Author: AfraRaymond

Managing Director, Raymond & Pierre Ltd. Past-President, Joint Consultative Council for the Construction Industry, Trinidad and Tobago- December 2010 to November 2015. Past President Institute of Surveyors of Trinidad & Tobago 2009-2010.

The CL Financial bailout: Taking in Front – The NGC element

One of the abiding questions on the CL Financial issue is – ‘What main event/s caused the group to fail?‘

One of the main rumours making the rounds at the time of the bailout was that the State-owned National Gas Company had made heavy withdrawals from CLICO Investment Bank.  Those withdrawals and the requests for the return of further deposits were said to have triggered the ‘crash’ within the CL Financial group.

Another major issue which was raised in the Parliament by the current leader of the opposition was the allegation that the Minister of Finance and Governor of the Central Bank had used ‘insider information’ to withdraw their own deposits from CIB.  Despite the explanations by these officials, which form part of this article, those perceptions persist among the population.

Ultimately, the questions have to be ‘What did they know?‘ and ‘When did they know it?‘  This article will delve into some of those issues, using the published record, as is my practice.

The main points are –

  • Frank Look Kin, Former NGC President
    Frank Look Kin, Former NGC President

    The NGC press release – This was published in the daily newspapers on 4 February 2009, as a corrective to the widespread and potentially-damaging rumours.  It was issued under the hand of the NGC President, Frank Look Kin – it is the penultimate item on its publications page, under the title ‘Press Release- NGC’s Management of Its Financial Investments‘.  Due to its huge revenues (stated to be $14.0Bn in 2008), over 90% of which are in US dollars, the NGC has established a policy for the management of its large-scale, short-term investments.  According to the press release, those funds are placed in either approved financial institutions or investment-grade rated foreign banks.  The placement of those deposits is guided by limits for the percentage of funds allocated to a financial institution or group of financial institutions.  The selection of deposit-taking institutions and the establishment of placement limits are both good financial practice in terms of risk management.

  • NGC’s placement limits – These were not disclosed in the NGC press release, but we are told that at the start of 2008, the CL Financial group was allocated 40% of the NGC’s deposits, which by the end of 2008 had been slightly reduced to 37%.  At another point we are told that in 2008, NGC withdrew an average of $151M USD per quarter, with CL Financial’s portion of that being 45.7% – more than the 2008 allocations stated earlier.The silence on the actual placement limits means that we cannot determine whether the 2008 deposits in the CL Financial group complied with that policy.  The only deposits for which we are told ‘…the deposits were within the maximum percentage limits…’ were CIB deposits in 2001, but no percentages were given in that case.We are also told that “…In the 4th quarter of 2008, deposits were recalled upon maturity from…seven financial institutions in Trinidad & Tobago and the USA…”  Even if we only count the local ones, there are 6 large banks and 19 other approved financial institutions available to accept deposits under NGC’s policy.  It is passing strange that up to 45.7% of NGC’s funds could be allocated to a single group.  If that allocation of funds in 2008 was in conformity with NGC’s deposit placement policy, it is indicative of a tremendous measure of confidence in the CL Financial group, to put it in its best possible light.  Even if CL Financial were a ‘blue-chip’ group, which they were not, such an allocation of deposits could be viewed as reckless behaviour by the responsible parties.Despite its claims of a policy to manage the risks associated with being responsible for such huge, short-term investments, it seems that the NGC may have yielded to the temptation of the unrealistically high interest rates offered by the CL Financial group.  Again, on a governance note, one has to ask – ‘What good is a prudent policy, if it is violated in practice?’It seems that we may need to examine more closely how our energy revenues are invested.
  • November 2008 – We are also told in that press release that “…In November 2008 CIB failed to return the principal and interest upon the maturity of an NGC deposit (US$10 million).  This deposit, plus interest, was paid in two amounts during the first week of December 2008…”  From that statement it seems certain that CIB’s inability to repay was known to NGC, a huge, State-owned corporation.  It is difficult to imagine that news of that importance would not have traveled to the very highest levels.  Indeed, one could argue that proper management of the State’s financial resources would have required such a piece of news to be formally reported to the relevant officials.When one juxtaposes the fact that CIB “…failed to return…” $10M USD to NGC with the measure of confidence one can infer from the extent of their dealings, it is impossible to imagine such an episode passing off quietly.
  • The Governor’s response – Ewart Williams’ written response to the allegations was unequivocal and made the very same day – it can be viewed at http://www.central-bank.org.tt/news/releases/2009/mr090204.pdf.
  • The Minister’s response – That was a statement in Parliament on the very day and it is at pages 626 to 631 of http://www.finance.gov.tt/documents/news/spF82F5F.pdf. At the time of the CL Financial collapse, the Governor was clear in identifying the prime cause to be “…excessive related-party transactions…” and this NGC/CIB situation bears a strange resemblance.We need to strive for better norms of governance and prudence if we are to avoid a recurrence.History is said to be rich in irony, never more so than in this situation, since the defensive statements by both officials were made on the very day the NGC published its own defence.  Wednesday 4 February 2009.

SIDEBAR

Approved Financial Institutions

Those are taken to mean the 25 companies licenced under the Financial Institutions Act 2008.  Those companies are all required to be members of the Deposit Insurance fund and their names can be viewed at http://www.dictt.org/deposit_insurance/index.php?pid=2006.  There are 6 main banks on the list – Citibank, First Caribbean, First Citizens’, RBTT, Republic Bank and Scotiabank.  Two smaller banks on the list are Intercommercial Bank and Bank of Baroda.

Interlocking Directorships

A continuing concern, in light of the growing challenges to the old order of the commercial and financial world, is the role of inter-locking Directorships.  That is the situation in which a very small group of people control most of the major companies and activities in a society.

Critics of that situation would say that such situations are a recipe for corruption and self-serving behaviour.  The small group of people can enrich themselves, leaving the leftovers for everyone else.  Those who support that situation would say that the emergence of such a small group of leaders is natural, particularly in a small society such as ours, and the real challenge is to develop rules and norms which limit the possible negatives.

This is an issue which I am exploring in the ongoing series to examine the governance implications of the UDeCOTT fiasco.  It is not surprising that it is also a feature of the CL Financial collapse and there is an example of that in the case of NGC and CIB.

The CIB Directors

At the time of the collapse, the Board of Directors of CLICO Investment Bank comprised –

Mervyn Assam (Chairman)
Amjad Ali
Anthony Rahael
Maria Thorne
Michael Callendar
Faris Al Rawi

The NGC Executive

At that time, the National Gas Corporation’s executive management included –

Ms. Olave Maria Thorne, Vice President, Legal and Corporate Management and Company Secretary – see http://www.ngc.co.tt/About/executive.htm. Yes, same person.

Learning the Lessons of the UDeCOTT fiasco: Part 2

There has been a powerful and positive response to the first column in this series.  The reflections continue, as they must.  No time for distractions, in this election season.

Last week I paused with the promise to spend some time examining the Special Purpose Entity (SPE) model and its role in national development.  This week, I continue the reflection with focus on the Directors of these companies as key players in the sector.

One of the fascinating aspects of the Uff Report is its discussion of the nature and extent of the independence of the Special Purpose Entities.  Obviously, that discussion was mostly focused onto UDeCOTT and the reporting relationship with its line Ministry.

Some main points would be –

  • Multiple Directorships –
    Calder Hart. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
    Calder Hart

    One thing which is clear from the Calder Hart episode is that one individual had control of a vast slice of State resources.  Hart was Executive Chairman of UDeCOTT, Chairman of the Home Mortgage Bank, Trinidad & Tobago Mortgage Finance, the National Insurance Board (NIB) and the National Insurance Property Development Company (NIPDEC).  He obviously enjoyed a tremendous level of confidence at the very highest levels of government.  It is equally clear, from the Uff Report, that that confidence was woefully misplaced.  Even in the early days of ‘Corporation Sole’ we have never had an individual invested with so much power.  It seems that this individual never had to answer to a Chairman, since he was head of all the Boards he sat on.  Is that a healthy precedent?  For those who would be quick to say that he has been found guilty of nothing, please note that this is the same individual who described himself to the Uff Commission as  –

    Q.      Yes.  But your lawyers misdescribed you in these proceedings as a financial expert.  You would not agree with that description?
    A.       I would not describe myself as an expert of anything.

    See – ‘End-notes on the Uff Commission‘ at http://www.raymondandpierre.com/articles/article77.htm

    Yes, that is the same individual who stated, under oath, that all outstanding issues with the audited accounts of UDeCOTT had been resolved and that we could expect those in February 2009. Yes, that is the man who was in charge of our national savings and pensions.  And yes, I will write it – He could not do such in Canada.  I am saying that no single individual could properly discharge all those functions.  No way.  The fact that so much trust was reposed in that particular individual is indicative of a distorted sense of values.  Time to think again.

    A similar set of contradictions exist with the outspoken Independent Senator, Michael Annisette.  See – https://afraraymond.wordpress.com/2008/01/12/an-unhealthy-choice/.  Incredible as it might seem, Annisette’s position is even more complicated than Hart’s.

  • Over-burdened Directors – Quite apart from the particular issues which beset these two individuals, there is broader issue to consider.  Do  we draw our Directors and leaders from a sufficiently broad cadre of people? In terms of both the State sector and the private sector, it seems to me that we have similarly narrow channels from which we make these appointments.  I am not at all sure that the private sector can claim a superior method or results in terms of over-burdened Directors.  The result, as was clearly the case at UDeCOTT, can be a poor quality of strategic decision-making and lax oversight of the company’s affairs.  That is a sorry result, given that those are core Board functions.One key lesson we should be able to draw from this is that there is no way people can function with this level of multiple responsibilities.  We now need to develop a new set of guidelines for these important roles.  The UDeCOTT episode must not only be used to critique the public sector, for there are surely examples of over-burdened within the private sector as well.
  • Under-development of our society – A paradoxical aspect of the situation is that the thrust to rapid development is given as the rationale for the Special Purpose Entity, yet the method of deployment is somewhat counter-productive.  I am saying that the cadre of people from which we draw our Directors and leaders needs to be wider if we are really to develop our potential as a nation.  That also applies to the private sector, since the prevailing instinct seems to be that we pick people with whom we are comfortable for these leadership positions.  Very understandable, whether we are speaking about the public or private sectors, but the act of restricting the ranks of leaders is itself inimical to our development.
  • The proper role of the State – I am also saying that the State must behave in an exemplary fashion.  That is very important, given the corrosion of proper standards we are living through.  The State has an indispensable role to play in national development and that is not just limited to  construction.

What we saw at UDeCOTT was rampant expediency, with good management and internal controls being violated at every turn.  All in the interest of achieving targets and developing the country.  Huge contracts granted via sole selective tendering, without competition. That means they gave the contracts to their chosen contractor and consultants.  Yes, just so.  Huge payments made before works were done or materials purchased.

Yes, expediency was allowed to eclipse good governance and accountability.  The interest of the taxpayer was jeopardised, supposedly all for the benefit of said taxpayer.

We can now soberly put the question – ‘What was it really all for?‘

SIDEBAR

The Ordinary citizen

I am also asking that our Prime Minister give details of his conversation with Calder Hart.  Of course, one does not seriously expect an answer.  That, too, is a big part of the problem we are trying to probe with only our wits and words.

UDeCOTT’s Audited Accounts

This column is to be published on 22nd April, four weeks after Jearlean John held her first meeting with the UDeCOTT Board.  Readers might remember that Ms. John, citing her adherence to good standards of governance and professional conduct, promised to publish UDeCOTT’s audited accounts.  Those were last published at the end of 2006.  No accounts for 2007, 2008 or 2009.  Worse yet, no explanation at all.  I have had to dismiss some absurd attempts to explain that the delay has been due to the Uff Commission itself.  Those attempts emanated from a member of the Cabinet who definitely ought to have known better.  Ms. John is now making me wonder ‘What is the mystery?’ Is this one of those cases which gave rise to our folk saying ‘More in the Mortar than the Pestle’?

Ten to One is Murder

A Kaiso title for the Election season.  And yes, we are told that CL Financial will rise again.  The picture is even more clouded than a year ago and the rumours abound.

The latest developments are –

  • Press conference of 24th March –
    Justice Carlton Best. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
    Justice Carlton Best
    Following a front-page Express story, on the impending lawsuit by Justice Carlton Best to recover his $57,000 CLICO deposit – see ‘I want my Cash’ at http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=161613671 – the Governor of the Central Bank held a press conference that very day to tell us that those waiting for the return of their deposits would have to hold strain – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2010/03/25/delay-your-redemptions.  The further shocking news, after all the emphatic official statements that the group had good assets, was that if those were liquidated there would only be 10 to 15 cents in the dollar available to pay claims.  Now how could that possibly be the case? How are we to reconcile these conflicting accounts of the situation with CL Financial’s assets?  Is it that they are fully-pledged, over-pledged, or is there actually any ‘headroom’ within which the taxpayer can have a chance to recover the huge sums advanced so far?  Which is it?  Please note that this is not an isolated situation, as shown by another threatened  lawsuit from a former Attorney General of Guyana for the recovery of over $500,000 from CLICO – see http://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2010/03/27/former-attorney-general-threatens-to-sue-clico-trinidad/
  • Post-Cabinet Press Briefing – The Minister of Finance confirmed the Governor’s position to the media the next day, as reported in this paper – http://guardian.co.tt/business/business/2010/03/26/tesheira-clico-policyholders-be-patient.  In that article, the Minister is reported to have affirmed, again, that “…“The CL Financial Group had sound assets that were valued at more than $100 billion…”  Both the Governor and the Minister took steps to recover their own funds before the group’s financial troubles were public knowledge and that sits awkwardly, in the public mind, with their current appeals for patience.
  • Dr. Euric Bobb – At a Central Bank press conference on 31st March, resigned as Chairman of CLICO and as a Director of CL Financial, of which he was the Chairman, until his resignation late last year.
  • Governance – His statements as to the poor governance at CLICO, the leading company in the CL Financial group, were astonishing, to say the least – see “Governance was an alien term in CLICO’ at   http://guardian.co.tt/business/business/2010/04/01/bobb-governance-was-alien-term-clico.  No reconciliation of the company’s bank accounts.  No audit committee.  Those are serious shortcomings in the basic accounting and governance controls in any company.  For one which had investment as its centrepiece, those are shocking.  They give the impression of unprofessional and haphazard management of a significant part of our nation’s savings.  They detract from the reputation of the CL Financial chiefs.  Surely these shortcomings found their way into the Management letter from the Auditor to the Board and Shareholders?  Was the Central Bank aware that these elementary controls were absent?  Even if there are serious shortcomings in the financial procedures at CLICO, are we not entitled to rely on the Supervisor of Insurance or Inspector of Financial Institutions to resolve those in favour of the investing public?
  • Marlon Holder – At the same press conference, we heard that he resigned his job as Executive Director of the Unit Trust Corporation to become CEO/MD of CL Financial and Chairman of CLICO – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2010/04/01/utc-boss-takes-over-clico-chairman.  Mr. Holder has had a high-profile career in the financial services industry at Citibank, FCB and the Unit Trust Corporation, before this latest move and we await his recovery strategy.
  • Reporting the changes – Both the CL Financial Chairman and the new CEO/MD recently confirmed that one of their leading priorities was to furnish a report on the state of the group and the progress towards its re-structuring.  That report is anxiously awaited and must include the audited accounts for 2008 and 2009.  As stated before, this is not negotiable and will be most revealing as to the apparent discrepancies in the asset values.
  • The Private assets – We also read recently that former CL Financial chief, Lawrence Duprey, had taken steps to limit the information he was required to furnish to the liquidator of CLICO (Bahamas) as to his private assets, allegedly acquired with CLICO funds – see http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/nart?id=161623489.

Hence this week’s title.  We await the audited figures.

SIDEBAR: Leading Lawsuit

There were reports in the Sunday Express of 11th April that the Central Bank had initiated legal action against Andre Monteil and Richard Trotman, both formerly of CLICO Investment Bank, for the recovery of huge sums allegedly obtained improperly in the HMB takeover – see http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/nart?id=161626823 and http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/nart?id=161626819

Those moves by the Inspector of Financial Institutions represent, as far as I am aware, the first time that legal action is being taken on this scale to tackle those accused of ‘white collar’ crime.  It is a decisive step to tackle the widespread impression that jail is not for the rich or lettered class in this society.  The course of this trial will be closely observed as it is the first step in a very long and necessary journey.

Our notions of development are rooted in the aspiration toward equality and opportunity.  Those worthwhile concepts must be extended to include true equality under the law.

One of the really fascinating aspects of this unfolding financial debacle, which includes the UdeCOTT collapse, is the idea that those accused of this sort of wrongdoing have extensive rights.  That kind of consideration is seldom offered to those accused of run-of-the-mill crimes.  If nothing, else, the CIB trial will be a kind of long-overdue ‘Open University’ course in the boardroom dealings which are masked from most of our people.

Learning the Lessons of the UdeCOTT fiasco

Former UDeCOTT Board
Former UDeCOTT Board, (l-r) Dr. Krishna Bahadoorsingh, Sen. Michael Annisette, Mr. Anthony Cherrie, Mr. Wendell Dottin

The leaking of the Uff Report, the delayed dismissal of the remaining, ‘squeaky-clean’ UdeCOTT Board members and the dissolution of Parliament are all part of a major distraction operation. The fallout from suppressing the Uff Report would have been huge and unpredictable, so the name of the game was spin. That spin is what we have been getting from government ever since we entered the end-game. The ultimate attempt to distract us was of course the dissolution of the Parliament by FAX on Thursday 8th April.

The strategy seems to be an attempt to provide the media and the population with even more interesting talking points, so that the Uff Report slips into obscurity. I expect that if the incumbent party is returned to office, there will be attempts to claim that the ‘mandate’ granted by that vote is a justification for the matters revealed in the Uff Report. Already a large slice of attention has been shifted to the impending elections, as expected.

I have no intention of allowing those distractions to take hold. I will continue to write on the lessons of the UdeCOTT fiasco.

This entire series of revelations is historic in that finally we have a Report by a Commission of Enquiry published. The second note for us is that it raises once again sobering governance issues, including matters of professional integrity and Directors’ responsibility. Those are aspects into which Property Matters will delve in the coming series.

Some main points for us to consider –

  • Cleaver Heights – The Uff Report makes it clear that there is no missing money. None. There are other serious concerns addressed in the Report as to the change in the form of contract and the fact that some $140M was paid to the contractor without title having passed to the State. I do agree that those are matters worthy of further investigation. To be clear, the questions would have to be whether any undue benefit was enjoyed by the contractor and, if so, how did the HDC’s checks and balances fail to detect and arrest this? Please note that the entire contract sum was never estimated to exceed $150M for this project. That said, we still have two mysterious parts of the puzzle to figure out – firstly, now that, under cross-examination, everyone has denied doing so, ‘Who told the Prime Minister that blatant untruth about ‘missing money’? Secondly, the renowned Forensic Accountant, Bob Lindquist, has been investigating the Cleaver Heights project for some considerable time now, so what are his findings? Note well that I am not asking for his report, since some ‘bright’ person would be quick to say that he never submitted his report or that it is incomplete. I am asking for his findings, even the interim ones, before we spend more money on more investigations.
  • The non-gazetting of the Uff Commission – We were all shocked to learn, at the end of August 2009, that the Enquiry had not been properly set-up, due the failure to ‘Gazette’. A special, one-man Enquiry into that episode was launched by the AG, with a final report handed into the AG on 9th December 2009 by retired Judge, Anthony Lucky – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/politics/2009/12/10/lucky-report-goes-cabinet-today-lead-pg3. What are the findings of the Lucky Report, Mr. AG? I think that we need to know and now, please.
  • Was there any evidence of criminal wrongdoing by UdeCOTT? – According to Para 14.41 of the Uff Report – “…there should be an investigation by an appropriate criminal law Authority into the award of the MLA contract to CH Development to include the role of Mr. Calder Hart and the conduct of the Board in not ensuring that an enforceable guarantee was given by the parent company of CH Development….”
  • Calder Hart – Was Calder Hart a good executive manager, who may have just ‘over-reached’ his authority in an effort to meet his demanding targets? According to Para 12.55 of the Uff Report – “…We have noted the apparent absence of any note of criticism or dissent within the UdeCOTT staff and the dominant influence of the Executive Chairman, Mr. Calder Hart. To the extent the failure of senior staff and directors to raise any voice in opposition to the level of financial irregularity found on the Brian Lara Project amounts to loyalty, such loyalty is clearly misplaced…”
  • That UdeCOTT Board – It was a relief to see the dismissal of these Directors. In fact, the more one considers their bizarre and reckless statements, the more obvious it was that this was indeed a large corporation in crisis. Problem was, that it was our money they were wasting and worse yet, failing to publish audited account for three years. A sad example of wrong and strong. The AG said, on 1st April as he announced that the Uff Report would be published in full, that Calder Hart was just ‘an ordinary citizen’. It seems to me that Calder Hart enjoyed benefits far beyond those extended to the ‘ordinary citizen’. I have never heard of the PM tipping off anyone else under serious investigation. The other UdeCOTT Board members were not given the ‘tip’ to resign and have had to be fired. There must be a lesson in there, somewhere.
  • The Model – This colossal failure is such as to prompt a serious re-examination of the idea that the Special Purpose Entity (SPE)is the preferred vehicle for our national development. The continued down-sizing and sidelining of Ministries and the promotion of SPEs have continued apace, most recently in the TTRA proposals. I am saying that it is time to soberly re-examine these ideas against the actual results, so that we can chart a better way forward.

Next, I will be examining the implications of the SPE model and its effects on the nation.

An overview of the Uff Report

Professor John Uff. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
Professor John Uff

The Attorney General announced at the Post Cabinet press briefing on Thursday 1st April that the full Uff Commission Report will be laid in the Senate on Tuesday 6th April – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/politics/2010/04/02/uff-report-senate-tuesday.  I was pleased to hear that, but there remained a widespread attitude of skepticism as to the outcome of the AG’s promise.  One can hardly blame people for having those feelings since, as TTTI’s President, Victor Hart, has recently reminded us, PM Manning broke his promise to publish the report of the Bernard Commission into the Piarco Airport project.  That was over 6 years ago and still no Bernard Report yet.

I received a copy of the Uff Report in my email on Saturday and several other concerned citizens as well, so it seems that some publicly-minded person wanted to ensure that it was not either suppressed or edited.  Thank you, whoever you are.

The Uff Report is 512 pages long and contains 91 recommendations, so its sheer volume and the limited time available mean that I am unable to give a detailed review.  This week’s column will therefore comprise an overview of the main concerns raised in the Enquiry and the way in which the Report has handled those.

CORRUPTION

Q – Does corruption exist in the manner alleged by the government’s critics?

A – At para 59. the Uff Report states that “…It is accepted that corruption is a problem of serious proportions in Trinidad & Tobago…to which the construction industry is particularly prone…”

Was there actually something corrupt or wrong at UDeCOTT?
Q – Is there good reason for concern at UDeCOTT’s operations, or is it a case of politically-motivated attacks?

A – Para 14.36, from the Commission’s discussion of the Ministry of Legal Affairs Tower/CH contract, is a classic of understatement – “…UDeCOTT’s application of its own rules discloses a worrying lack of transparency as well as inconsistency…”

Para 14.37 states – “…the appearance of Mr. Calder Hart’s fax number on the notepaper, which was no doubt hurriedly printed by CH Development, remains unexplained…”

Para 14.41 –“…there should be an investigation by an appropriate criminal Law Authority into the award of the MLA contract to CH Development, to include the role of Mr. Calder Hart and the conduct of the Board in not ensuring that an enforceable guarantee was given by the parent company of CH Development…”

LOCAL VS FOREIGN

Q – Are local contractors being unfairly replaced by foreign contractors or do the foreigners really deliver better performance?

A – Para 6.18 states that – “…no convincing comparison has yet been presented from which reliable conclusions can be drawn as to the relative performance of local and foreign contractors or consultants…”

PROCUREMENT

Q – Is it better for the government to try using Design and Build or should they stick with the traditional Design and Tender method of procurement?

A – Para 7.20 states that – “…there is no single system of procurement which should be preferred in all circumstances…”

The Hart legacy –
According to Para 12.55 – “…We have noted the apparent absence of any note of criticism or dissent within the UdeCOTT staff and the dominant influence of the Executive Chairman, Mr. Calder Hart.  To the extent the failure of senior staff and directors to raise any voice in opposition to the level of financial irregularity found on the Brian Lara Project amounts to loyalty, such loyalty is clearly misplaced…”

The Property Matters critique of UDeCOTT started in 2008 on the theme ‘A considerable concentration of power’, which attempted to draw lessons from the Cadbury Commission as to the perils of the Executive Chairman.

The role of UDeCOTT’s Board and its Executive Chairman came in for heavy criticism, with the Report calling for full investigations into the Ministry of Legal Affairs Tower and the Brian Lara Cricket Academy.  Furthermore, there is a recommendation that the roles of Chairman and CEO should be separated.

The Rowley saga –

Q – Was there really any money missing at Cleaver Heights?

A – Para 27.11 – “…the entirely erroneous addition of $10,000,000…”

SIDEBAR: Notes to Jearlean John

Jearlean John. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
Jearlean John, Chairman UDeCOTT

On Tuesday 16th March, I spoke at a JCC press conference and took the opportunity to issue two calls to Ms. Jearlean John – the MD of the Housing Development Corporation and newly-appointed Chairwoman of UDeCOTT.  See http://www.caribdaily.com/article/267861/publish-udecott-accounts/.

On the question of the HDC’s fundamental role and its performance, I again raised the issue of their output.  In the course of the Enquiry and in this column, I have pointed out the serious output shortfall of the HDC, the primary function of which is contained in its name.  Housing Development.  At the press conference I was openly skeptical about the often-repeated figure of 26,000 new homes built by the HDC in the execution of the present national housing policy (implemented in 2003) which set a target of 100,000 new homes in a decade.  I doubted that even half that amount had actually been built and requested that Ms. John should publish a list of where and how many new homes were completed.  On Sunday 28th March, this newspaper carried a two-page ‘Special Report’ on UNC claims of voter-padding and that included the requested information.  The article was probing another aspect of the housing riddle, but the two figures which struck me were ‘15,394 housing units constructed by the government in 2003-2009’ and the table detailing the locations and unit numbers with a closing total of 13,677 units.  Either way, the total is far less than that claimed thus far and using the upper figure equates to an average of just about 2,200 new homes per year.  That is a far cry from the original annual target of 10,000 new homes and even the revised target of 8,000.  One can only wonder where the wrong, inflated figure came from and, those having been fed into the budget process, how accurate is our planning?  It is all reminiscent of the outstanding query from the Uff Commission as to the Cleaver Heights housing project and the false claims as to missing money – Who told the PM that false information for him to have made those baseless and misleading statements to the Parliament?  No one ever admitted to that in the course of the Uff Commission.

Thank you for releasing that info, Ms. John, even if it was in response to another call.  Given our persistent culture of secrecy, especially in public matters, it is a welcome change.

My second call to Ms. John at that press conference was to publish the UDeCOTT accounts without further delay.  As I put it – ‘Ms. John, if you want to be noted for integrity and transparency, you must publish the UDeCOTT accounts without delay.  UDeCOTT has published no audited accounts since the end of 2006 and I was pleased to see the Ms. John’s positive response to those calls.  See – http://www.caribdaily.com/article/268401/john-udecott-will-publish-accounts/.

Ms. John was reported to have been appointed and met with UDeCOTT’s Board on 25th March – See http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2010/03/26/udecott-pushes-complete-priority-jobs.  That report in this newspaper concluded with a telling quote from the Deputy Chairman – “Bahadoorsingh said John was an excellent chairman, “Highly competent, very knowledgeable, no nonsense and to the point and very friendly, a pleasure to work with. “It’s a new era with this new chairman. I’m very impressed,”

We are waiting for either the prompt publication of UDeCOTT’s Annual Report, accompanied by audited accounts, or some cogent public explanation for the unacceptable delay in so doing.  For all this time to pass, with neither of those events to taking place, can only deepen the atmosphere of distrust.  We, the taxpaying public, expect better from you, Ms. John.

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 17 March 2010

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 17 March 2010

Afra Raymond sits with Fazeer Mohammed and Jessie May Ventour to discuss, among other things, the “battle” between the Government & the construction industry in Trinidad and Tobago. Video courtesy CNMG

  • Programme Air Date: Wednesday, 17 March 2010
  • Programme Length: 0:38:03

M

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 09 March 2010

VIDEO: First Up Interview – 09 March 2010

Afra Raymond sits with Fitzgerald Hinds and Jessie May Ventour to discuss an updated in-depth look at UDeCOTT subsequent to the resignation of its Executive Chairman, Calder Hart. Video courtesy CNMG

  • Programme Air Date: Tuesday, 9 March 2010
  • Programme Length: 0:43:23

Response to Minister after receipt of CL Financial Shareholders’ Agreement

CL Financial Shareholders’ Agreement of 12th June 2009

From: Afra Raymond <afra@tstt.net.tt>
To: Nunez-Tesheirak@gov.tt
Date Fri, March 12, 2010 6:26:03 PM

Madam Minister,

I am writing to thank you for sending me the CL Financial Shareholders’ Agreement of 12th June 2009, as requested in my Freedom of Information application of 16th November 2009.

I have now published this onto my website – www.afraraymond.com – for public information and to develop a better understanding of its implications.

Finally, I am taking the opportunity to point out that my second Freedom of Information application, for Mr. Lawrence Duprey’s 13th January 2009 letter to the Central Bank Governor, was filed on 1st March.  It would be a positive move, in the direction of transparency and public accountability, if you were to release that document to me within the statutory timeframe of one month.

I await your reply.

Yours sincerely,

Afra Raymond