An overview of the Uff Report

Professor John Uff. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
Professor John Uff

The Attorney General announced at the Post Cabinet press briefing on Thursday 1st April that the full Uff Commission Report will be laid in the Senate on Tuesday 6th April – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/politics/2010/04/02/uff-report-senate-tuesday.  I was pleased to hear that, but there remained a widespread attitude of skepticism as to the outcome of the AG’s promise.  One can hardly blame people for having those feelings since, as TTTI’s President, Victor Hart, has recently reminded us, PM Manning broke his promise to publish the report of the Bernard Commission into the Piarco Airport project.  That was over 6 years ago and still no Bernard Report yet.

I received a copy of the Uff Report in my email on Saturday and several other concerned citizens as well, so it seems that some publicly-minded person wanted to ensure that it was not either suppressed or edited.  Thank you, whoever you are.

The Uff Report is 512 pages long and contains 91 recommendations, so its sheer volume and the limited time available mean that I am unable to give a detailed review.  This week’s column will therefore comprise an overview of the main concerns raised in the Enquiry and the way in which the Report has handled those.

CORRUPTION

Q – Does corruption exist in the manner alleged by the government’s critics?

A – At para 59. the Uff Report states that “…It is accepted that corruption is a problem of serious proportions in Trinidad & Tobago…to which the construction industry is particularly prone…”

Was there actually something corrupt or wrong at UDeCOTT?
Q – Is there good reason for concern at UDeCOTT’s operations, or is it a case of politically-motivated attacks?

A – Para 14.36, from the Commission’s discussion of the Ministry of Legal Affairs Tower/CH contract, is a classic of understatement – “…UDeCOTT’s application of its own rules discloses a worrying lack of transparency as well as inconsistency…”

Para 14.37 states – “…the appearance of Mr. Calder Hart’s fax number on the notepaper, which was no doubt hurriedly printed by CH Development, remains unexplained…”

Para 14.41 –“…there should be an investigation by an appropriate criminal Law Authority into the award of the MLA contract to CH Development, to include the role of Mr. Calder Hart and the conduct of the Board in not ensuring that an enforceable guarantee was given by the parent company of CH Development…”

LOCAL VS FOREIGN

Q – Are local contractors being unfairly replaced by foreign contractors or do the foreigners really deliver better performance?

A – Para 6.18 states that – “…no convincing comparison has yet been presented from which reliable conclusions can be drawn as to the relative performance of local and foreign contractors or consultants…”

PROCUREMENT

Q – Is it better for the government to try using Design and Build or should they stick with the traditional Design and Tender method of procurement?

A – Para 7.20 states that – “…there is no single system of procurement which should be preferred in all circumstances…”

The Hart legacy –
According to Para 12.55 – “…We have noted the apparent absence of any note of criticism or dissent within the UdeCOTT staff and the dominant influence of the Executive Chairman, Mr. Calder Hart.  To the extent the failure of senior staff and directors to raise any voice in opposition to the level of financial irregularity found on the Brian Lara Project amounts to loyalty, such loyalty is clearly misplaced…”

The Property Matters critique of UDeCOTT started in 2008 on the theme ‘A considerable concentration of power’, which attempted to draw lessons from the Cadbury Commission as to the perils of the Executive Chairman.

The role of UDeCOTT’s Board and its Executive Chairman came in for heavy criticism, with the Report calling for full investigations into the Ministry of Legal Affairs Tower and the Brian Lara Cricket Academy.  Furthermore, there is a recommendation that the roles of Chairman and CEO should be separated.

The Rowley saga –

Q – Was there really any money missing at Cleaver Heights?

A – Para 27.11 – “…the entirely erroneous addition of $10,000,000…”

SIDEBAR: Notes to Jearlean John

Jearlean John. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
Jearlean John, Chairman UDeCOTT

On Tuesday 16th March, I spoke at a JCC press conference and took the opportunity to issue two calls to Ms. Jearlean John – the MD of the Housing Development Corporation and newly-appointed Chairwoman of UDeCOTT.  See http://www.caribdaily.com/article/267861/publish-udecott-accounts/.

On the question of the HDC’s fundamental role and its performance, I again raised the issue of their output.  In the course of the Enquiry and in this column, I have pointed out the serious output shortfall of the HDC, the primary function of which is contained in its name.  Housing Development.  At the press conference I was openly skeptical about the often-repeated figure of 26,000 new homes built by the HDC in the execution of the present national housing policy (implemented in 2003) which set a target of 100,000 new homes in a decade.  I doubted that even half that amount had actually been built and requested that Ms. John should publish a list of where and how many new homes were completed.  On Sunday 28th March, this newspaper carried a two-page ‘Special Report’ on UNC claims of voter-padding and that included the requested information.  The article was probing another aspect of the housing riddle, but the two figures which struck me were ‘15,394 housing units constructed by the government in 2003-2009’ and the table detailing the locations and unit numbers with a closing total of 13,677 units.  Either way, the total is far less than that claimed thus far and using the upper figure equates to an average of just about 2,200 new homes per year.  That is a far cry from the original annual target of 10,000 new homes and even the revised target of 8,000.  One can only wonder where the wrong, inflated figure came from and, those having been fed into the budget process, how accurate is our planning?  It is all reminiscent of the outstanding query from the Uff Commission as to the Cleaver Heights housing project and the false claims as to missing money – Who told the PM that false information for him to have made those baseless and misleading statements to the Parliament?  No one ever admitted to that in the course of the Uff Commission.

Thank you for releasing that info, Ms. John, even if it was in response to another call.  Given our persistent culture of secrecy, especially in public matters, it is a welcome change.

My second call to Ms. John at that press conference was to publish the UDeCOTT accounts without further delay.  As I put it – ‘Ms. John, if you want to be noted for integrity and transparency, you must publish the UDeCOTT accounts without delay.  UDeCOTT has published no audited accounts since the end of 2006 and I was pleased to see the Ms. John’s positive response to those calls.  See – http://www.caribdaily.com/article/268401/john-udecott-will-publish-accounts/.

Ms. John was reported to have been appointed and met with UDeCOTT’s Board on 25th March – See http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2010/03/26/udecott-pushes-complete-priority-jobs.  That report in this newspaper concluded with a telling quote from the Deputy Chairman – “Bahadoorsingh said John was an excellent chairman, “Highly competent, very knowledgeable, no nonsense and to the point and very friendly, a pleasure to work with. “It’s a new era with this new chairman. I’m very impressed,”

We are waiting for either the prompt publication of UDeCOTT’s Annual Report, accompanied by audited accounts, or some cogent public explanation for the unacceptable delay in so doing.  For all this time to pass, with neither of those events to taking place, can only deepen the atmosphere of distrust.  We, the taxpaying public, expect better from you, Ms. John.

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 17 March 2010

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 17 March 2010

Afra Raymond sits with Fazeer Mohammed and Jessie May Ventour to discuss, among other things, the “battle” between the Government & the construction industry in Trinidad and Tobago. Video courtesy CNMG

  • Programme Air Date: Wednesday, 17 March 2010
  • Programme Length: 0:38:03

M

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 09 March 2010

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 09 March 2010

Afra Raymond sits with Fitzgerald Hinds and Jessie May Ventour to discuss an updated in-depth look at UDeCOTT subsequent to the resignation of its Executive Chairman, Calder Hart. Video courtesy CNMG

  • Programme Air Date: Tuesday, 9 March 2010
  • Programme Length: 0:43:23

Response to Minister after receipt of CL Financial Shareholders’ Agreement

CL Financial Shareholders’ Agreement of 12th June 2009

From: Afra Raymond <afra@tstt.net.tt>
To: Nunez-Tesheirak@gov.tt
Date Fri, March 12, 2010 6:26:03 PM

Madam Minister,

I am writing to thank you for sending me the CL Financial Shareholders’ Agreement of 12th June 2009, as requested in my Freedom of Information application of 16th November 2009.

I have now published this onto my website – www.afraraymond.com – for public information and to develop a better understanding of its implications.

Finally, I am taking the opportunity to point out that my second Freedom of Information application, for Mr. Lawrence Duprey’s 13th January 2009 letter to the Central Bank Governor, was filed on 1st March.  It would be a positive move, in the direction of transparency and public accountability, if you were to release that document to me within the statutory timeframe of one month.

I await your reply.

Yours sincerely,

Afra Raymond

CL Financial Shareholders’ Agreement

Second MOU between CLF and Govt of TT
FOR YOUR INFORMATION: A copy of the official agreement between C.L. Financial Limited and the Government of Trinidad and Tobago has finally been delivered to me per my request under the Freedom of Information Act. This CL Financial Shareholders’ Agreement (SA) of 12th June 2009 which I requested on 16th November 2009 under the Freedom of Information Act was sent to me by the Ministry of Finance on 11th March 2010 and my emailed response to the Minister of Finance is on the home page of this blog.

My preliminary comments are –

  1. Quantum – The SA is silent as to quantum, which would seem to mean that the group will enjoy unlimited access to taxpayers’ funds. The 2010 budget statement on 7th September states an estimated allocation to the CL Financial bailout of $5.4Bn – but subsequent events have only added to the confusion. To wit, the $50M USD for the British-American Insurance recovery (as per 2nd November ECCU press release) and the ‘up to $510M’ announced to be available to meet the pensions due to ex-Caroni workers. Question being whether the $5.4Bn includes the subsequently-announced amounts or are those to be added-on?
  2. Security–At the preamble to the SA – on page 5 – we are told that “…valuable consideration…” is being offered by CLF as per the original MoU. Of course, given the Governor’s revelations on 7th April 2009 – see http://guardian.co.tt/business/business/2009/04/08/govt-left-empty-handed-cl-financial-bailout – that is simply not so. Indeed, it seems clear that the cupboard is bare and that this CLF group has no unpledged assets of any value.
  3. Interest–No mention of interest at all. We are therefore now advancing an unlimited quantum of taxpayers’ funds, for which no security has been provided and those funds are being advanced at ZERO interest. Given the well-established rule that late payment of taxes makes a taxpayer liable to 20% interest and the interest rate the Federal government charged AIG for their bailout funds – it was 8.5% above the benchmark LIBOR, which was at 3.0% – it is clear that this represents a massive concession to the CL Financial group. Quite apart from the bailout itself, the 325 shareholders of this group are also benefiting from this unprecedented and unexplained facility of ZERO percent interest rate.
  4. Accounting–Section 4 of the SA sets out the procedure for a proper system of accounts, culminating at 4.4.5 – “…shall ensure that an annual report of CLF is prepared and dispatched…in manner consistent with standard corporate practice…”  The accepted interpretation of this language informs us that the word ‘shall’ denotes an obligatory, non-voluntary duty.  If that is the case, when can we expect publication of the 2008 annual report, accompanied by audited accounts, as per ‘standard corporate practice’?
  5. The role of the Shareholders–The MoU of 30th January, at Para (c) of its preamble, spells out its aims as “…to protect the interests of depositors, policyholders and creditors of these institutions…”  According to the second sentence of the Ministry of Finance press release of 12th June 2009 – this is the penultimate document in the ‘Quick-Guide’ in the CL Financial bailout section of this website – “This new agreement is designed to give substance to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) of January 30th 2009.” The SA of 12th June 2009 was the subject of that press release.  The SA, at Para A. of its preamble, states the intentions of the parties as having been set out in the MoU of 30th January 2009 and ends by “…their stated understanding, inter alia, that certain steps be taken to correct the financial condition of CLICO, CIB and BA in order to protect the interest of depositors, policy holders, creditors and shareholders of these institutions…” (These two words are put in bold as my own emphasis).  I questioned that official version in ‘Fit and proper?’, ‘Party of parties’ and ‘Figuring it out’ – all available on this blog.  Now that we have the actual SA to work with, it is clear that the statement in 12th June press release is extremely misleading.  The SA does not just ‘…give substance to…’ the original MoU, it in fact is an entirely different species of agreement.  The SA constitutes a written guarantee to protect the 325 shareholders of this CLF group.
  6. Assisting the incoming Management–Clauses 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. of the SA, require the outgoing CL Financial chiefs to render all assistance to the incoming Board and Management in terms of all records and accounts etc.  The question here is ‘Have the new Board and management been receiving the full assistance of the previous CLF chiefs?’  If not, what is being done about it?  If yes, where is the $5.0Bn missing from the CLICO Statutory Fund?
  7. Analysing the lacunae–The events in the interregnum and their consequence are extremely important aspects of this matter.  I say so because the intervening period – i.e. between 30th January and 12 June 2009 – was one in which several important and shocking facts came to light. Some of these were –
    • Payment of Dividends – $3.00 per share paid on 16th January – i.e. three days after Duprey wrote to the Central Bank Governor for urgent financial assistance.
    • Over-pledging of assets – As cited above, the Central Bank Governor revealed that CL Financial’s assets were all fully pledged.
    • $5.0Bn is missing from CLICO’s Statutory Fund – According to the newly-appointed CEO of CLICO, Claude Musaib-Ali (he has since resigned, effective 14th February 2010) the CLICO Statutory Fund had $5.0Bn missing – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2009/03/01/where-money-gone.
    • Attempted sale of assets as per CLICO Energy – Also, CL Financial attempted to sell its shares in CLICO Energy, which was in breach of the terms of the MoU. At clause H. and 6.1, the outgoing CL Financial Directors agree to use their best endeavours to reverse the sale of those shares.

    With the exception of the last item, none of these other three serious matters are addressed at all in the SA.  Silence on the payment of dividends.  Over-pledged assets are described as being ‘valuable consideration‘.  Silence on the missing $5.0Bn from CLICO’s Statutory Fund.

    Those four events, having been revealed in the gap between the MoU and the SA, should have informed the stances taken by the parties.  To my mind, these actions by CL Financial are indicative of insincere behaviour intended to outwit and cheat the taxpayer.  The Ministry of Finance press release describes the SA as ‘…giving substance to…‘.  Nothing could be further from the truth, since the SA in fact creates new levels of entitlements and protections for the CL Financial shareholders.

    As taxpayers, we ought to have been able to rely on the State negotiators to propose terms which would have extinguished the equity of the CL Financial owners and taken other steps to restore the correct position.  Instead, the SA has not sought to address their assaults on good faith and ‘fit and proper’ behaviour.  We have now been bound into a long-term arrangement to restore the fortunes of one of the Caribbean’s riskiest adventurers.

Readers, please take note. In terms of its size, timing and terms, this CL Financial bailout is a grievous attack on the very integrity of our Treasury.

SIDEBAR: Heads we lose, tails they win…

The EQUITY position

In a situation like this, where a company is effectively both illiquid and insolvent, the incoming investor/lender has enhanced rights.  Effectively, such a company is dead – just like someone whose heart has stopped beating – and any assistance or lending is usually on very onerous terms.  The only exception would be in the case of related-parties who are able to agree special terms which no one else could accept.

That seems to have been the case here, since we had the CL Financial group out of cash, with its assets fully pledged, but yet able to get the full financial assistance of the State, without being forced to relinquish the rights of its shareholders.

One is reminded of the telling statement by the Governor at the press conference to announce the bailout on 30th January 2009, as to the fact that one of the main reasons for the collapse of the CL Financial group was ‘…excessive related-party transactions…’.  It seems to me that this is exactly what we, the entire nation of Trinidad & Tobago, have now entered into.

The capacity to learn from the past is one of the main signs of maturation, but we are not displaying those qualities here at all, at all.

We do not seem to have learned from the central lesson of that tragic collapse.

The PUBLIC position

Another troubling aspect of this SA is that it does not properly allocate risk and reward between the parties.  Again, readers are asked to remember that the mis-matching of risk and reward was also one of the elements which brought down the CL Financial group.

  1. First example, let us use an Optimistic Modelin which the State intervention in CL Financial is successful. That would look like this –
    • All policyholders’ and depositors’ claims are satisfied;
    • All asset values are restored;
    • Republic Bank Limited and Barbados National Bank continue to thrive as leading banks in their sectors;
    • CLICO, British-American etc are restored as dynamic companies with healthy market share;
    • Angostura, Methanol Holdings, Home Construction Ltd and the other non-financial parts of the CL Financial group are also restored to health;
    • Overall, the CL Financial group returns to profitability.

    If that happened, the State investment in CL Financial would have been beneficial to the 325 shareholders, but all the State would be entitled to receive, for having risked its own capital, would be a repayment of those sums, with no interest.

    In this situation, the SA has allocated to the State all the risk, a massive injection of capital, responsibility for management, yet even in the case of a successful outcome there is no return either by way of interest on the funds advanced or equity in the rejuvenated enterprises.

  2. Second example, let us use a Pessimistic Modelin which the State intervention in CL Financial fails. That would look like this –
    • Many policyholders’ and depositors’ claims are frustrated;
    • Assets are sold by mortgagees and decline in value;
    • Republic Bank Limited and Barbados National Bank are disposed of to meet the demands of creditors;
    • CLICO, British-American etc fail to regain their place in the markets;
    • Angostura, Methanol Holdings, Home Construction Ltd and the other non-financial parts of the CL Financial group are adversely affected by the group’s troubles and also decline or are disposed of;
    • Overall, the CL Financial group is slowly broken up.

    If that happened, the State investment in CL Financial would have been a loss for the taxpayer, since it would be impossible to recover our funds.

    In this situation, the SA has allocated to the State all the risk, a massive injection of capital and responsibility for management.  The only thing the State has to look forward to here is the blame and the losses.

Heads we lose, tails they win…

The UDeCOTT finale

Calder Hart. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
Calder Hart

The resignation of Calder Hart as Executive Chairman of UDeCOTT and all four other major Boards he chaired is no surprise to me. None whatsoever. I had already noted in this space the consistent false claims and bogus rationales emerging from that individual.

One of the main ones is the ‘Anancy-story’ that all these new buildings would reduce the rents paid by government for offices. Those false claims of savings to the public purse were often repeated by the PM and his then Minister of Planning and Development, Camille Robinson-Regis, but they were withdrawn when challenged to let us have some figures. By my calculations, the UdeCOTT offices will cost this country about 3 times MORE per square foot than the space now occupied. Hart has consistently declined/refused or ignored my several requests for information on the touted savings.

We need to locate this moment firmly in context, so that we are not fooled, again, into seeing these issues too narrowly. Some main issues are –

  • Rationale – If we are to do better with our limited resources, we need to behave differently. Before we can behave differently, we need to think differently. This entire UDeCOTT/Calder Hart/JCC/Imbert/Rowley/Uff scene has been useful in that huge areas, previously hidden, have now been revealed. It is an opportunity for us to learn from our mistakes. In my view, the weak spot in the link is that we have no proper system for project origination, selection and ranking. We need to start asking the essential questions – ‘What are we proposing?’ and ‘Why are we proposing that?’
  • Cabinet-Approved? – We need to be mindful of the PM’s address to the Senate on 13th May 2008 – see http://www.ttembassy.org/051308.htm – in which he emphasised that all UDeCOTT’s projects were carried out with proper Cabinet approval – after a thorough process – and that that organisation enjoyed his full confidence. One is now bound to reflect on the implications of the doctrine of Cabinet solidarity – one for all and all for one. Does the Cabinet as a whole share in the political cost of Mr. Manning’s vote of confidence? If Mr. Hart’s actions were indeed Cabinet-approved, why the need for him to resign? If he is guilty of ‘going too far’, does the doctrine of collective responsibility apply here? Do his fellow Board Directors share in that responsibility? How far does the stain spread? Are the other companies Hart chaired OK?
  • UDeCOTT’s procedures – For example, UDeCOTT was shown at the Uff Commission to have separate tendering rules from those applicable to other State Enterprises. Even with that special approval in hand, UDeCOTT found it necessary to breach its own tender procedure. Other shocking evidence of improper practices emerged at the Uff Commission, so one can understand their strong attempts to derail that enquiry. The public should brace for a critical report with many unpleasant revelations. The report of the Uff Commission must be published without delay or dilution.
  • UDeCOTT’s board – On Monday morning, I was disgusted, but not surprised, to read about the flat refusal of the other UDeCOTT directors to step down. Some real predictable alibis there – ‘Innocent until proven guilty’, ‘needing more information before a statement could be made’ and, of course, the classic one, ‘squeaky-clean’. The most worrying aspect of UDeCOTT’s shambles is the steadfast silence on its audited accounts. I published End-notes on the Uff Commission in this space on 17th December 2009 – that article highlighted Hart’s opaque explanation for the lack of accounts for UDeCOTT. UDeCOTT is the largest State Enterprise and, at the Uff commission, its attorneys stated it to be a $20Bn + company. We have all heard over and over from the PM that it is the best-performing State Enterprise. The lack of audited accounts since 2006 is shocking. No accounts for 2007, 2008 or 2009 and that could never be exemplary or squeaky-clean. It is obvious, to anyone with a shred of sense, that a company which was unable or unwilling to publish audited accounts for three years has serious issues, none of them likely to be positive. I doubt that the Unit Trust would buy, or continue to hold, shares in a company which had failed to publish accounts for three years. I doubt that any prudent or proper investment house would do so. What is worse, UDeCOTT has offered no cogent explanation for its failure to publish accounts. The difference with UDeCOTT is that we are constitutionally unable to divest ourselves of those shares. It seems to me that the contemptuous attitude of those at the top is informed by this reality.
  • Hart’s testimony – Calder Hart, under oath, denied the allegations made by Carl Khan as to the link between the owners of CH Limited and himself. Given what has transpired here, is Hart guilty of lying to the Commission? Is that a criminal offence? Readers need to note that the instant Calder Hart’s and UDeCOTT’s attorneys refused to question testimony of Carl Khan, it was tantamount to an admission of the truth. That refusal to cross-examine Carl Khan was almost 6 months ago, so this trusted civil servant was given time to prepare before his resignation. Not everyone is offered that sort of courtesy and consideration, as Dr. Rowley’s case shows. It is a clear case of double-standards. Calder Hart appears to have enjoyed a most favoured status, for whatever reason.
  • Manning’s judgement – This entire sorry episode casts a shadow of doubt over the quality of judgement exercised by our Prime Minister. Consider that since Carl Khan filed his evidence in May, Calder Hart must have known that his days were numbered. Did Hart tell Manning that there was truth to the accusations? Yes or no? Did Manning ask him? Did they just keep on with the relationship long after a wise person would have broken it off?

Finally, we need to deal with the widespread belief that after all is said and done, the country is better off as we have gotten many new buildings for our money, even if a few things went wrong, or too far. I do not support those views, for three reasons –

  1. Firstly, none of the UDecott projects make any commercial sense. Even NAPA, which is supposedly of some cultural or artistic importance is now being seriously questioned by many responsible groups.
  2. Secondly, what we are hearing is a version of ‘the ends justify the means’ and that is not an acceptable path to developing any modern country. Every time we have tried that, the costs far outweigh the benefits. That is the strategic and moral bankruptcy which took us to this sorry place.
  3. Lastly, we need to remember that most of UDeCOTT’s projects were paid for with borrowed monies, which we are only now starting to repay.

Freedom Of Information Request for Duprey’s Letter

This is my second application, under the Freedom of Information Act, for access to a vital document in this CL Financial bailout. The first application was made on 18th November 2009 for the Agreement dated 12th June 2009 between our government and the CL Financial group – it can be accessed here.

On this occasion I am applying for access to the letter written by Lawrence Duprey, Executive Chairman of the CL Financial group, to Ewart Williams, Governor of the Central Bank of Trinidad & Tobago, on 13th January 2009. That letter was read into the records of our Parliament on 4th February 2009 by the Minister of Finance as featured in ‘Finding the Assets’‘. My reading of that letter is that CL Financial stated its asset value to be $23.9BN at the time of writing. Given that the asset value of the CL Financial group was stated to be some $100.7Bn as at the end of 2007, this is a central part of the riddle we need to solve.

The Central Bank is exempted from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and it is likely that this immunity will be cited to deny my application. My point is that the Minister of Finance, having deliberately removed that letter from the legal cloak of secrecy enjoyed by the Central Bank and read the letter into the Parliament’s records, can hardly claim that providing me with a copy is in any way inimical to the resolution of this matter.

It seems to me that a refusal to provide the copy of Mr. Duprey’s letter will only deepen the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.

AUDIO: High Noon Interview – 26 February 2010

AUDIO: High Noon Interview – 26 February 2010

Power 102 FM

Afra Raymond is interviewed on the “High Noon” show on Power 102 Fm in Trinidad and Tobago, hosted by Larry Lumsden, on the CL Financial bailout and its possible ramifications for the the society.

  • Programme Date: 26 February 2010
  • Programme Length: 0:43:17