VIDEO: Cock-a-Doodle-Doo Interview – 26 February 2010Afra Raymond sits down with Magella Moreau at Gayelle TV to discuss and review the politics and the state of transparency in public affairs in the country.
As we move forward into the deep waters of the CL Financial bailout, the picture becomes murkier and less encouraging. It seems to me that we have never had a government which spends more on PR and advertisements, yet on this most important issue, the picture is nothing but baffling.
This week I will focus on three of the main areas which need urgent explanation –
When British American Insurance Company, a key part of the CL Financial group, was declared insolvent at the end of October 2009, that was after the international firm of accountants, KPMG, had examined their books. The governments of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union issued a press release – http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/eccu-clico-statement.pdf – which included this sobering statement – “In the event of a liquidation of BAICO, policyholders will not be paid in full. Indeed, it is probable that if BAICO was liquidated, policyholders will only get 10 cents on their dollar. This means if you have an annuity of $1000, you would only receive $100.”
I just wonder what are the real figures for the entire CL Financial group, given the sheer refusal, by all the responsible officials, to discuss the 2008 audited accounts for the group.
It seems to me, based on the available information, that the interests of the taxpayer have been subordinated to those of policyholders, depositors and most odious of all, the 325 private shareholders of CL Financial.
The first MoU was signed on 30th January and is published by the Ministry of Finance at http://www.finance.gov.tt/documents/news/mr03183E.pdf. The second MoU was signed on 12th June 2009 and, although certain details were set out in the Ministry’s press release, it has never been published. That is odd, to say the least, if one considers the second sentence of the press release – “This new agreement is designed to give substance to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) of January 30th 2009.”
Michael Carballo was emphatic that the shareholding had not been affected by the new MoU – “Carballo said the government was in control of the management and running of the Caribbean conglomerate, but what has not changed is the ownership.
“The shareholding hasn’t changed. There is no intention to change the shareholding. It’s an agreement for about three years whereby the assets are managed and restructured and then the company will be returned to the shareholders,” he said.” That was in the Jamaican Gleaner of 17th June 2009
see – http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20090617/business/business1.html.
As we enter the wrong side of the boom, it is a little like traveling to the dark side of the moon. Familiar navigation points fade from view and we are forced to use bearings that are new.
At these moments of turmoil and impending crisis, it is always interesting to observe closely what key people are not saying. Yes, the pauses and silences can be very instructive in these situations.
I do believe that our national appetite for melodrama, bacchanal and commess is being played upon to distract us from the seriousness of the situations facing us.
The main example is the CL Financial bailout, which was announced a little over a year ago when the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on 30th January 2009. Given the subsequent revelations as to the withdrawals of funds by important people and the shareholdings of the Minister of Finance in CLF, it is impossible to say exactly when the actual bailout began. All we can say for sure is that we, the public, were told of a bailout on 30th January 2009.
There has been a cascade of bewildering and disturbing events – those are set out at my blog, www.afraraymond.com – and we are now at a position of deep confusion. The resignations of three top-level executives of the group and the subsequent bald press releases are most disturbing. They speak of disputes and jostling taking place in terms of this huge group we are now committed to rescue. For the record, those resignations were –
The growing sound we are hearing is that the Bob Lindquist forensic report into the dealings of CLICO etc. is to be completed at the end of February. Many people for whom I would normally hold some respect are anxiously awaiting that report to see what possible wrong-doing might be revealed.
In my view it is an error at this time for us to be awaiting the publication or selected leaking of such a document.
We need to press for the Audited Accounts of the CL Financial group as at 31st December 2008. Those accounts should be signed-off by the same professional firm which did the 2007 audit, the internationally-renowned PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
That is the most important single document, since it will fix an asset value at the end of 2008. That is –
Despite its obvious importance in the mystery of the missing money, there is complete silence as to the progress of the 2008 audit. It is almost a full year overdue and the only accounts we hear of are the forensic and confidential ones. The CL Financial group’s audited accounts were always published anyway, so why can we not have a clear, official statement as to when the 2008 audited accounts will be published? What is the mystery?
This country is now bailing-out a group which has failed and/or refused to provide its annual audited accounts and that is unacceptable in terms of the proper expenditure of our taxpayers’ funds.
Let us mark this moment well, because if the 2008 audited accounts are allowed to fade into obscurity, please do not think that we, the citizens, will be treated any better with the 2009 accounts. Please take note that this is a recipe for even greater levels of corruption than what besets us now.
There are also other facts, now in the record, which cry out for early attention, without need for special reports or melodrama.
Was the payment of a dividend to CL Financial shareholders, after writing to seek urgent financial assistance, an illegal act by its Board of Directors? Yes or no? If yes, then what actions are to be taken to both a) recover those sums of money and b) punish the Directors of CL Financial for their illegal act? If no, we need to hear how that could possibly be the case. If that dividend payment were legal, our tiny Republic would once again be setting a new precedent for the world to observe. Is it possible, as incredible as it might seem, that the Board of CL Financial did not know that Duprey’s letter had been sent to the Central Bank?
The State is in control of the CL Financial group and ought to be able to present a picture as to who broke their deposits in the last 90 days. That is guaranteed to be an interesting read and no need for any forensic report there, either. Maybe more importantly, who borrowed from the floundering group in its last days and on what terms. Another piece of the puzzle which is easily within grasp, but the mysterious silence is persistent.
The Governor of the Central Bank has, on several occasions, publicly and clearly stated his deep concern at the actions of the CL Financial chiefs – look at these 2 examples –
The Central Bank issued updated regulations as to the qualities of person considered to be fit and proper to serve as Directors or Senior Officials of Financial companies – that is at http://www.central-bank.org.tt/news/releases/2005/mr050510.pdf. At 3.1, it states –
“In accordance with governing legislation a person is considered to be fit and proper if the person essentially is of good character, competent, honest, financially sound, reputable, reliable and discharges and is likely to discharge his/her responsibilities fairly.”
The Governor of the Central bank has spoken, in unmistakable terms, about the conduct of these CL Financial officials – so what is the delay in exercising his powers under the fit and proper regulations? If we are to believe his statements, and I have no reason to doubt the Governor’s word, there is no lack of evidence that the CL Financial chiefs were not operating in accordance with the official rules as to fit and proper conduct.
We do not need to wait for any forensic report to be leaked or any opinion from expensive foreign lawyers. Sweet as the melodrama can be, it is a most dangerous distraction in this case.
As per the CL Financial fiasco, we are all waiting on the completion of the report of the Uff Commission of Enquiry into the Public Sector Construction Industry, with particular attention to UDeCOTT and Cleaver Heights. That report is due to be presented to the President at the end of this month and, as important as it no doubt is, the primary issue is in danger of becoming conveniently obscured. I have raised the question before, is UDeCOTT insolvent? Why the inordinate and unexplained delay in publishing their audited accounts? The last time UDeCOTT published audited accounts was in 2006 – so no account for 2007, 2008 or 2009. State guidelines require that State Enterprises publish their audited accounts by the end of April of the next year.
There is no good reason for the non-publication of any of these accounts. They are bound to help us solve the mystery of the missing money.
VIDEO: Up Next Interview – 07 February 2010Jerry George a freelance journalist from SVG has been following and reporting on the CLICO/British American story and its impact on the Eastern Caribbean countries. He came to Trinidad on the anniversary of the Bailout to interview Afra Raymond. Jerry is the Host and Producer of UP NEXT! which is aired on SVGTV in St Vincent and the Grenadines.
Video courtesy UP NEXT! with Jerry George.
We have all looked on in horror at the scenes of destruction and human suffering, experienced by our Caribbean neighbours in Haiti as a result of the strong earthquake on 12th January. Coming after the horror and attempts to assist, my mind shifted to the possibility of such a disaster in our country. That prompted me to attend the seminar organized by the Association of Professional Engineers of T&T (APETT) and the T&T Contractors’ Association (TTCA) at Crowne Plaza on Wednesday 3rd February. The seminar was excellent and such was the content that this week I am setting aside the other important matters with which I have been dealing.
The Structural situation
We heard several presentations from engineers and the President of the TTCA which set out the structural situation. Some of the main points emerging there were that we are at significant risk because –
These quotes were drawn from the Trinidad Express story on Friday 5th February – http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=161591595 .
The Seismic situation
The speaker on this aspect was Dr. Walter Salazar, Senior Research Fellow at the Seismic Research unit at UWI. The three main points from his presentation were firstly, that our country is indeed at similar risk as Haiti in terms of a strong earthquake. Secondly, the most likely areas for the strongest earthquakes are Tobago and the north-west peninsula of Trinidad, particularly Chaguaramus. Thirdly, we are now overdue for that strong earthquake.
The disaster-preparedness situation
The head of our Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management (ODPM), Col. George Robinson has confirmed, in light of natural public concerns, that our systems are in place to deal with such an earthquake. Knowing the individual, there is little doubt in my mind that the necessary diligence has been applied to developing solid systems.
What is the likely financial impact?
My concerns as to our level of earthquake-preparedness are rooted elsewhere and that is at the level of the ‘financial safety-net’ upon which we would rely in the event of such a disaster. Our low national savings rates have long been a concern of economists/financial experts. We do not save enough money, in the view of these experts, to propel our country’s journey to the next level of national development. My concern is the implied question of how we would cope with a destructive earthquake.
Add to that the fact that only a small fraction of our buildings are properly insured and a worrying element to the disaster-preparedness picture starts to emerge.
Aside from the structural concerns and seismic risks as outlined above, there is a question as to the nature and extent of our financial safety-net. Where will we find the money to rebuild? Our lending institutions need effective systems to ensure that the properties they hold as security are properly insured.
Such an earthquake would also damage our infrastructure – roads, water and electrical distribution systems, drains and so on.
As a consequence, even if your own property is undamaged or properly-insured, you could also suffer from the wider damage. If your entire neighbourhood is severely-damaged, apart from the issue of loss of life and physical injury, there would be a negative effect on the value of your property.
This issue affects everyone.
Some suggestions
I am suggesting that this is an issue which needs our urgent attention and that the private sector can take the lead. The Association of Trinidad & Tobago Insurance Companies (ATTIC) and the Bankers’ Association of Trinidad & Tobago (BATT) can take a leadership position here. One way forward could be for the insurance and banking sectors to agree, in their self-interest, a minimum code for design and construction with APETT and the TTCA. That would be one way to set a benchmark in terms of proper standards for all financed or insured construction going forward.
In terms of existing privately-owned building owners, the Central Bank should consider adding a component on the importance of proper insurance to their National Financial Literacy Programme.
The other urgent requirement is the retro-fitting of our major public buildings to meet the challenge of these overdue earthquakes.
Thank you to APETT and the TTCA for organising this important intervention.
VIDEO: First Up Simulcast Interview – 21 January 2010Fazeer Mohammed and Jessie May Ventour interview Afra Raymond on the simulcast of First Up on Talk City 91.9 FM radio and C Television on the topic, “What’s the Deal with CL Financial” touching on the continued silence of the professional class, politicians and labour unions on the ongoing debacle of the CL Financial bailout. Video courtesy Caribbean New Media Group Limited.
PODCAST: RICS Americas Interview – 14 January 2010
This is a podcast Afra Raymond did while in New York on Thursday 14th January at the offices of RICS Americas, the regional HQ of the international professional body, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors.
As you will hear, Afra Raymond was speaking from his positions as a Chartered Surveyor, Managing Director of Raymond & Pierre Limited and of course, President of the Institute of Surveyors of Trinidad & Tobago. He focused on 2 matters
He concluded by reminding listeners that the RICS’ principal cause was that of “serving the public interest” and that that was one of the main engines for him as a campaigning surveyor.
My last column on this important matter was published on 31st December, almost a month ago, with several major developments since then. The main development in my view is that we had some truly remarkable statements from the Governor of the Central Bank.
The messages on the CL Financial group are now so confused that the most charitable phrase possible, is that the public is getting ‘mixed messages’.
On 19th January, we were told that Michael Carballo, the group Finance Director, was resigning, also effective 31st January. See – http://guardian.co.tt/business/business/2010/01/20/another-exec-leaves-cl-financial or http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=161584620. Carballo had the unique position of being the only senior executive to survive the crisis at the group and keep his position. We were not given any reason for his departure, but we were told that Carballo is to continue acting as a Director on CL Financial’s Board.
Bideshi and Carballo were the two top executives at CL Financial. What is going on?
To date there has been no proper explanation as to the causes of these major resignations or clear statement on the way forward. To have both the group CEO and Finance Director resign within a week of each other, effective within less than a month, speaks of turmoil and jostling. That kind of thing would not happen if the situation was stable. The purpose of this bailout was said to be the avoidance of systemic risk and the maintenance of confidence in our financial system. The official silence on this startling development only adds to the impression of ‘more in the mortar than just the pestle’.
An absolutely fundamental clash of ideas seems to be emerging, but that is beyond the scope of this week’s column. One week ago, I appeared for the first time on the electronic media (CNMG/91.1FM) to discuss these issues. It seems that there is a ‘Code of Silence’ on this issue with the political parties all having agreed to not discuss it in any sustained or meaningful way. Our civic bodies are little better, with a remarkable silence from our professional bodies (most notably, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of T&T), trade unions and institutes of higher learning.
Early on in the bailout process, on 13th February 2009, the Governor of the Central Bank had promised regular updates to the media – see http://www.central-bank.org.tt/news/speeches/2009/sp090213.pdf. For whatever reason, those have not been as regular as hoped for or as informative as the first. Given that various teams of accountants have been working on the group’s books since the first MoU was signed, that is disappointing in terms of quality and quantity of information. I was therefore very pleased to note that the Governor made certain statements on CL Financial later that same morning, Thursday 21st January. See http://guardian.co.tt/business/business/2010/01/22/governor-promises-action-cl-financial-audit or http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=161585448.
“I prefer, however, to focus on the governance issues because, without doubt, the failure of Clico was a failure of Governance … it was absence of controls from the Board of Directors. Clico shows what damage could occur when prudence is clouded by unbridled ambition. Clico shows what can happen in the virtual absence of a risk management framework and the absence of internal controls. Clico shows that we need to rethink corporate governance … not only in Trinidad and Tobago but in the region as a whole.” (Please note that the emphasis is the Governor’s.)
If one is unable or unwilling to pick the ‘low-hanging fruit‘, which are well within grasp, why should we believe you will take action in more complicated and contested cases?
On Thursday 15th October 2009, Mariano Browne, Minister in the Ministry of Finance, spoke at the post-Cabinet press briefing – see http://guardian.co.tt/business/business/2009/10/16/browne-no-plans-govt-increase-shares-rbl – and his reported statement was very clear – ‘Browne also said government had no intention of selling any of the assets of Clico, one of the three CL Financial-owned companies that was being bailed out. “One needs to be judicious in terms of the managing of the assets at CL Financial Group, given the depressed state of the market both here and internationally. There is certainly no intentions (sic) of selling the assets. The position is to manage them and manage them well,” he said.
It is either that there has been an unannounced, significant shift in policy on this important matter or there really is a scene with ‘turmoil and jostling’. Both statements cannot be true.
We were told in the 2010 Budget that the monies allocated to the CL Financial bailout were some $5.1Bn, which is a huge amount of money. I am beginning to wonder what is the total amount of money really allocated to this bailout and if we are ever going to recover it. Just to make 2 examples, we have had the British-American Insurance Company’s insolvency, announced in November 2009, and the government’s subsequent commitment to put $50M USD towards that regional effort to construct a new company. Also, on Christmas Eve we heard of the $400M commitment to pay CLICO pensions due to ex-Caroni workers. What are the real totals?
This is to be published on the last day of 2009 and it is intended to do two things – firstly, to provide an overview of the CL Financial bailout and secondly, to start a critical conversation on our work as writers and analysts.
The timeline of the events over the last year or so on the CL financial bailout is set out for ease of reference. The detailed material can be found in the earlier part of this series at www.afraraymond.com. In doing some other reading, I came across a valuable part of the story and that is the first item in the timeline.
It is common to criticise governments on the basis that they are out of touch and seem to operate in silos. Meaning that various departments of our governments often operate without taking account of each others’ plans and actions. That is indeed so, but we also have to be willing to change if we are to have a chance of changing our world.
In saying so, we in the media have been existing in a similar place where cross-linking and critical discourse is almost extinct. If we are not able or willing to start a critical, public conversation amongst ourselves, there would also be severe limits on our own growth and effectiveness. The times are very challenging and they pose a caution for us all in the media. Our country needs a quality media of integrity.
Of course, I am speaking of the work of Camini Marajh, the respected investigative reporter from the Express. This year we have been treated to 3 high-profile exposes on CL Financial by Ms. Marajh – on Gita Sakal, Patrick Patel and most recently, the Home Mortgage Bank/Angostura deal (those 3 articles are at http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=161566763, http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=161566759, http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=161569418), with heavy focus on the role of the CL Financial group’s former Finance Director, Andre Monteil.
It is clear from that series of articles that Ms. Marajh has access to private documents and Michael Carballo. Is it that readers will have to remain in suspense as to the key mysteries of the CL Financial fiasco? In my view, those would have to be –
See http://guardian.co.tt/business/business-guardian/2009/11/19/finding-assets.
See http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_opinion?id=161452507.
Of course, one could maintain that the focus on the other aspects of the story are of greater importance and public interest. I am just wondering, in public, whether those questions have ever been put to Carballo and if so, what did he reply. It would be a real piece of investigative tonic if Ms. Marajh were to use her access to ask these burning questions.
It also needs to be said that Ms. Marajh’s last set on the Angostura purchase of the Lascelles Mercado group in Jamaica opened two aspects for further investigation.
I do not have the kind of space the Express affords my colleague, so this will be brief.
The first of these was the fact that Home Mortgage Bank seems to have guaranteed a transaction in which Angostura took over Jamaican rum manufacturer, Lascelles Mercado at a cost exceeding $600M USD. It seems that the HMB guarantee was set out in a December 2007 document. That sum was also said to be in excess of the financing headroom available to HMB, but that is not something I am going to pursue here. My concern is that the Home Mortgage Bank was established by an Act of Parliament to provide liquidity to the secondary mortgage market. How come a mortgage company, established to provide finance for the benefit of homeowners, could issue a guarantee to a conglomerate to buy a liquor company? How come? To my mind, that seems to be well outside the intended scope of the HMB as per its own company information – http://www.homemortgagett.com/loadpage.cgi?company_info. There is also the interesting point that this huge deal, with all its possible implications for the stability of the HMB, was not disclosed in the audited accounts (where it ought to have appeared as a Contingent Liability) or Chairman’s Review of their 2007 Annual Report – see http://www.homemortgagett.com/AnnualReport2007/HMBAnnualReport2007.pdf.
The second point is that the expose mentioned that the Angostura purchase was made at twice the listed price of the Lascelles Mercado shares. It is one thing for a company to take strategic decisions, using its own shareholders’ funds and paying ‘over the odds’ for assets, if that acquisition satisfies its objectives. That is one thing, but what we seem to have here is a mortgage bank guaranteeing a massive purchase of shares at twice the value. Was a due-diligence of the transaction done? If there was none, this would be a case in which shareholders’ and depositors’ monies were put needlessly at risk.
As far as I can tell, this is the kind of behaviour which led to the collapse of the entire CL Financial group. We in the media have a responsibility to do better.
The Uff Commission ended its hearings last week, amidst even more ‘amazing scenes’.
There are so many examples to draw on, but here are a few choices –
Cleaver Heights missing money – The entire reason this HDC project was included on the Uff Commission’s agenda is PM Manning’s $10M question to his former Housing Minister, Dr. Keith Rowley ‘Where the money gone?’ After months of evasion, the purging of an HDC Board, the resignation of the HDC’s CEO and the rustication of the UK-based expert, Gerry McCaffrey, the truth is out. No money missing. Simple so. Given the denials by Noel Garcia, the then-CEO of the HDC, and his principal assistants, the question remains who informed the PM of that missing money. I do not expect our PM to either apologise to or re-appoint Dr. Rowley.
More questions than answers – The open process adopted by this Enquiry was refreshing, so much so that it has yielded a real ‘windfall’ in terms of public awareness. Even the least-interested or most-loyal citizens are now aware that something huge is wrong here. We now see that our PM dismissed a Cabinet Minister on grounds which have all proven baseless, yet continues to publicly defend one of his key lieutenants, whose behaviour is now revealed to be questionable. That outcome would have been entirely unthinkable to the government at the outset of this bizarre year. It is a prime example of the Law of Unintended Consequences.
Calder Hart is Executive Chairman of UDeCOTT, Chairman of the Home Mortgage Bank, Trinidad & Tobago Mortgage Finance, the National Insurance Board (NIB) and the National Insurance Property Development Company (NIPDEC). He obviously enjoys the highest level of trust from the government. So consider this extract from Calder Hart’s cross-examination, under oath, at the Enquiry on Wednesday 28th January 2009. Hart is being questioned by Gilbert Peterson SC, attorney for Dr. Keith Rowley –
Continued Cross-Examination By Mr. Peterson:
Q. Mr. Hart, I am examining your CV. I see that you attended St. Francis Xavier University. What degree did you obtain from that University?
A. Bachelor of Arts in Economics.
Q. Bachelor of Arts in Economics. And I also see that you attended a course at MIT?
A. That’s correct.
Q. What was the scope of that course?
A. Well, I think it’s down there as Urban Economics and Public Policy.
Q. What was the duration of that course?
A. I think it was either two or three weeks.
Q. And the one at Alberta?
A. The University of Alberta I gained managing human resources; the same amount of time, two or three weeks.
Q. You would not describe yourself as a financial expert, would you?
A. No, I would not describe myself as a financial expert. But I would describe myself as a person with a body of experience.
Q. Yes. But your lawyers misdescribed you in these proceedings as a financial expert. You would not agree with that description?
A. I would not describe myself as an expert of anything.
That cross-examination can be found at page 53 of that day’s transcript – http://www.constructionenquiry.gov.tt/getattachment/6f957486-f0f4-4aad-b585-d644f3212806/COE-Construction-Industry-20090128-Merged-doc.aspx.
We have repeatedly been told that UDeCOTT is an exemplary and highly-efficient State Enterprise. In light of those assertions, coming from the PM and his colleagues, we are entitled to be concerned as to their lack of financial transparency. On 28th January 2009, Calder Hart was cross-examined, also under oath, by Alvin Fitzpatrick SC, attorney for the JCC. Consider his testimony on the specific issue of UDeCOTT’s audited accounts –
Continued Cross-Examination By Mr. Fitzpatrick
Q. Now, rather than go through all of them, would you accept that in respect of the audited accounts for the periods which are due at 31st December of each year and the all the accounts from 2003 to 2006 were signed off by your external auditors prior to the end of March of the following year?
A. That’s correct.
Q. That’s correct. And your external auditors are Price Waterhouse?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I notice that there are no audited accounts for the period ending December 2007?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Now, that is close to two years ago they are overdue. Is that so?
A. Just one year.
Q. Just one year.
A. Not quite a year. Normally they would have been due in March.
Q. They would have been due in March and they are now overdue?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, the period 2007 would have included a number of costs related to the Brian Lara Cricket Academy?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you agree that external auditors will not sign off on statements where they are not satisfied with the records or they have some concerns about the records?
A. No, that’s not my understanding at all. My understanding is that there were issues surrounding the notes to the accounts in terms of some of the areas where they wanted to change some of the interpretation of what we had been doing. So there was a long discussion. I think some of the problems had to do with getting all of the information reconfigured. So my understanding is that probably before the end of next week we shall have our 2007 accounts.
Q. I will be very glad to hear that. So what you are saying is that the accounts have not been signed off by your external auditors, because they did not agree with the existing configuration of some of the figures?
A Well no, I mean, you have to understand that PWC have been doing our accounts from day one. But I think that what they wanted to do was to deal with some of the notes as well as the manner in which the structure of our operations—I think what has happened is that as we have moved to expand our financing in the international markets. My understanding is that they are obviously ensuring that international standards are followed and in looking at them they want to restate some of the elements in it.
And my understanding is that has all been agreed between the accountants. There were some issues surrounding some of the information and that sort of thing which they have now been satisfied with. And we are expecting it obviously within the next couple weeks.
Q. Let me see if I can summarize that. It was quite a mouthful. PWC have not signed off because there were some unresolved issues which have now been resolved?
A. As I understand it, yes.
Q. And, of course, PWC will not sign off on any financial statements unless they are satisfied that all the issues remain unresolved (sic)?
A. Mr. Fitzpatrick, let me assure you, there is no flight of fantasy eh.
Q. Thank you. Well, I assume before we resume on the next occasion we will have those audited accounts?
A. Yes.
This part can be found at pages 37 to 39 of the same day’s transcript.
No accounts yet for 2007, none for 2008 and we are near to the end of 2009. If this is exemplary performance, what next?
Afra Raymond is Managing Director of Raymond & Pierre Limited and President of the Institute of Surveyors of Trinidad & Tobago. Comments can be sent to afra@raymondandpierre.com.
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