CL Financial bailout – Examining the Horns

Once again, I am returning to the need for us to grow a culture of responsible behaviour as a vital part of national development.

Responsible Reasoning

William Lucie-Smith
William Lucie-Smith

The idea that the CL Financial bailout is just like the one in the USA is a durable one, which has been very useful to those people who are seeking satisfaction.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  That is a false view and what is more, extremely misleading to the public, who rely on informed members of society to share that information conscientiously.  Rightfully or wrongfully, many people here look upon the USA and the doings of its government with a sense of approval, to the point that if Uncle Sam does it that way, there must be some good sense in that.  That idea that our bailout is ‘just like the one in America‘ must be challenged, defeated and put out of its misery.

On Wednesday August 18th, William Lucie-Smith, the Express columnist wrote on this very topic, his sub-title being ‘A new strategy required’.  That column can be found at http://www.trinidadexpress.com/commentaries/CL_Financial_A_new_strategy_required_.html
Lucie-Smith is a chartered accountant, former Managing Partner of PricewaterhouseCoopers and currently is a Director of both Republic Bank and Sagicor – he is described in his byline as ‘specialising in corporate finance’.

That article started with the claim that the CL Financial bailout was in some way similar to the US government’s bailout of its financial sector.

…The original plan was to guarantee policyholder funds and make loans available to Clico, so that confidence would be restored and the group businesses turned around. This is what happened in the United States with the vast majority of TARP funds being repaid in full with interest…

Given the huge stakes in this matter, the promotion of such misleading views is nothing less than public mischief.

Here are some of the main points of the CL Financial bailout which are, in every respect, completely different from the USA situation –

  • No Public Explanation – Apart from Duprey’s single, brief speech at the press conference to announce the bailout on 30th January 2009, there has been no proper forum at which the CL Financial chiefs have been made to give an account of this catastrophic collapse.  Neither has there been an attempt to set one up.  That is in direct contrast to the highly-publicised and televised Congressional hearings at which the chiefs of these failed financial institutions have been questioned as to their actions and the serious consequences.  We have all seen those TV shows.  Even the new CL Financial management is little better, compared with the USA where the Treasury must make a monthly report to Congress on the bailout.
  • No limit on quantum – No limits have ever been set on the CL Financial bailout.  Every firm in the USA bailout had its borrowing limits specified at the outset.  As an example, see Citigroup’s terms at http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/hp1287.html.  Or the wider bailout, at http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg13.html.
  • No interest – Neither of the Agreements specifying the terms of the CL Financial bailout even mention interest.  As Lucie-Smith himself stated, the recipients of the US bailout had to repay taxpayers’ monies with interest.
  • No pre-payment of creditors – An interesting feature of the US bailout was that the failing financial institutions were made to stand the first tranche of losses before any taxpayers’ monies were injected.  In other words, they had to sell some of their assets first before tapping into Uncle Sam’s Treasury.  In contrast, CL Financial has been able to tap right into Treasury funds without any significant asset disposals – yet another point that Lucie-Smith himself makes.
  • No time-limit for repayment – Neither of the Agreements specifying the terms of the CL Financial bailout give any stated payback period.  The US bailout set out repayment periods for all recipients of taxpayers’ funds.
  • No security taken – No significant CL Financial assets have been disposed of, as per the agreements – yet another point that Lucie-Smith himself makes.  In addition, the Governor of the Central Bank has himself confirmed that all of the CL Financial group assets are encumbered – see http://guardian.co.tt/business/business/2009/04/08/govt-left-empty-handed-cl-financial-bailout.
  • No dilution of equity position of CL Financial shareholders – Despite the massive extent of the CL Financial bailout – it is effectively an open-ended commitment – there is no dilution of the shareholders’ equity.  In the US bailout, the troubled  companies were forced to give equity to the Federal Government.  In order to receive taxpayers’ money in the USA, Fannie Mae (the huge mortgage company) gave 79.9% of its equity; while AIG (at that time the world’s largest insurer) gave over 85% of its equity; 36% of Citibank belonged to the US government in February 2009 – pages 229, 401-2 and 530 of Andrew Ross Sorkin’s ‘Too big to Fail’ refer.  CL Financial shareholders have not been made to dilute their equity.  If I, writing as an interested citizen, could know this, it seems that any specialist in corporate finance would also know these details.

The only resemblance to the US bailout is in name only.  Real Trini-ting.    Duprey and his cohorts negotiated a Blank-Cheque Bailout at zero interest, without losing any of their assets.  That deal is absolutely unique.

Our taxpayers have effectively made a huge single loan (probably the largest in the Region’s history) to the wealthiest individual in the Region at Zero interest.  Virtually every relevant professional body and Civic Society organisation has remained silent on this bold-faced attack on our Treasury.  Nothing from the Accountants, Lawyers, Bankers, Economists, Trade Unionists or Religious bodies.  The one recent exception to this has been the call by the Trinidad & Tobago Transparency Institute (TTTI) for investigations into the Angostura disaster.

The CL Financial bailout has been cloaked in the robes of benevolence and stability, resulting in a situation which has minimised the floods of lawsuits which would have been confronting some of those responsible parties – Auditors, Attorneys, Company Directors and Officers.  In reality, the common-wealth of our entire society has been pledged to rescue a fortunate few.

The CL Financial bailout is in urgent need of re-negotiation, to say the least.  “It wrong like a biscuit.”

In the same way it was wrong for the last administration to use taxpayers‘ money to rescue the CL Financial chiefs from the real consequences of their decisions, it would be equally wrong for this newly-elected government to also bailout those affected by HCU’s demise.  Two wrongs could never make a right.

Cocktail of Consequences

Angostura Rums

Angostura is the Caribbean’s flagship rum and bitters company.  It was a Caribbean icon, manufacturer of Angostura Bitters, as well as classic rums like 1919, Royal Oak, 1824, VAT 19 and Old Oak – Angostura was acquired by CL Financial in 1998.

The 2008 audited accounts were finally published at the end of July 2010 and the extent of their losses are cause for grave concern, seemingly a harbinger of the state of the entire group, 18 months into the bailout.

Coming after an extended wait for the 2008 audited accounts, the Guardian headline on 4th August 2010 was stunning: ‘Angostura declares $1.28Bn loss’ – see   http://guardian.co.tt/business/business/2010/08/04/angostura-declares-128-billion-loss.

The Express headline, on the same date and story, made me smile – ‘Angostura sales rise’ – see http://www.trinidadexpress.com/business/99917894.html.

It was said to be the largest loss in the history of our stock market and it represents colossal destruction of investors’ capital and national wealth.  It seems that the source of the losses was a receivable due from its parent company, CL Financial – according to the Deputy Chairman’s report – see http://www.angostura.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JSMxolh%2bmC8%3d&tabid=144 –

…[the] precarious financial position of our parent company…impaired the collectability of circa $1,185M in receivables from the CL Financial group…

The Notice to Shareholders of 26th June 2009 – see https://afraraymond.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/26jun2009_angostura_notice_to_shareholders.pdf – stated that the receivable from the parent company was $633M.  So you have to wonder what is the reason for that receivable almost doubling.

The interests of the minority shareholders have been subordinated to those of the majority shareholder, CL Financial, which was able to acquire the leading Jamaican distiller, Lascelles Mercado, by deploying the Angostura assets.  This episode is one which raises issues of minority shareholder rights which are unlikely to disperse.  As Justice Carlton Best is reported to have said, in relation to his lawsuit against CLICO for a $57,000 fixed deposit they failed to honour upon maturity – ‘It feels like robbery without a firearm’.

Who advised the Angostura Board on this transaction?  How can we accept the declaration that those funds are now irrecoverable?  How could a parent company, said by its auditors to have assets worth in excess of $100Bn at the very same accounting date (31st December 2008) be unable to repay a mere $1.185Bn.

Yes, it is true, the same accountants – the esteemed international firm, PriceWaterhouseCoopers – are auditors for both CL Financial and Angostura.  But more on that in the sidebar.

It is almost a metaphysical query – can a responsible class always escape judgement?

SIDEBAR: Auditing the Auditors

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) is the world’s largest professional services firm in the accounting and finance industry.  PwC audits the accounts for UDeCOTT, CL Financial, Angostura and at one point I can even recall the Hindu Credit Union announcing that that firm was to be their internal auditors.  Clearly, PwC is a main player in the big leagues here in Trinidad & Tobago.  Let me declare here that they are also my [Afra Raymond, not Raymond & Pierre] accountants.

On 30th June that firm issued a letter, under the hand of Colin Wharfe, its new Senior Partner, to announce four new appointments.  The letter also explained that four of the most senior Partners had all retired on 30th June, those were –

  • Graham Mitchell, former Senior Partner, after 28 years’ service;
  • Jewan Ramcharitar, after 34 years’ service;
  • Peter Inglefield, after 34 years’ service;
  • Gerald Olliverre, after 32 years’ service.

The new appointments were announced in full-page press adverts, which omitted the retirements. See letter here – https://afraraymond.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/pwc_resignations.pdf

•
A version of this commentary appeared in print on August 26, 2010, on page 17 of the Business Guardian.

Housing Policy Imperatives – part 5

This week the examination shifts to the scale of the failure of our national housing policy – see <http://www.vision2020.info.tt/pdf/Policies and Procedures/Strategic_Corporate Plans/Housing Plan.pdf>.  Three main points for consideration are –

  1. Meeting the targets
    The original target was for the HDC to construct 100,000 new homes in a decade, which figure was generated from the 1994 ‘PADCO reports’—The Review of Shelter and Land Development Policy Study (PADCO reports): The PADCO reports is a series generated by The Planning and Development Collaborative International, Inc. and Laughlin and Associates Limited (who were contracted by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago in 1993)—that study is available at the Ministry of Housing & Environment’s library.  The annual target was reduced to 8,000.  As noted in the previous article, the reduced targets should have yielded 60,000 new homes by now, but the HDC has built only 15,394 new homes.The HDC made a recent statement that the number of empty new homes was approximately 10,000.  So just about 5,000 new homes have been built and distributed since the inception of this ‘accelerated housing programme’ in September 2002.  Even if we omit 2002, that is an annual average of 667 new homes being built and distributed. Even with the most optimistic assumptions, one is looking at considerable challenges in achieving these demanding targets.  At the current rate of performance it would take over 140 years to satisfy the original target.  That is how far off-track this accelerated housing programme has gone.  Deep into the long grass.
  2. The Cost-based Pricing model
    In previous articles in this series, I have been critical of the HDC’s cost-based approach to pricing its units.  In terms of the central mission of the Ministry of Housing  – i.e. creation and distribution of housing to the needy – that pricing model is inappropriate.  That is because it does not identify either the housing subsidy allocated to successful applicants or the opportunity cost of the HDC’s policies. The value-based approach is the more appropriate model to satisfy those basic requirements.  That is because it offers greater clarity to policymakers, since it is based on the market value of the completed homes, with the housing subsidy and the opportunity cost being the difference between the value and the actual HDC selling price. On 21st March 2008, this newspaper carried a report headlined “PM’s son in line for apartment” – see http://legacy.guardian.co.tt/archives/2008-03-21/news8.html – on allegations that Brian Manning, son of the then-PM was in line to receive one of the HDC apartments at Fidelis Heights in St. Augustine.  Noel Garcia, the then-MD of the HDC, was reported to have said –

    …the Government had taken a decision not to subsidise this  particular development. It is being sold at market rates in HDC’s thrust to expand and attract an open market clientele.

    Noel Garcia, former MD of HDC. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
    Noel Garcia, former MD of HDC. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian

    Given that the units were reportedly being sold for a maximum of $875,000 and that they were worth a minimum of $1.7M, it is clear that each new home there is sold with at least $800,000 in housing subsidy.  The only way Garcia’s incredible statements could be correct is if one were using the misleading cost-based approach.

    I entirely agree with his statement that the Fidelis Heights development “…is therefore not part of HDC’s provision of subsidised housing for low-income earners.”  It is really subsidised housing for the middle-income groups, but that could never be right when the waiting list is bulging with needy people who cannot even get an HDC unit to rent.

    Fidelis Heights was, even by its name, a monument to misleading and wrong-headed thinking.  The HDC project with probably the highest level of housing subsidy per unit was built for the least needy on their waiting list.  Only if the underlying philosophies and resulting models are appropriate, can we avoid a repetition of this blatant waste of public funds in the face of real, human need.

    Given that the HDC is unable to satisfy the needs of the people it was intended to serve – the poorest citizens who cannot afford a proper home – it is scandalous that its scarce resources should have been diverted to Fidelis Heights, or the one at Federation Park in Port-of-Spain.

    The selection of this pricing model is proof of misguided policy at the most elementary level.  The basic concept of opportunity cost appears to have eluded the responsible officials and, what is more, that misguided policy appears to have been approved at the very highest level.

    Wrong-headed thinking can only encourage corrupt behaviour.

  3. Costs
    What has the national housing programme cost this country?  That is no rhetorical question, since this fact sits at the heart of the analysis.  The Housing Development Corporation (HDC) is the State’s implementing agency for production of new housing, it was formed in 2005 by an Act of Parliament and replaced the National Housing Authority (NHA).  The HDC’s funding comes from four sources –

    1. Treasury allocations – Those are announced in the budget and can be established from the Estimates of Expenditure as Capital Allocations to the Ministry of Housing.
    2. Sale of new homes – When the HDC sells a new home, that money is also available to them.
    3. Bond Issues – The HDC has also raised money by occasional bond issues; those funds can be used to either build more homes or ‘pay down’ on more expensive loans.  The bonds issued are government-guaranteed, so they are considered as virtually risk-free ‘sovereign debt’.  Given that the government itself issues bonds at lower rates of interest, it begs the question as to why these SPE’s are allowed to borrow on these terms.  That issue was raised by in the BG View of 20th August 2009 – see http://guardian.co.tt/business/business-guardian/2009/08/20/debt-depreciation-or-discipline.
    4. Bank Financing – The HDC also borrows money from commercial banks or the IADB to fund their construction programme.

    Try as I might, it has proven impossible to determine just how much the HDC has spent on building new homes in any given year.  That is because there are no accounts at all which are available to the public.

    The HDC Act, at section 18 and 19, mandates that the Board shall keep and properly audit accounts.  Section 20 requires the Board to submit its annual report to the line Minister within 3 months of the end of the financial year.  The line Minister is in turn obliged, by section 20 (2), to lay that report in Parliament within 3 months of receipt.  See – http://mphe.gov.tt/home/images/stories/pdfs/tthdc%20act%2024%20of%202005.pdf.

    The HDC has never laid either its annual report or audited accounts into Parliament for the public.  The failure to publish accounts is one of the most serious warning-signs of companies in financial trouble.

    That failure to publish HDC or NHA accounts over such a long period (since 2002 at least) spanning several administrations, is a serious indictment of the main participants – the politicians, the Board Directors and of course, the professionals involved in the entire huge operation.

    I have been reliably informed that the HDC’s new management is attempting to rectify this situation and that must be a priority if we are to properly assess the performance of this vital social programme.

The overall picture is stark –

  • Gross under-performance in terms of the output of new homes, only about one-quarter of the reduced target has been achieved:
  • Poor financial and project controls – as revealed in the Uff Report (at para 25:30 – see http://www.raymondandpierre.com/articles/article84.htm), not one HDC project has a signed contract:
  • No accounts or annual reports, given the preceding point, that is not surprising:
  • An inequitable allocations policy, with lower priority given to those who cannot afford to buy.
  • Approximately 10,000 new homes remain empty and that is the one which tops them all.  The ongoing adverse consequences include – vandalism, the greater rate of general deterioration afflicting empty homes, the high cost of security and of course, the continued pressure on those people on the waiting list ‘holding strain’.

Given the combined effect of all this, which is probably hidden to most of today’s readers, one can only wonder at the patience of our needy citizens.

The entire situation also raises potent questions about the purpose and performance of the SPEs.

SIDEBAR: The concept and importance of opportunity cost and housing subsidy

Let’s use a typical home at Fidelis Heights as an example.

  • Unit Cost – $825,000 (and it is not clear if land and professional fees were included)
  • Selling Price – $825,000
  • Market Value – $1.7M

    • In the prevailing cost-based pricing model, this is considered a satisfactory, ‘zero-subsidy’ result, since the State has recovered all of its costs. Another phrase in the lexicon is the ‘cost-recovery’ model of pricing.

    The danger, as shown in the example in this article, is that the ‘cost-based’/’cost-recovery’ model ignores opportunity cost.

    The opportunity cost is the difference between the actual selling price of the unit and the market value. The HDC could sell each Fidelis Heights home for $1.7M, but has made the decision to sell at a reduced price of $825,000, which means that each sale is at the loss of those possible earnings. That amount of the loss incurred by the decision to sell at a lower price is called the opportunity cost. It is important that opportunity cost be identified and quantified as an element in all decision-making, both private and public sector. A decision-making process which ignores or obscures opportunity cost is negligent at the very least and can encourage corrupt practices and the dilution of capital.

    In this example, the opportunity cost is $1,700,000 – $825,000 = $875,000.
    Opportunity cost

    $875,000 is enough money to build at least three modest homes, yet this system has allocated that much money to each Fidelis Heights purchaser, each of whom qualified for a mortgage at that level.

    As a result of this questionable choice and the resultant shaky pricing model, there is an enormous ‘leakage’ of housing subsidy and opportunity cost.

    The opportunity cost can also be described as the housing subsidy since that is the difference between what a Fidelis Heights unit actually sold for and what a purchaser in the open market would have to pay for a similar unit.
    The two terms are therefore synonymous – Opportunity Cost is exactly equal to Housing Subsidy.

    http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2009/03/25/quality-performance-must

    •
    A version of this commentary appeared in print on August 5, 2010, on page 13 of the Business Guardian.

    Related reading:

    Housing Policy Imperatives – Part 4

    Having set out a framework for a more effective and equitable national housing policy, it is time to deepen the discussion.  In this week’s column, I will further analyse the existing housing policy so as to highlight those errors which we must avoid if we are to do better.

    My proposed framework would quantify housing subsidy and allocate that in accordance with identified housing need, with the quality of the new homes also being monitored to ensure constant improvement.

    To go further into the issues requires that we examine these aspects –

    • National Planning – It will be very difficult to achieve improved levels of housing quality if we proceed to build large numbers of new homes without reference to a national land-use plan.  1984 was the last time our Parliament approved a national land-use plan.  Over 25 years have elapsed and the position of the last government was that the national land use plan was being prepared for discussion in the next 2 years or so.  We have very limited developable land in this country – only about 9 to 10% of the total – so it is critical to plan and co-ordinate our future for best results with our limited resources.  Transportation, education, shopping, health-care, industry, housing and recreation are the main aspects which need to be fit onto those developable lands.  This ongoing housing programme has already had grievious cases of the alienation of agricultural lands for housing.  Alienation of agricultural lands is when we pave over farmland for non-agricultural development.  That land is permanently lost in terms of our food supply, but we need to preserve our agricultural lands.  That is vital in terms of maintaining our food security.
    • Intensity of development – An associated aspect that we need to reconsider is whether we can spare the land to continue HDC developments of  homes with gardens.  The HDC must publish its figures on the numbers of new homes built; the amount of land consumed; the numbers of houses versus the numbers of multiple-family homes and of course, the numbers of these various types of homes which have actually been occupied.  At this point the HDC has only built 15,394 new homes, compared to their annual target output of 8,000 new homes, which, if attained, would have been 60,000 new homes.  The HDC has only built a quarter of the intended number of new homes, which means that we still have time to adjust and improve the programme.
    • Pricing – The more I consider the dilemma in which this housing policy has been caught, the more it seems that the fundamentals were poorly-considered.  Just consider the issue of the pricing of the units – How did the pricing model evolve?  I have already, in part 2 of this series, critiqued the HDC’s cost-based model for its erroneous outputs in terms of assessing the quantities of housing subsidy being allocated.  One can go further to ask how these price points emerged.  Was any reference made to the incomes of the people on the waiting-list or were the HDC prices driven by the demands of the physical development agenda?  It seems to me that the latter was what took place, if indeed any conscious process of setting prices ever did occur.  If we are aiming for people-centred development, that entire misguided approach to pricing needs to be revised.  We need to give serious consideration to building more modest multiple-family homes for rental.
    • Quality – Another matter which has been in the news from both the last administration and now the new one, is the issue of the poor quality of some of the new homes.  We have been given various ‘horror stories’ about poor construction and the need for further works and so on.  But there is more to this story.  The fact is that the norm in the construction industry is that a contractor only has a valid claim to be paid in the case of ‘works properly executed’, so how did the HDC end up paying for all these defective buildings?  I am not seeking to exonerate the contractors from any wrongdoing, but the simple fact is that someone in HDC ought to have had the responsibility to inspect and approve the works before payment was authorized.  Either the HDC has a process for doing that or not.  If yes, what went wrong?  Who signed-off on those poorly-built homes?  If there is no such process, then the HDC system is one which exposes the Treasury and the neediest families in the land to real abuse.  These are serious questions which need to be answered, and soon.  If there are indeed civil servants and consultant advisers who have been approving defective work, they need to be dealt with.  If that were so, it seems to me that such actions would amount to grave professional misconduct, at the very least.  Such people should be banned from any State work for a period, as a minimum.  The real horror story is the official silence on the fact that someone from the HDC had to approve these very same defective works.  Lying by omission – see http://guardian.co.tt/commentary/letters/2010/06/03/don-t-blame-contractors-only-shoddy-hdc-work.  That continuing dishonesty is the real horror story.  To remind readers that this is no new issue, please see – http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2010/04/26/capacity-firms-weak-non-existent.

    I close this week by renewing my call for Minister Moonilal to take leadership on this burning national issue.  A conference on revising Housing Policy should include participation from the leading civil society organizations such as the JCC, the National Land Tenants’ and Rate-payers’ Association, the Sou-Sou Land group, Habitat for Humanity and the Salvation Army.

    Basic facts need to be compiled and distributed to seed the discussion.  The framework and philosophy need to be clearly articulated, if we are to get it right this time around.

    The continuing presence of over 10,000 empty homes is intolerable – it is solid proof of a seriously failed policy.  Our silence has to be broken on this issue.  We cannot continue this way.

    Related reading:

    VIDEO: Morning Edition Interviews

    VIDEO: Morning Edition Interviews – March 2010

    AfraRaymond.com, at this time chooses to re-issues these interviews on Morning edition on TV6 CCN, Trinidad and Tobago, to keep readers up-to-date on issues surrounding Uff Report and UDeCOTT Affair respectively.

    1. Afra Raymond sits with senior journalist Andy Johnson to discuss the “UDeCOTT/Calder Hart Affair” on Morning Edition television show on TV6.
      • Programme Date: 10 March 2010
      • Programme Length: 0:28:16

    2. Afra Raymond sits with guest host, William Lucie-Smith on the Morning Edition television show as part of a panel with senior counsel Israel Khan, to discuss the leaked Uff Report.
      • Programme Date: 31 March 2010
      • Programme Length: 0:26:52

    Second FoI Application for Duprey Letter

    Application #2 for Duprey Letter

    This is a second attempt to get at the Duprey letter – the first application was eventually deflected by the Ministry, who asked us to refer to the Central Bank. I believe that was a barefaced attempt to stifle our request with the fact that the Central Bank is exempt from the FoI Act.

    My request for the 2008 audited accounts is based on the terms of the 12th June CL Financial Shareholders’ Agreement – Section 4 of the SA sets out the procedure for a proper system of accounts, culminating at 4.4.5 – “…shall ensure that an annual report of CLF is prepared and dispatched…in manner consistent with standard corporate practice…” The accepted interpretation of this language informs us that the word ‘shall’ denotes an obligatory, non-voluntary duty. If that is the case, when can we expect publication of the 2008 annual report, accompanied by audited accounts, as per ‘standard corporate practice’?

    Housing policy imperatives – part 3

    hdc-logoLast week’s column delved into the vital issue of housing subsidy and its mis-allocation.  This week, I will set out some suggestions as to how this wrong-headed allocation of public subsidy might be re-oriented to better serve our needy citizens.

    The existing system is fundamentally flawed and in urgent need of reform, if we are to better apply the limited quantities of housing subsidy to the nation’s real housing needs.

    In order to create a more effective and transparent equation for the allocation of housing subsidy we need to establish three things.  Those are the quantity of housing subsidy which is available for the State to dispense; the housing need of those on the HDC’s waiting list and the housing quality of the new units produced by the HDC, since those ought to be raising the general standard of housing accommodation.

    The key point here is that there is only limited housing subsidy available and a clear choice has to be made as to its allocation.  That choice has been made under the existing policy, which in my view is inequitable and counter-productive.  If we accept that the proper measure of a successful housing policy is needy families moving into new HDC homes which improve their living conditions, we also need to accept that a policy which can generate over 10,000 empty homes is a failure.

    A supplementary point is that if we are spending vast sums to build new homes, we also need to obtain a measurable improvement in the nation’s housing standards.

    The main points could be outlined in this way –

    • Housing Subsidy – First of all, we need to establish the quantity of housing subsidy the State is prepared to dispense.  That can be determined by the sale of the new homes, as recently proposed by Minister Moonilal.  The figure here being the difference between the market value of the new homes and the HDC’s sale price.  I am of the view that we are at, or very close to, the ceiling as to the national percentage of home-ownership.  Another approach would be to establish the difference between the market rental value of the HDC units and the rents affordable to the applicants on the waiting list.  That figure can be capitalized to allow comparison between the policy choices.  The proposed effort to sell the new homes will in fact be inimical, since it will have the effect of decreasing the amount of housing subsidy available to those who cannot afford to buy.  In other words, the neediest people on the waiting list are being discriminated against by the policy of the HDC.
    • Housing Need Index (HNI) – We need to develop a framework for measuring the housing need of applicants for HDC housing.  That analysis would need to include such items as size of the family, family income and their living conditions, as well as any special needs such as disabilities and the location of the extended family.  The UK’s Department of the Environment and its implementing agency, The Housing Corporation, have already done substantial work in developing the HNI as a means of properly allocating State funding for housing across the nation.  The USA’s Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has also done considerable work on this complex series of questions.
    • Housing Quality Index – In 1993 I proposed a Housing Quality Index for the UK which would have been a tool for measuring how effectively the State funding had been applied in creating good quality housing.  The main elements of my proposal were to measure the quality of design of and amenity provided by new homes.  The Housing Corporation’s approach to this can be viewed at http://www.housingcorp.gov.uk/upload/pdf/710_HQI_Form_v3-1.pdf, see also this view from the UK’s Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) – http://www.homesandcommunities.co.uk/housing_quality.  Training is available at the Housing Quality Network – http://www.hqnetwork.org.uk/index.

    We need to allocate the limited housing subsidy to those in the greatest need.  That is the only reasonable policy for this critical area of national development.  That can only proceed properly on the basis of understanding the parts of the puzzle.  Anything other than a comprehensive review of these wrong-headed policies is a recipe for more waste and empty homes.

    Which brings me to an issue raised in last week’s column; the incidence of ‘policy silos’.  That phrase – ‘policy silos’ – refers to a condition in which the activities of various State agencies impinge on the same issues and yet, incredibly, there seems to be scant, if any, co-ordination between those agencies.  The aspects addressed last week can be summarized as –

    • The Minister of Housing and the Environment, Dr. Roodal Moonilal, making extensive statements on the sale of new homes, but being silent on the burning issue of new homes for rent.  Silence as to the greater area of need, alongside ambitious proposals to advance futile policies in favour of the less-needy.
    • The Minister of Science, Technology and Tertiary Education (MSTTE), Fazal Karim, proposes blanket rental subsidies for students in tertiary education.
    • The Legal Affairs Minister, Prakash Ramadhar, who is responsible for the rent control system, declares that he prefers that rents be determined by market forces.

    Those are exactly the ‘policy silos’ we need to dismantle if we are to make any real progress on these vital issues.

    Minister Moonilal should take the lead on this issue by convening a symposium or conference to debate these issues and establish some kind of policy consensus.  We cannot continue this way.

    We need to go beyond the numbers game of billions spent, jobs created and new homes built.  We need to move to a new, clear space where our national housing policy is declared as existing to improve the living conditions of our neediest citizens.  We need to move beyond the narrow perspectives which glorify home-ownership as the only correct answer.  There are many productive and honest families, in advanced countries, who never own a home.  They are no less worthwhile than those of us who are home-owners.

    Most of all, Minister Moonilal should take urgent steps to distribute the ‘…approximately 10,000…’ homes to the most needy.

    SIDEBAR: Re-purchase programmes

    There ought to be a programme for those people who have HDC homes and no longer need them.  That program would offer a cash payment to those HDC tenants who vacated their units.  That would have the practical effect of releasing additional housing units to the HDC without the expense and delay of having to construct new ones.

    Related reading:

    Change, not Exchange – Part 3: Jack Warner

    Jack Warner, MP. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
    Austin 'Jack' Warner, MP and acting Prime Minister
    On 6th June, I wrote in this space about the challenge to the new government to bring about a real change, as opposed to mere exchange.  I ended that column by highlighting the worrying case of Jack Warner, one of my former history teachers, making history by being the first Cabinet Minister to hold other appointments.  My objection to Mr. Warner serving two masters was that it would be impossible for him to give the full energies we have every right to expect from our Cabinet members.

    We need to be mindful of the relationship between morals, ethics, law and of course, that scarce commodity, good sense.  Obviously, law is the paramount authority, because we live in a republic ruled by laws, not men. No one should break the law and there are penalties for doing that.  But we also know that in life we make many important decisions without referring to any laws. Those are sound decisions, which form norms, eventually described as custom-and-practice or culture. There are many acts, which are at one and the same time both deeply offensive to right-thinking people (and I think that most people are right-thinking) and in breach of no particular law.  Many acts, with no need for examples, since this is a newspaper any child could pick up and read. There might even be laws against me describing such acts in print.  Who knows?

    The reality being that, as important as law is, the proper development of our society depends on far more than just law.  Law is a necessary, but not sufficient ingredient for proper development.  So, what do I mean by proper development?  One of the key signs that we are moving forward would be an increased sense of consequence and the capacity to learn from our errors.  Some examples of our failures in those respects were set out in the prior article in this series.

    Some of the main points here were –

    • Board resignations – Jack Warner’s opening statement, made on Indian Arrival Day, was his strong demand that all Board Directors of State Enterprises and Statutory Bodies coming under the control of his Ministry must submit immediate resignations.  In making that call, Mr. Warner relied heavily on custom-and-practice, good practice and established norms.  He was, quite properly, declaring that he expected those high-ranking public servants to behave properly.  No reference to law was considered necessary to see what was the right thing to be done.  Yet when queries arose on Jack Warner’s multiple appointments, we were rapidly boxed-into a strange place where only the law prevails.  That is ‘chinksing’ with a vengeance.
    • Warner’s statement upon his return home on the 15th was most instructive.  Consider please that this was no hasty response to an ambush question and that the entire Piarco reception had been arranged by Warner.  His emphatic reply as to the weakness of Rowley’s case was telling, in as much as it relied on the various examples of PNM wrongdoing that Rowley was accused of having condoned.

      …If Dr Rowley is so concerned about the Parliamentary Code of Ethics, I want to ask him some questions this afternoon. “Why was he so silent when Mr. Manning appointed his wife, not once, not twice, but three times as a minister? “I want to ask him why he was silent when a Minister of Health had his son open pharmacies all over the country to sell CDAP drugs? Wasn’t that code of ethics broken then? “I want to ask him also why he was silent when another Minister of Health had his wife take all the insurance of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to a company she owned? Why was he silent then?

      See – http://guardian.co.tt/news/politics/2010/06/16/warner-i-have-broken-no-law

      Strange as it might seem, a mere 3 weeks into the honeymoon, we were witnessing a premeditated statement by a senior Minister to the effect that ‘two wrongs make a right’.  Mr. Warner was trying to silence Dr. Rowley, by reference to his condonation.  That is a sad and rickety foundation from which to proceed, but even more telling is Warner’s implicit acceptance that his own position was wrong.

      Warner’s attempt to diminish Rowley’s victory was also interesting –

      Not contented that he removed Patrick Manning from office—he got the easiest political ride in history—he had the temerity to accuse me of breaking some law, or transgressing some code of ethics…

      It has to make you wonder, if that is Jack Warner’s view of Rowley’s victory, what is his view of the PP’s triumph?

    • In the midst of all the lawyers’ opinions, we had an attempt, by Michael Beloff QC, to set these local events in international context –

      …Beloff said he was unaware of any precedent in any common law jurisdiction for a person holding at one and the same time, ministerial office and another post outside of the Government.  “I have little doubt that a main reason is that the demands of ministerial office would usually preclude such dual appointment and the minister could be exposed to criticism for not devoting himself full-time to his government duties…

      see http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/97564904.html

    • The silence of the lions – Most notable, for me, in all this, was the lack of comment from outspoken people like – Errol McLeod, David Abdullah, Makandal Daaga and Anil Roberts.
    • We voted against the idiosyncratic and bizarre leadership style of Mr. Manning, in which important policies were perverted and new precedents set for a favoured operative.  It seems that the grounds for the decision were limited and the well-established precedents set aside for Mr. Warner and effectively, a ‘special case’ was made for him.

    I say again that the State has a duty to be exemplary in its conduct.  We have a right to reasonable, consistent and transparent decision-making by government.  Another aspect of this is that this lawyer-driven decision seems, to me at least, to limit the PM’s power in Cabinet to control her team.

    Apart from law, most of the people who supported Jack Warner on this issue seemed to proceed from either the ‘two wrongs’ principle or from the notion that Mr. Warner is a superior performer.  It seems that, in this case, Jack Warner will have to ‘take win’ and all we can do is measure his reputation against his actual performance.

    One of the fascinating aspects of this affair is the way in which power has been defined, and re-defined, in the unfolding.  My favourite definition of power was always ‘the ability to set the agenda’.  It has always been the case that the setting of the public agenda was a prerogative of the PM, leaving Leaders of the Opposition lagging one beat behind.  As a result of that pattern, a lot of sound and fury became the norm of Opposition. In his opening statement on 4th June, Dr. Keith Rowley, as the new Leader of the Opposition, set out his objections to Jack Warner’s multiple appointments.  We had comments from every sector of the society on this issue and many group exchanges on radio call-ins and the social media.  Whatever one thinks of the actual objections raised by Dr. Rowley, it is clear that those objections shaped the public agenda. That is no bad thing. In this rounds, it seems that the change we voted for could be coming from unexpected places and with odd timing.

    Housing policy imperatives – Part 2

    Last week’s column set out my principal queries as to our nation’s housing policy – see http://www.vision2020.info.tt/pdf/Policies and Procedures/Strategic_Corporate Plans/Housing Plan.pdf – and the intervening events have only put those into better focus.

    Key points –
    ‘Cheaper Govt Houses’ in the Sunday Guardian of 27th June featured an interview with Dr. Roodal Moonilal, Minister of Housing and the Environment.  The Minister touched on some of the key issues and confirmed that

    …Some people simply cannot afford the market value of the homes. As a result, Government is looking to provide a further subsidy to assist with the purchasing of homes. I intend to take a proposal to Cabinet to consider the price reduction of the housing units…

    – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/politics/2010/06/27/cheaper-govt-houses-pg-6 .

    There was no mention of rented housing in that article, so it seems that the new Minister has adopted the existing policy of preferring to sell the new homes built by the Housing Development Corporation (HDC).  In addition, he is proposing to increase the housing subsidy.  An important  correction is that HDC houses are not sold at ‘market value‘ as the Minister implied.  Market value is the amount the new home could sell for on the open market and the HDC offers the new homes to applicants at a lower price.

    What is Housing Subsidy?

    This is an important aspect of the housing policy discussion and these are the basic points –

    • Public funding – To create new homes, the HDC has to spend public money for land acquisition, professional fees and cost of construction – these are ‘first costs’ for new homes, but there are other significant costs of getting a needy family to move in.
    • Housing subsidy – For example, if the market value of a new HDC home is $900,000 and those homes are sold to applicants for $425,000, the housing subsidy in that case is $475,000.  Please note that I am not relating the sale price to the cost of production of the new home – that is a mistaken approach, because it ignores the opportunity cost of the investment decision to sell at that reduced price.  Effectively, this ignores the market to the detriment of the taxpayer.  Even in the case of rented housing, the same basis would apply, with the difference between the market rent and the actual rent being the weekly housing subsidy.
    • The allocation of Housing Subsidy – Fidelis Heights at Bates Trace in St. Augustine is a new HDC development of townhouses near to UWI – in my view, the homes there are middle-income units which should not have been built by the HDC.  In that case the housing subsidy per unit is in excess of $850,000.  In view of the desperate national housing shortage and the scarcity of resources, it was a grievious mis-allocation of both public capital and housing subsidy to have embarked on this scheme.  In the examples cited by the new Minister, the housing subsidy is far lower.  The people who purchased units at Fidelis Heights got them at between $780,000 to $900,000.  I am also aware that those homes were allocated without reference to housing need – i.e. some of them went to single people, without children.  To put it plainly, there is no case for allocating $850,000 in housing subsidy to a single person, when there are entire families in greater need, who are not catered for by the system.  There is a very poor quality of discussion on the issue of housing subsidy.  That is because of the system of cost-based pricing, as mentioned above, which error is compounded by the sparse references in the official statistics.  I have only been able to unearth a single official attempt to quantify housing subsidy in the ‘2010 Draft Estimates of Development Programme‘ http://www.finance.gov.tt/documents/publications/pub07D7E4.pdf ‘Provision of Housing Subsidies at Greenfield sites’ is stated, at line H 003 to be $3,058,863.  I am not saying that there is a poor understanding of the role of housing subsidy.  That would be untrue, since the people who are manipulating the system all understand the real value of housing subsidy very well.
    • Rent control – ‘Rent subsidies for tertiary students’, also in Sunday’s Guardian – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/politics/2010/06/27/rent-subsidies-tertiary-students – featured a discussion on the housing situation affecting 14,000 UWI students.

      [Minister of Science, Technology and Tertiary Education (MSTTE) Fazal] Karim said while the university has established mechanisms to register landlords “there exist no mechanisms to monitor prices, ensure quality accommodation, minimise security anxiety or seek the interests of the landlords and students.” In the near future, Karim said, the MSTTE and the Health Ministry will establish a committee that will make recommendations to establish mechanisms for the provision of subsidies “on rents to all students residing in the region and who are registered at tertiary institutions in the area.”

    It seems from his statements that the MSTTE is proposing a rental subsidy to all tertiary students, whatever their means.  In a situation of scarce resources, that type of policy can have inequitable consequences, since some of these students are not needy at all.

    The Minister of Legal Affairs, Prakash Ramadhar, attending as MP for the area, said –

    …what adds to the problem is the lapsing by the Rent Assessment Board. “We nationally had to debate the issue if this country would go into a free market in terms of rent or rent restriction.”

    Ramadhar said he would like to see free market forces determine rents.

    Legal Affairs Minister Prakash Ramadhar, left, Fazal Karim, Science, Technology and Tertiary Education Minister, right, listen attentively to the landlords during yesterday’s discussion. Photo: Jennifer Watson. Courtesy Trinidad Guardian
    Legal Affairs Minister Prakash Ramadhar, left, Fazal Karim, Science, Technology and Tertiary Education Minister, right, listen attentively to the landlords during yesterday’s discussion. Photo: Jennifer Watson

    So here we have the paradox deepening, with the Minister responsible for the rent control system seeming to say that he is against those controls.

    The outlook for the state’s intervention into the housing arena is confusing, to say the least.  Confusion is the ideal atmosphere to breed under-performance and corruption.

    Our needy citizens deserve better.  This entire debate should be to create reasonable, redistributive and  sustainable housing policies for our nation.

    The allocation of scarce housing subsidy must be reported and improved, so that the most needy receive the most subsidy.

    Next week, we expand to include questions as to how many of the HDC houses are occupied by the legitimate tenants?  Are steps being taken to deal with those who have broken the terms of their tenancy?  Also, some discussion on the use of re-purchase schemes as another way to create extra units of housing.

    SIDEBAR: The numbers’ game

    Last week’s column asked Dr. Moonilal to specify how many new homes were empty at this time and it was very disappointing to read that “…approximately 10,000 homes, including defective units, are unoccupied…”.  The new administration has to strive to do better than the one they just replaced and it is just not acceptable that the HDC cannot (or will not?) report on an elementary matter like this.

    Related reading: