, none of the UDecott projects make any commercial sense. Even NAPA, which is supposedly of some cultural or artistic importance is now being seriously questioned by many responsible groups.
  2. Secondly, what we are hearing is a version of ‘the ends justify the means’ and that is not an acceptable path to developing any modern country. Every time we have tried that, the costs far outweigh the benefits. That is the strategic and moral bankruptcy which took us to this sorry place.
  3. Lastly, we need to remember that most of UDeCOTT’s projects were paid for with borrowed monies, which we are only now starting to repay.

Preparing for the worst – Some implications of a major earthquake on Trinidad & Tobago

Earthquake damage in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Photo courtesy BBC.
Earthquake damage in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Photo courtesy BBC.

We have all looked on in horror at the scenes of destruction and human suffering, experienced by our Caribbean neighbours in Haiti as a result of the strong earthquake on 12th January. Coming after the horror and attempts to assist, my mind shifted to the possibility of such a disaster in our country. That prompted me to attend the seminar organized by the Association of Professional Engineers of T&T (APETT) and the T&T Contractors’ Association (TTCA) at Crowne Plaza on Wednesday 3rd February. The seminar was excellent and such was the content that this week I am setting aside the other important matters with which I have been dealing.

The Structural situation

We heard several presentations from engineers and the President of the TTCA which set out the structural situation. Some of the main points emerging there were that we are at significant risk because –

  • “An approved national building code does not exist at this time, designers use building codes with which they are familiar,” Darryl Thomson, a standards officer at the Trinidad and Tobago Bureau of Standards (TTBS), said during his presentation.
  • “I would think generally we are not (prepared) and we need to seriously look at what we are doing and change the way we do business where the built environment is concerned,” President of TTCA, Mikey Joseph said.
  • Past-President of APETT, Mark Francois, told us of estimated multi-billion dollar damage to buildings if a natural disaster were to hit our main cities. “Potential building economic loss … in Port of Spain was of the order of US$5 billion and in San Fernando US$6 billion” Francois said. Francois went on to make 3 other important points – firstly, as a former British colony, our professionals had used British Standards up until the late 1960s, with the risk to us being that, since the British Isles are not prone, those standards did not take account of earthquakes. As a result, he stated that major parts of our civil infrastructure, upon which we would rely in a disaster, were not designed or built to withstand earthquakes. His example of the POS General Hospital being one such structure was sobering. Secondly, he stated that building plans are being certified by engineers who do not posses the necessary qualifications in structural work and that he had done assignments to re-design some of those ‘certified’ plans. Thirdly, he dealt with the well-known practice of engaging personnel employed with the regulatory authorities to draw plans for buildings and obtain permission. This begs the question as to how could a public employee on such a ‘PJ’ fail to pass their own plans.

These quotes were drawn from the Trinidad Express story on Friday 5th February – http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=161591595 .

The Seismic situation

The speaker on this aspect was Dr. Walter Salazar, Senior Research Fellow at the Seismic Research unit at UWI. The three main points from his presentation were firstly, that our country is indeed at similar risk as Haiti in terms of a strong earthquake. Secondly, the most likely areas for the strongest earthquakes are Tobago and the north-west peninsula of Trinidad, particularly Chaguaramus. Thirdly, we are now overdue for that strong earthquake.

The disaster-preparedness situation

The head of our Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management (ODPM), Col. George Robinson has confirmed, in light of natural public concerns, that our systems are in place to deal with such an earthquake. Knowing the individual, there is little doubt in my mind that the necessary diligence has been applied to developing solid systems.

What is the likely financial impact?

My concerns as to our level of earthquake-preparedness are rooted elsewhere and that is at the level of the ‘financial safety-net’ upon which we would rely in the event of such a disaster. Our low national savings rates have long been a concern of economists/financial experts. We do not save enough money, in the view of these experts, to propel our country’s journey to the next level of national development. My concern is the implied question of how we would cope with a destructive earthquake.

Add to that the fact that only a small fraction of our buildings are properly insured and a worrying element to the disaster-preparedness picture starts to emerge.

Aside from the structural concerns and seismic risks as outlined above, there is a question as to the nature and extent of our financial safety-net. Where will we find the money to rebuild? Our lending institutions need effective systems to ensure that the properties they hold as security are properly insured.

Such an earthquake would also damage our infrastructure – roads, water and electrical distribution systems, drains and so on.

As a consequence, even if your own property is undamaged or properly-insured, you could also suffer from the wider damage. If your entire neighbourhood is severely-damaged, apart from the issue of loss of life and physical injury, there would be a negative effect on the value of your property.

This issue affects everyone.

Some suggestions

I am suggesting that this is an issue which needs our urgent attention and that the private sector can take the lead. The Association of Trinidad & Tobago Insurance Companies (ATTIC) and the Bankers’ Association of Trinidad & Tobago (BATT) can take a leadership position here. One way forward could be for the insurance and banking sectors to agree, in their self-interest, a minimum code for design and construction with APETT and the TTCA. That would be one way to set a benchmark in terms of proper standards for all financed or insured construction going forward.

In terms of existing privately-owned building owners, the Central Bank should consider adding a component on the importance of proper insurance to their National Financial Literacy Programme.

The other urgent requirement is the retro-fitting of our major public buildings to meet the challenge of these overdue earthquakes.

Thank you to APETT and the TTCA for organising this important intervention.