Tag: construction industry

Property Matters – The EFCL Query part 3

On Thursday 14th July, the EFCL published a full-page response to the first article in this series – it was also the same day that the second article in this EFCL Query was published.  Although it was comforting to see the clear statements on EFCL’s ‘speak out’ component, Whistle-Blowing policy and procedure and Fraud Policy, the central concerns are greater, if anything.

I deliberately used the word response, since no reasonable person could consider that advertisement to be a reply to my emailed queries.

If EFCL were really replying to my query, it would have been no problem to provide a copy of the documents and answer the simple questions.

EFCL’s preferred course of action is to spend more taxpayers’ money on expensive artwork and advertising, so the further question is ‘Why?’.

Considering that all I was doing was questioning the existence and origin of an important policy of this State-owned company, it is perturbing to be having this level of challenge in getting a simple clarification.

As I wrote in this space last week – ‘So, what is the secret?’

What could be the delay or difficulty in providing a copy of the EFCL’s Confidentiality Policy, as requested?

In the first article in this series, I posted the documents which had been passed to me.  The simple question is whether these are the genuine documents.  There was no attempt by EFCL to even answer that important query.

It is important because the EFCL advertisement told readers that “…Employees were not asked to sign under threat of dismissal…”

The first sentence of the preamble of the Staff Confidentiality Agreement is –

“All new and existing employees will be given a copy of this confidentiality policy and will be required to sign a confidentiality agreement at the time of hiring or during their service to the company.”

The emphasis is mine – yes, it reads ‘required to sign’.

But there is more, because the EFCL advertisement also stated that –

“Staff who asked for time to get external advice, were allowed to.”

However, clause 1 d. of the Confidentiality Agreement states –

“The existence of this agreement and its terms are confidential and none of the parties to this agreement may disclose anything about this agreement or its subject matter or implementation to any person except if required by law to do so.”

It is clear that the EFCL advertisement and the documents sent to me cannot both be true.

So, which is true?

Why did EFCL not send or publish the documents?

Quite frankly, it appears that EFCL is making a great effort to conceal or obscure its true policy on confidentiality, for whatever reason.

If this is the kind of effort being put into obscuring the elementary policy of this State-owned company, I can scarcely imagine their reaction to queries on particular projects, Directors’ benefits or tender procedure.

The behaviour of the State and its agents must be exemplary.  Public Officials have an obligation, in my view, to behave in a fashion which fosters trust and good order.

It is all starting to resemble a tangled web, sad to say.

Again, I hope that my doubts are misplaced.

SIDEBAR

Five simple questions for EFCL…

  • Is there a new EFCL Confidentiality policy?
  • When did that come into effect?
  • Would you please provide a copy of that policy?
  • Was that policy approved by the Board of Directors?
  • Is the Ministry of Education aware of this new policy?

Property Matters – The EFCL Query part 2

efcl-confidentialDespite the first column in this series, I have had no direct reply or even acknowledgement from any of the EFCL officials to whom my initial queries were directed.

It seems that the people concerned would rather not write, on this matter at least.  A meeting has been indirectly suggested, which of course would have to be properly recorded and minuted – no word on that meeting as I write again.

What could be the delay or difficulty in answering the five simple questions posed last week –

  1. Is there a new EFCL Confidentiality policy?
  2. When did that come into effect?
  3. Would you please provide a copy of that policy?
  4. Was that policy approved by the Board of Directors?
  5. Is the Ministry of Education aware of this new policy?

Four of those questions require basic yes/no responses, while only one requires a date.

I closed Sunday Guardian’s article by reminding readers of the equation

Expenditure of Public money – Accountability – Transparency = CORRUPTION

The elementary accountability of a public company having its policies available for the public to consider seems to be either lacking or of low priority in the case of EFCL.  As we move along, it will be interesting to see how the Transparency part of the equation works out.

In researching this article, it emerged that our country is a signatory to two relevant international conventions.  As I understand it, the effect of our State having become signatory to those agreements is that the country has adopted those standards.

The first one is the Inter-American Convention against corruption, which was signed by our country in April 1998.  At that time, UNC was in power, under PM Basdeo Panday.  At Article III, clause 8, we are obliged to

“…consider the applicability of measures to…create, maintain and strengthen…Systems for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption, including protection of their identities, in accordance with their Constitutions and the basic principles of their domestic legal systems…”

The second convention is the United Nations’ Convention against Corruption, which was signed by our country in December 2003.  At that time, PNM was in power, under PM Patrick Manning.  At Article 8 – Codes of Conduct for Public Officials, clause 4 obliges us to

“…4. Each State Party shall also consider, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, establishing measures and systems to facilitate the reporting by public officials of acts of corruption to appropriate authorities, when such acts come to their notice in the performance of their functions…”

So, what is the big secret?

I do understand that staff at companies like this can jeopardize the integrity and effective operations of the organisation by leaking certain confidential information.  That would be a proper concern of management and a confidentiality policy is one of the ways that could be dealt with, just one.

During the Uff Enquiry, UDeCoTT claimed several times that this or that document was confidential and used its lawyers to protest strongly, sometimes even seeking the protection of the High Court.  That was outrageous conduct by a state-owned company, which appeared to be trying to frustrate the Uff Commission, appointed by the State, by seeking to conceal documents.  A case of ‘the tail wagging the dog’.

This situation is one in which it seems that the dangers of leaks in relation to tendering estimates, for example, has been conflated to cover all information in the company.  It appears to be part of a new policy which does not conform to either good labour relations or our country’s international obligations with respect to Whistle-Blowers.

Given the electoral promises made by this government and the importance of the struggle to reduce the menace of corruption in our society, it is very important for us to be attentive to these matters.

UDeCoTT wanted to conceal certain documents and one had to wonder why, given that they are not involved in secret work.  If it was not so serious it would be comical, they are not a spying, military or health institution.  UDeCoTT is just a facilitator for erecting buildings, yet their chiefs were able to pretend to the public that a large part of what they did was confidential. That kind of secrecy could never be in the public interest.  Not ever.

Similarly with EFCL, one has to ask – What is the secret?  That organisation is responsible for the repair and maintenance of schools, using Public Money to do so.

I wonder if that document, which a number of EFCL staff have now been required to sign, is legal and binding?  Could it withstand a challenge in the Courts?  Did EFCL take proper legal advice in this matter?  Was that advice followed?

The legitimate interests of taxpayers require that the management of State Enterprises take proper steps to handle these integrity challenges – Does the EFCL Confidentiality Agreement achieve this?

There is a certain kind of way in which this episode with EFCL is starting to remind me of the early UDeCoTT grappling, before Uff and so on, with tremendous difficulty in getting basic dialogue going, shadow-boxing and bizarre positions being taken.

I really hope that I am wrong, because the correct, encouraging attitude to Whistle-Blowers is essential for the success of the larger Public Procurement agenda.

Property Matters – The EFCL Query

Continuing the series of examinations into the purpose and performance of our State Enterprises, this week I am looking at an important issue which seems to be emerging at the Education Facilities Company Ltd. (EFCL).

EFCL is a state-owned company involved in the building and maintenance of schools.  It consumes public money in the execution of its functions and that is why it is important to put these points now.

efcl excerpt 3

One of the biggest public concerns is the high level of white-collar crime, which means bribery, corruption, fraud, over-billing, ‘back-fitting’, tax-evasion, asset-stripping and so on.  White Collar crime is a growth industry, since the rewards are very high, while the risk of being caught or punished is extremely remote.

Due to the size of the State, a great deal of that white collar crime can be found in State Institutions.  Once Public Money is being spent, we must demand a high standard of accountability and transparency.

In terms of principles, there needs to be an appropriate balance between the long-established ‘Right of privacy‘ in commercial transactions and the growing ‘Right to know‘ which is part of the emerging social order.  There will be different views as to where the correct balance exists and furthermore, the consensus position will shift as time passes.

It seems to me that the default position should be that, in doubtful cases, the right of the public to information should prevail, since we are the ones paying the costs.  Indeed, that position forms part of the Freedom of Information Act, so that is substantial support.

In early 2009 we witnessed an attempt by the then PNM government to amend the Integrity in Public Life Act (IPLA) so that people reporting breaches of that Act would have been forced to give their names and addresses.  That arrangement would have given even greater protection to corrupt officials, since virtually no-one would want to make a report.  Of course people are strongly encouraged to report ‘normal’ crime like rape, robbery, murder and so on – further encouragement is offered by allowing them to make anonymous reports via 800-TIPS, for example.  Those proposals to amend the IPLA would have encouraged corrupt behaviour by reducing the reports.

That Bill was piloted by then Attorney-General, Bridget Annissette-George.  The proposals were strongly opposed in the Parliament and in the wider society, eventually being withdrawn.  One of the strongest protestors in the Parliamentary debate was Dr. Tim Gopeesingh, who was reported to have accused the government of trying to intimidate people into not making reports. [Hansard, 1 May 2009 p.441] On that occasion, the Standing Orders were used by Colm Imbert, to curtail Gopeesingh’s presentation. [Hansard, 1 May 2009 p.455]

The normal good governance provisions for annual accounts, Board Meetings, minutes and so on are very important.  But those provisions must be supplemented by an atmosphere and a series of institutional arrangements which facilitate Whistle-Blowers.  There must be clear channels and protection for Whistle-Blowers if we are to have any chance of reducing corruption in our country.

Without the assistance of Whistle-Blowers, we would not have known of the Piarco Airport or UDeCoTT fiascos and we know for sure that somebody leaked the file on the Heights of Guanapo Church just prior to last year’s election.  We need encouragement for Whistle-Blowers – in some countries they are even given big cash rewards.  The JCC has been active with its partners – TTMA, the Chamber of Commerce and the Transparency Institute – in making Public Procurement proposals to the Joint Select Committee.  An important element of those proposals is the creation of proper channels for Whistle-Blowers.

I recently received a copy of some EFCL documents, which were stated to be their new Confidentiality Policy Statement and a Staff Confidentiality Agreement for the signature of employees.  I was also told, separately, that EFCL staff are being required to sign that Agreement, under threat of dismissal.  What is more, the Agreement contains a specific clause which forbids revelation of either the existence or the terms of the agreement.

efcl excerpt 2

If those documents are genuine, there are serious grounds for concern, so I made a written query via email on Friday 1st July to the EFCL’s CEO, Paul Taylor, and its Chairman, Ronald Phillip.  I outlined what had been reported to me and asked these questions –

From: Afra Raymond <afraraymond@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 1:13 PM
Subject: EFCL Confidentiality Policy
To: paul.taylor@efcl.co.tt
Cc: ronald.phillip@efcl.co.tt

Hello Paul,

I am reliably informed that EFCL staff were recently directed to sign a ‘Confidentiality Agreement’, the rationale being that it is the new Company policy.

Before taking this any further, I am requesting your written response to these questions –

  1. Is there a new EFCL Confidentiality policy?  When did that come into effect?  Would you please provide a copy of that policy?

Assuming a new Confidentiality Policy is in place, these are my queries –

  1. Was that policy approved by the Board of Directors?
  2. Is the Ministry of Education aware of this new policy?

I would appreciate a timely response.

With best wishes.
Afra Raymond

That email was also copied, purely for information, to the Minister of Education.  At the time of writing, there has been no acknowledgment or reply.

efcl excerpt 1

This is a serious development for these reasons –

  1. The Super-Confidentiality provisions mean that staff are forbidden to obtain any advice, which seems to be a breach of good labour relations, at the very least.
  2. The unilateral imposition of this new document does violence to the proper meaning of the word ‘Agreement’.
  3. The ‘Guiding Principles’ at page 2 refer to ‘privileged information‘ and ‘EFCL’s right to privacy‘, both of which seem to me to be leading away from greater transparency and improved procurement procedures – which leads into the final point
  4. This administration promised, both on the campaign trail and post-election, to make new procurement legislation a priority.  The Joint Select Committee on Public Procurement was Chaired by Dr. Tim Gopeesingh, Minister of Education.   EFCL is the principal State Enterprise within the Ministry of Education, so what is Dr. Gopeesingh’s position on all this?  Is this taking place with Dr. Gopeesingh’s knowledge and/or approval?

It is clear to me that this kind of stealthy restriction on the possibility of staff becoming whistle-blowers is incompatible with the high-profile public statements of support for a new, effective public procurement system. Those statements range from the promises at page 18 of the People’s Partnership Manifesto to numerous speeches by the present Prime Minister.

The reality is inescapable –

Expenditure of Public money – Accountability – Transparency = CORRUPTION

I am closing by wondering, aloud, if this is the shape of the new Information policy for our State Enterprises.

SIDEBAR: What is a Super Injunction?

It is possible for a prominent person to obtain a Court Order called an injunction to prevent the publication of material which is likely to be damaging to their reputation.  That is a long-standing legal right and there has been a recent series of decisions in the UK in which super-sensitive, high profile people have been able to obtain ‘Super-injunctions’ from the High Court, which have the effect of prohibiting the publication and further prohibiting revealing the very existence of the injunction itself.  Of course the media have been fighting that in Court and there are two investigations underway into whether the ‘Super-Injunction’ is itself an abusive instrument.  The emerging thinking seems to be that these ‘Super-Injunctions’ are destroying the information balance I outlined earlier.

efcl excerpt 4

This EFCL Confidentiality Policy, if it is so, would seem to be a similar device, doing great violence to the information balance.

An Overview on the CIVIL SOCIETY submission to the Joint Select Committee on PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

This special publication is dedicated to the important issue of Public Procurement.  It is written by the a private sector group, headed by the Joint Consultative Council for the Construction Industry (JCC).  The JCC consists of:

  1. Association of Professional Engineers of Trinidad & Tobago (APETT)
  2. Trinidad & Tobago Institute of Architects (TTIA)
  3.  Board of Architecture of Trinidad & Tobago (BOATT) – observer status
  4. Trinidad & Tobago Society of Planners (TTSP)
  5. Trinidad & Tobago Contractors’ Association (TTCA)
  6. Institute of Surveyors of Trinidad & Tobago (ISTT) comprising Land Surveyors, Quantity Surveyors and Valuation Surveyors.

The private sector group consisted of –

  • Joint Consultative Council for the Construction Industry
  • Trinidad & Tobago Chamber of Industry & Commerce
  • Trinidad & Tobago Manufacturers’ Association
  • Trinidad & Tobago Transparency Institute.

The members of that Private Sector group were part of the Working Party on the Public Procurement White Paper, which was published in August 2005 and laid in Parliament the following month.

The Peoples’ Partnership’s manifesto, at page 18, commits to –

Procurement

  • Prioritise the passing of procurement legislation and appropriate rules and regulations
  • Establish equitable arrangements for an efficient procurement system ensuring transparency and accountability by all government departments and state enterprises…

In keeping with those campaign promises, the Minister of Finance tabled two legislative proposals in Parliament on 25 June 2010.  Those were a Bill to amend the Central Tenders’ Board Act (originally prepared in 1997, when Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj was Attorney General) and the Public Procurement Bill (originally prepared in 2006, after publication of the White paper).  A Joint Select Committee (JSC) was established on 1 October 2010 to examine those proposals, invite submissions and make recommendations.

The stated target of the PP government is to have the new Public Procurement legislation in place by the first anniversary of their electoral victory – i.e. by 25 May 2011.

Our Private Sector/Civil Society group reconvened last year and made a joint submission to the JSC in December 2010 – it is available here from the JCC‘s website.  Our Private Sector group has had several meetings with the JSC – which was chaired by Education Minister, Dr. Tim Gopeesingh – but the results of those are not featured in this publication.

This special publication is intended to inform readers of the necessity for new Public Procurement legislation in our country and to set out the objectives of our proposals.

The guiding Principles

 These are –

  • Transparency
  • Accountability
  • Value for Money

The broad picture

One of the most serious findings of both the Bernard Enquiry (Piarco Airport Project) and the Uff Report (UDeCOTT and HDC) was the extent to which the largest State projects were being executed outside of any normal system of accountability.  The very purpose of setting up these companies and procurement methods was to bypass the Central Tenders Board.  The natural consequence of that way of proceeding being that if the CTB could be sidelined as a deliberate act of public policy, then other important elements of the regulatory framework are violated as a matter of course.  In the case of both UDeCOTT and NHA/HDC, accounts were not filed for years – since 2006 for the former and 2002 for the latter – in flagrant violation of the rules and laws.

These were the largest State projects – often described as being the flagship or centre-piece of this or that government’s policy – yet they were breaking the main rules and getting away with it.  The ‘getting away with it’ is the cloudy part of the picture, because we never hear of any penalty being sought against those State Enterprise Directors who broke the governance rules.

But that is the very centre of the puzzle and we need to understand it before we can try to unlock it.  So, we are told, time and again, that the only way to really get important and urgent projects done in the correct fashion is to go outside the rules.  The stated reasons are that the old rules are too cumbersome, slow etc… and yet, we end up, time and again, in the same mess.

Some of the features of these fiascos are –

  • Huge cost over-runs on virtually every project.
  • Unfinished projects which virtually no one can make sense of – to date there is no proper rationale for the huge and loss-leading International Waterfront Project, apart from Calder Hart’s bogus explanation to the Uff Enquiry.
  • A gross burden on our Treasury going forward – The continuing delay in completing the accounts for these State Enterprises shows how difficult it is to work out exactly what the State owes and to whom.

What all that tells us is that the existing rule-book seems to be blocking progress and the attempts to bypass it have done little better, if not far worse.

The dismal picture on public procurement is not limited to construction projects and can be found in all the other areas.

A new approach is needed and that is what is at the foundation of these legislative proposals.

What is Public Money?

Central to the new proposals is that any new Public Procurement system must be in full effect whenever Public Money is spent.

‘Public Money’ is defined at page 5 of our proposals as money which is either due to, or ultimately payable by, the State.

Our proposals are intended to form part of a financial management reform package to include for a National Audit Office and a Financial Management and Accountability Bill.

The intended move is towards a greater transparency and duty of care in terms of how taxpayers’ money is spent.  Our citizens, particularly the unborn ones who will have to pay for some of the wasteful schemes which are littering the landscape, deserve no less.

The new equation confronting us is –

Expenditure of Public Money
minus            Accountability
minus            Transparency
equals         CORRUPTION

We must fix that.

So, what is at stake here?

Our society is beset by large-scale corruption, which sustains wrong-headed decision-making.  The wider social consequences of that toxic culture are now hatching, with a vengeance, in the naked violence and wily crimes which pre-occupy our head-space.

The killing-fields of East POS, the decimation of African urban youths, the URP and CEPEP gangs and the battle for turf are all part of this picture.

As long as our society continues to applaud and reward dishonest, corrupt behaviour, we will continue sliding downhill.

The structure of our economy is that most of the country’s foreign exchange is earned by the State in the form of oil & gas earnings.  The rest of the society relies on the State and its organs to recycle those earnings for the benefit of those of us not directly engaged in the energy sector.

For that reason, the State casts a very long shadow in our country, far more so than in other places.  Virtually every substantial business relies on the State and its organs for a significant part of its earnings.  A healthy connection with the State is essential for good profits.

But that is where the particular problem is, since the conduct of the State and its organs is often found to be lacking in the basic ingredients of fairplay, accountability and transparency.

If the State is the biggest source of funds in the place and the State is not playing straight at all, a serious question arises – How can we hope to uplift our society?

The State has an over-riding duty to behave in an exemplary fashion in its policy and operations.

Due to its tremendous footprint, the State has to behave in that exemplary fashion if we are to move out of this mess.  A positive shift in State conduct will have a salutary effect on the commercial culture and wider society, one that is long overdue.

So, who spends Public Money?

We have a vast, expensive and confusing array of organs, all of which are authorized to spend our money.  For a country of about 1.4M people, we have 26 Ministries.  Just consider that the UK, with a population of about 65 million, has 19 Ministries and the USA, with a population of about 300 million, has 16 Ministries.  For a Caribbean example, Jamaica has twice our population and 16 Ministries.

Quite apart from the number of Ministries, there are two further layers of agencies which also have the power to spend – our country has 73 Government Bodies and 58 State Enterprises.

Given the vast range of operations undertaken by these agencies, any new system would have to be flexible in order to cover all those types of transactions.

The main features of the new system

Three new independent organs will be created –

    1. The Procurement Regulator (PR), with the duty to create overall Guidelines and a common handbook to guide the public procurement process.  The Regulator is appointed by the President in his own discretion and reports only to the Parliament.  Agencies can create their own procurement handbooks, once these conform to the overall Guidelines, as approved by the Procurement Regulator.
    2. The Public Procurement Commission (PPC) will be the investigative arm of the new apparatus to which complaints will be directed.
    3. The National Procurement Advisory Council (NPAC) will be purely advisory and comprises 14 members from a broad range of named private sector/civil society organisations – the JCC, Manufacturers’ Association, Chamber of Commerce, Transparency Institute – as well as the Ministry of Finance and the Tobago House of Assembly.

All expenses are to be drawn on the Consolidated Fund, with the Procurement Regulator and Advisory Council required to report annually to Parliament.

A vital part of our proposals is that Cabinet, Government Ministers or politicians are prohibited from instructing or directing these new agencies in any way.

They are intended to be entirely independent of political influence, which conforms to the proposals in the White Paper.

That freedom from political influence was also specified in both the 1997 and 2006 draft legislation.

A Complaints Procedure

The proposed system will create clear rights to make complaints or report wrongdoing.  Those rights are an important aspect of any modern procurement system and we propose three types of complaints/investigations –

  1. Potential tenderers/suppliers can complain, in the first instance directly to the Agency with which the tendering opportunity resides, then, if that is not dealt with satisfactorily, they can complain to the Public Procurement Commission.  Ultimately, the right to seek the protection of the High Court is preserved, once the established complaints procedure has been followed.
  2. The Whistleblower – We are proposing that whistleblowers be given legislative protection and practical means to bring their complaints direct to the Public Procurement Commission.
  3. The Public Procurement Commission can also, on its own initiative, start an investigation into an area of concern.

There are strict time-limits for acknowledgement and resolution of complaints.

Our proposal is for the Public Procurement Commission to have powers to punish both frivolous complainants as well as parties found to be in breach of the new system.  Those can range from fines to embargoes, during which offending parties can be banned from tendering opportunities.  Offending public officers can be subject to both fines and/or imprisonment.

The concern over the cost of the new apparatus

One of the most frequently expressed criticisms is that as critics of the rationale and operations of significant State Enterprises, we seem to be proposing a new series of state-funded agencies.  Some people have pointed out that these offices are unlikely to be cheap, particularly the PPC, which is to be constituted as a standing Commission of Enquiry under those existing legal provisions.

Yes, there will be new agencies and yes, they will cost money.

Given the recent revelations as to the cost of the Uff Enquiry – already estimated to exceed $50M – there are genuine concerns that we could soon have three new state-funded agencies which could absorb maybe $100M a year.

The challenge here is to move beyond the obvious and factual observations so that we can consider the decisive factors.  Our proposals have the promotion of Value for Money as one of its founding principles and that is good for the public.  So, how can we measure the value for money of these proposals, at this stage?

The scale of public procurement spending

In the case of expenditures direct out of the Ministries, the 2011 Budget has an anticipated capital expenditure for the Ministries of $7.050Bn, as per para 8 at page 4 of the Public Sector Investment Program (PSIP).

Also in that Budget there is an anticipated capital expenditure for the State Enterprises of $6.725Bn, as per the Foreword at page 4 of the Supplementary Public Sector Investment Program (Supplementary PSIP).  The combined figure of $13.775Bn is only for projects, so it excludes the salaries, rents and normal running expenses.  Please note that other elements in public expenditure, beyond just capital projects, will be covered by these proposals.  The guiding principle being that those activities involve the expenditure of Public Money.

There are very limited exemptions from the proposed provisions and those can be viewed at the JCC website.

I am also sure that there are other ways in which Public Money is being expended which are not shown in the national Budget, so the amounts are surely larger than that estimate.

The potential for savings

The scale of the public transactions, involving Public Money, which will come under the control of this new system is huge, at least $14Bn in size.  Even if the new system only saves 5% of that sum every year, we can easily justify an annual running expense in the $100M range, as mentioned earlier. 5% of $14Bn is $700M.

In the next 30 days, we expect our Legislators to make the crucial decisions on this series of proposals and we all need to be vigilant to preserve the key points.

Those key points would include –

  • Heads of Independent organs to be appointed by the President
  • Separation of the Regulator from the Investigator
  • Regulations laid in Parliament for negative resolution, with no Ministerial or Cabinet approval required.
  • Independent Organs funded from the Consolidated Fund, with no requirement to seek a Ministerial approval or Budget vote.
  • Accountability is ensured by the requirement to report annually to Parliament.
  • Private Sector/Civil Society oversight via the National Procurement Advisory Council.
  • Proper provisions for complaints and Whistle-Blowers.

The ultimate question, given what we know now, is – Can we afford not to take this step?

At this unique and challenging moment in what has been a long, twisted journey, the prospects of more corruption and waste are grim.

For these proposals to succeed, the legislators will have to vote in favour of a new law which reduces their power and discretion.  To some, that might be an impossible contradiction and an unreasonable thing to expect, but there will be considerable political credit to the account of those who make this change happen.  Our citizens deserve no less.

Freedom of Information in the CL Financial bailout

This – clfFoI-1 – is a copy of the letter sent today from my attorney to the Ministry of Finance, requesting that they provide –

  • ‘The Duprey letter’ – The fateful 13th January 2009 CL Financial letter, signed by Lawrence Duprey, seeking urgent and massive financial assistance from the Central Bank.
  • CL Financial’s 2008 audited accounts – These should have been prepared by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, as at 31st December 2008 and of course those are of great interest, since the 2007 audited accounts (published on 18th November 2008) disclosed assets of $100.6Bn, while ‘the Duprey letter’ showed assets of $23.9Bn.

The letter invites the Ministry of Finance to send the documents in 10 days or we go to the High Court.

Given the current state of play at the Colman Commission, there are no prizes for guessing which of those is going to happen.

Housing Policy Imperatives – part 5

This week the examination shifts to the scale of the failure of our national housing policy – see <http://www.vision2020.info.tt/pdf/Policies and Procedures/Strategic_Corporate Plans/Housing Plan.pdf>.  Three main points for consideration are –

  1. Meeting the targets
    The original target was for the HDC to construct 100,000 new homes in a decade, which figure was generated from the 1994 ‘PADCO reports’—The Review of Shelter and Land Development Policy Study (PADCO reports): The PADCO reports is a series generated by The Planning and Development Collaborative International, Inc. and Laughlin and Associates Limited (who were contracted by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago in 1993)—that study is available at the Ministry of Housing & Environment’s library.  The annual target was reduced to 8,000.  As noted in the previous article, the reduced targets should have yielded 60,000 new homes by now, but the HDC has built only 15,394 new homes.The HDC made a recent statement that the number of empty new homes was approximately 10,000.  So just about 5,000 new homes have been built and distributed since the inception of this ‘accelerated housing programme’ in September 2002.  Even if we omit 2002, that is an annual average of 667 new homes being built and distributed. Even with the most optimistic assumptions, one is looking at considerable challenges in achieving these demanding targets.  At the current rate of performance it would take over 140 years to satisfy the original target.  That is how far off-track this accelerated housing programme has gone.  Deep into the long grass.
  2. The Cost-based Pricing model
    In previous articles in this series, I have been critical of the HDC’s cost-based approach to pricing its units.  In terms of the central mission of the Ministry of Housing  – i.e. creation and distribution of housing to the needy – that pricing model is inappropriate.  That is because it does not identify either the housing subsidy allocated to successful applicants or the opportunity cost of the HDC’s policies. The value-based approach is the more appropriate model to satisfy those basic requirements.  That is because it offers greater clarity to policymakers, since it is based on the market value of the completed homes, with the housing subsidy and the opportunity cost being the difference between the value and the actual HDC selling price. On 21st March 2008, this newspaper carried a report headlined “PM’s son in line for apartment” – see http://legacy.guardian.co.tt/archives/2008-03-21/news8.html – on allegations that Brian Manning, son of the then-PM was in line to receive one of the HDC apartments at Fidelis Heights in St. Augustine.  Noel Garcia, the then-MD of the HDC, was reported to have said –

    …the Government had taken a decision not to subsidise this  particular development. It is being sold at market rates in HDC’s thrust to expand and attract an open market clientele.

    Noel Garcia, former MD of HDC. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian
    Noel Garcia, former MD of HDC. Photo courtesy Trinidad Guardian

    Given that the units were reportedly being sold for a maximum of $875,000 and that they were worth a minimum of $1.7M, it is clear that each new home there is sold with at least $800,000 in housing subsidy.  The only way Garcia’s incredible statements could be correct is if one were using the misleading cost-based approach.

    I entirely agree with his statement that the Fidelis Heights development “…is therefore not part of HDC’s provision of subsidised housing for low-income earners.”  It is really subsidised housing for the middle-income groups, but that could never be right when the waiting list is bulging with needy people who cannot even get an HDC unit to rent.

    Fidelis Heights was, even by its name, a monument to misleading and wrong-headed thinking.  The HDC project with probably the highest level of housing subsidy per unit was built for the least needy on their waiting list.  Only if the underlying philosophies and resulting models are appropriate, can we avoid a repetition of this blatant waste of public funds in the face of real, human need.

    Given that the HDC is unable to satisfy the needs of the people it was intended to serve – the poorest citizens who cannot afford a proper home – it is scandalous that its scarce resources should have been diverted to Fidelis Heights, or the one at Federation Park in Port-of-Spain.

    The selection of this pricing model is proof of misguided policy at the most elementary level.  The basic concept of opportunity cost appears to have eluded the responsible officials and, what is more, that misguided policy appears to have been approved at the very highest level.

    Wrong-headed thinking can only encourage corrupt behaviour.

  3. Costs
    What has the national housing programme cost this country?  That is no rhetorical question, since this fact sits at the heart of the analysis.  The Housing Development Corporation (HDC) is the State’s implementing agency for production of new housing, it was formed in 2005 by an Act of Parliament and replaced the National Housing Authority (NHA).  The HDC’s funding comes from four sources –

    1. Treasury allocations – Those are announced in the budget and can be established from the Estimates of Expenditure as Capital Allocations to the Ministry of Housing.
    2. Sale of new homes – When the HDC sells a new home, that money is also available to them.
    3. Bond Issues – The HDC has also raised money by occasional bond issues; those funds can be used to either build more homes or ‘pay down’ on more expensive loans.  The bonds issued are government-guaranteed, so they are considered as virtually risk-free ‘sovereign debt’.  Given that the government itself issues bonds at lower rates of interest, it begs the question as to why these SPE’s are allowed to borrow on these terms.  That issue was raised by in the BG View of 20th August 2009 – see http://guardian.co.tt/business/business-guardian/2009/08/20/debt-depreciation-or-discipline.
    4. Bank Financing – The HDC also borrows money from commercial banks or the IADB to fund their construction programme.

    Try as I might, it has proven impossible to determine just how much the HDC has spent on building new homes in any given year.  That is because there are no accounts at all which are available to the public.

    The HDC Act, at section 18 and 19, mandates that the Board shall keep and properly audit accounts.  Section 20 requires the Board to submit its annual report to the line Minister within 3 months of the end of the financial year.  The line Minister is in turn obliged, by section 20 (2), to lay that report in Parliament within 3 months of receipt.  See – http://mphe.gov.tt/home/images/stories/pdfs/tthdc%20act%2024%20of%202005.pdf.

    The HDC has never laid either its annual report or audited accounts into Parliament for the public.  The failure to publish accounts is one of the most serious warning-signs of companies in financial trouble.

    That failure to publish HDC or NHA accounts over such a long period (since 2002 at least) spanning several administrations, is a serious indictment of the main participants – the politicians, the Board Directors and of course, the professionals involved in the entire huge operation.

    I have been reliably informed that the HDC’s new management is attempting to rectify this situation and that must be a priority if we are to properly assess the performance of this vital social programme.

The overall picture is stark –

  • Gross under-performance in terms of the output of new homes, only about one-quarter of the reduced target has been achieved:
  • Poor financial and project controls – as revealed in the Uff Report (at para 25:30 – see http://www.raymondandpierre.com/articles/article84.htm), not one HDC project has a signed contract:
  • No accounts or annual reports, given the preceding point, that is not surprising:
  • An inequitable allocations policy, with lower priority given to those who cannot afford to buy.
  • Approximately 10,000 new homes remain empty and that is the one which tops them all.  The ongoing adverse consequences include – vandalism, the greater rate of general deterioration afflicting empty homes, the high cost of security and of course, the continued pressure on those people on the waiting list ‘holding strain’.

Given the combined effect of all this, which is probably hidden to most of today’s readers, one can only wonder at the patience of our needy citizens.

The entire situation also raises potent questions about the purpose and performance of the SPEs.

SIDEBAR: The concept and importance of opportunity cost and housing subsidy

Let’s use a typical home at Fidelis Heights as an example.

  • Unit Cost – $825,000 (and it is not clear if land and professional fees were included)
  • Selling Price – $825,000
  • Market Value – $1.7M

    • In the prevailing cost-based pricing model, this is considered a satisfactory, ‘zero-subsidy’ result, since the State has recovered all of its costs. Another phrase in the lexicon is the ‘cost-recovery’ model of pricing.

    The danger, as shown in the example in this article, is that the ‘cost-based’/’cost-recovery’ model ignores opportunity cost.

    The opportunity cost is the difference between the actual selling price of the unit and the market value. The HDC could sell each Fidelis Heights home for $1.7M, but has made the decision to sell at a reduced price of $825,000, which means that each sale is at the loss of those possible earnings. That amount of the loss incurred by the decision to sell at a lower price is called the opportunity cost. It is important that opportunity cost be identified and quantified as an element in all decision-making, both private and public sector. A decision-making process which ignores or obscures opportunity cost is negligent at the very least and can encourage corrupt practices and the dilution of capital.

    In this example, the opportunity cost is $1,700,000 – $825,000 = $875,000.
    Opportunity cost

    $875,000 is enough money to build at least three modest homes, yet this system has allocated that much money to each Fidelis Heights purchaser, each of whom qualified for a mortgage at that level.

    As a result of this questionable choice and the resultant shaky pricing model, there is an enormous ‘leakage’ of housing subsidy and opportunity cost.

    The opportunity cost can also be described as the housing subsidy since that is the difference between what a Fidelis Heights unit actually sold for and what a purchaser in the open market would have to pay for a similar unit.
    The two terms are therefore synonymous – Opportunity Cost is exactly equal to Housing Subsidy.

    http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2009/03/25/quality-performance-must

    •
    A version of this commentary appeared in print on August 5, 2010, on page 13 of the Business Guardian.

    Related reading:

    Housing Policy Imperatives – Part 4

    Having set out a framework for a more effective and equitable national housing policy, it is time to deepen the discussion.  In this week’s column, I will further analyse the existing housing policy so as to highlight those errors which we must avoid if we are to do better.

    My proposed framework would quantify housing subsidy and allocate that in accordance with identified housing need, with the quality of the new homes also being monitored to ensure constant improvement.

    To go further into the issues requires that we examine these aspects –

    • National Planning – It will be very difficult to achieve improved levels of housing quality if we proceed to build large numbers of new homes without reference to a national land-use plan.  1984 was the last time our Parliament approved a national land-use plan.  Over 25 years have elapsed and the position of the last government was that the national land use plan was being prepared for discussion in the next 2 years or so.  We have very limited developable land in this country – only about 9 to 10% of the total – so it is critical to plan and co-ordinate our future for best results with our limited resources.  Transportation, education, shopping, health-care, industry, housing and recreation are the main aspects which need to be fit onto those developable lands.  This ongoing housing programme has already had grievious cases of the alienation of agricultural lands for housing.  Alienation of agricultural lands is when we pave over farmland for non-agricultural development.  That land is permanently lost in terms of our food supply, but we need to preserve our agricultural lands.  That is vital in terms of maintaining our food security.
    • Intensity of development – An associated aspect that we need to reconsider is whether we can spare the land to continue HDC developments of  homes with gardens.  The HDC must publish its figures on the numbers of new homes built; the amount of land consumed; the numbers of houses versus the numbers of multiple-family homes and of course, the numbers of these various types of homes which have actually been occupied.  At this point the HDC has only built 15,394 new homes, compared to their annual target output of 8,000 new homes, which, if attained, would have been 60,000 new homes.  The HDC has only built a quarter of the intended number of new homes, which means that we still have time to adjust and improve the programme.
    • Pricing – The more I consider the dilemma in which this housing policy has been caught, the more it seems that the fundamentals were poorly-considered.  Just consider the issue of the pricing of the units – How did the pricing model evolve?  I have already, in part 2 of this series, critiqued the HDC’s cost-based model for its erroneous outputs in terms of assessing the quantities of housing subsidy being allocated.  One can go further to ask how these price points emerged.  Was any reference made to the incomes of the people on the waiting-list or were the HDC prices driven by the demands of the physical development agenda?  It seems to me that the latter was what took place, if indeed any conscious process of setting prices ever did occur.  If we are aiming for people-centred development, that entire misguided approach to pricing needs to be revised.  We need to give serious consideration to building more modest multiple-family homes for rental.
    • Quality – Another matter which has been in the news from both the last administration and now the new one, is the issue of the poor quality of some of the new homes.  We have been given various ‘horror stories’ about poor construction and the need for further works and so on.  But there is more to this story.  The fact is that the norm in the construction industry is that a contractor only has a valid claim to be paid in the case of ‘works properly executed’, so how did the HDC end up paying for all these defective buildings?  I am not seeking to exonerate the contractors from any wrongdoing, but the simple fact is that someone in HDC ought to have had the responsibility to inspect and approve the works before payment was authorized.  Either the HDC has a process for doing that or not.  If yes, what went wrong?  Who signed-off on those poorly-built homes?  If there is no such process, then the HDC system is one which exposes the Treasury and the neediest families in the land to real abuse.  These are serious questions which need to be answered, and soon.  If there are indeed civil servants and consultant advisers who have been approving defective work, they need to be dealt with.  If that were so, it seems to me that such actions would amount to grave professional misconduct, at the very least.  Such people should be banned from any State work for a period, as a minimum.  The real horror story is the official silence on the fact that someone from the HDC had to approve these very same defective works.  Lying by omission – see http://guardian.co.tt/commentary/letters/2010/06/03/don-t-blame-contractors-only-shoddy-hdc-work.  That continuing dishonesty is the real horror story.  To remind readers that this is no new issue, please see – http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2010/04/26/capacity-firms-weak-non-existent.

    I close this week by renewing my call for Minister Moonilal to take leadership on this burning national issue.  A conference on revising Housing Policy should include participation from the leading civil society organizations such as the JCC, the National Land Tenants’ and Rate-payers’ Association, the Sou-Sou Land group, Habitat for Humanity and the Salvation Army.

    Basic facts need to be compiled and distributed to seed the discussion.  The framework and philosophy need to be clearly articulated, if we are to get it right this time around.

    The continuing presence of over 10,000 empty homes is intolerable – it is solid proof of a seriously failed policy.  Our silence has to be broken on this issue.  We cannot continue this way.

    Related reading:

    VIDEO: Morning Edition Interviews

    VIDEO: Morning Edition Interviews – March 2010

    AfraRaymond.com, at this time chooses to re-issues these interviews on Morning edition on TV6 CCN, Trinidad and Tobago, to keep readers up-to-date on issues surrounding Uff Report and UDeCOTT Affair respectively.

    1. Afra Raymond sits with senior journalist Andy Johnson to discuss the “UDeCOTT/Calder Hart Affair” on Morning Edition television show on TV6.
      • Programme Date: 10 March 2010
      • Programme Length: 0:28:16

    2. Afra Raymond sits with guest host, William Lucie-Smith on the Morning Edition television show as part of a panel with senior counsel Israel Khan, to discuss the leaked Uff Report.
      • Programme Date: 31 March 2010
      • Programme Length: 0:26:52

    Housing policy imperatives – part 3

    hdc-logoLast week’s column delved into the vital issue of housing subsidy and its mis-allocation.  This week, I will set out some suggestions as to how this wrong-headed allocation of public subsidy might be re-oriented to better serve our needy citizens.

    The existing system is fundamentally flawed and in urgent need of reform, if we are to better apply the limited quantities of housing subsidy to the nation’s real housing needs.

    In order to create a more effective and transparent equation for the allocation of housing subsidy we need to establish three things.  Those are the quantity of housing subsidy which is available for the State to dispense; the housing need of those on the HDC’s waiting list and the housing quality of the new units produced by the HDC, since those ought to be raising the general standard of housing accommodation.

    The key point here is that there is only limited housing subsidy available and a clear choice has to be made as to its allocation.  That choice has been made under the existing policy, which in my view is inequitable and counter-productive.  If we accept that the proper measure of a successful housing policy is needy families moving into new HDC homes which improve their living conditions, we also need to accept that a policy which can generate over 10,000 empty homes is a failure.

    A supplementary point is that if we are spending vast sums to build new homes, we also need to obtain a measurable improvement in the nation’s housing standards.

    The main points could be outlined in this way –

    • Housing Subsidy – First of all, we need to establish the quantity of housing subsidy the State is prepared to dispense.  That can be determined by the sale of the new homes, as recently proposed by Minister Moonilal.  The figure here being the difference between the market value of the new homes and the HDC’s sale price.  I am of the view that we are at, or very close to, the ceiling as to the national percentage of home-ownership.  Another approach would be to establish the difference between the market rental value of the HDC units and the rents affordable to the applicants on the waiting list.  That figure can be capitalized to allow comparison between the policy choices.  The proposed effort to sell the new homes will in fact be inimical, since it will have the effect of decreasing the amount of housing subsidy available to those who cannot afford to buy.  In other words, the neediest people on the waiting list are being discriminated against by the policy of the HDC.
    • Housing Need Index (HNI) – We need to develop a framework for measuring the housing need of applicants for HDC housing.  That analysis would need to include such items as size of the family, family income and their living conditions, as well as any special needs such as disabilities and the location of the extended family.  The UK’s Department of the Environment and its implementing agency, The Housing Corporation, have already done substantial work in developing the HNI as a means of properly allocating State funding for housing across the nation.  The USA’s Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has also done considerable work on this complex series of questions.
    • Housing Quality Index – In 1993 I proposed a Housing Quality Index for the UK which would have been a tool for measuring how effectively the State funding had been applied in creating good quality housing.  The main elements of my proposal were to measure the quality of design of and amenity provided by new homes.  The Housing Corporation’s approach to this can be viewed at http://www.housingcorp.gov.uk/upload/pdf/710_HQI_Form_v3-1.pdf, see also this view from the UK’s Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) – http://www.homesandcommunities.co.uk/housing_quality.  Training is available at the Housing Quality Network – http://www.hqnetwork.org.uk/index.

    We need to allocate the limited housing subsidy to those in the greatest need.  That is the only reasonable policy for this critical area of national development.  That can only proceed properly on the basis of understanding the parts of the puzzle.  Anything other than a comprehensive review of these wrong-headed policies is a recipe for more waste and empty homes.

    Which brings me to an issue raised in last week’s column; the incidence of ‘policy silos’.  That phrase – ‘policy silos’ – refers to a condition in which the activities of various State agencies impinge on the same issues and yet, incredibly, there seems to be scant, if any, co-ordination between those agencies.  The aspects addressed last week can be summarized as –

    • The Minister of Housing and the Environment, Dr. Roodal Moonilal, making extensive statements on the sale of new homes, but being silent on the burning issue of new homes for rent.  Silence as to the greater area of need, alongside ambitious proposals to advance futile policies in favour of the less-needy.
    • The Minister of Science, Technology and Tertiary Education (MSTTE), Fazal Karim, proposes blanket rental subsidies for students in tertiary education.
    • The Legal Affairs Minister, Prakash Ramadhar, who is responsible for the rent control system, declares that he prefers that rents be determined by market forces.

    Those are exactly the ‘policy silos’ we need to dismantle if we are to make any real progress on these vital issues.

    Minister Moonilal should take the lead on this issue by convening a symposium or conference to debate these issues and establish some kind of policy consensus.  We cannot continue this way.

    We need to go beyond the numbers game of billions spent, jobs created and new homes built.  We need to move to a new, clear space where our national housing policy is declared as existing to improve the living conditions of our neediest citizens.  We need to move beyond the narrow perspectives which glorify home-ownership as the only correct answer.  There are many productive and honest families, in advanced countries, who never own a home.  They are no less worthwhile than those of us who are home-owners.

    Most of all, Minister Moonilal should take urgent steps to distribute the ‘…approximately 10,000…’ homes to the most needy.

    SIDEBAR: Re-purchase programmes

    There ought to be a programme for those people who have HDC homes and no longer need them.  That program would offer a cash payment to those HDC tenants who vacated their units.  That would have the practical effect of releasing additional housing units to the HDC without the expense and delay of having to construct new ones.

    Related reading:

    Housing policy imperatives – Part 2

    Last week’s column set out my principal queries as to our nation’s housing policy – see http://www.vision2020.info.tt/pdf/Policies and Procedures/Strategic_Corporate Plans/Housing Plan.pdf – and the intervening events have only put those into better focus.

    Key points –
    ‘Cheaper Govt Houses’ in the Sunday Guardian of 27th June featured an interview with Dr. Roodal Moonilal, Minister of Housing and the Environment.  The Minister touched on some of the key issues and confirmed that

    …Some people simply cannot afford the market value of the homes. As a result, Government is looking to provide a further subsidy to assist with the purchasing of homes. I intend to take a proposal to Cabinet to consider the price reduction of the housing units…

    – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/politics/2010/06/27/cheaper-govt-houses-pg-6 .

    There was no mention of rented housing in that article, so it seems that the new Minister has adopted the existing policy of preferring to sell the new homes built by the Housing Development Corporation (HDC).  In addition, he is proposing to increase the housing subsidy.  An important  correction is that HDC houses are not sold at ‘market value‘ as the Minister implied.  Market value is the amount the new home could sell for on the open market and the HDC offers the new homes to applicants at a lower price.

    What is Housing Subsidy?

    This is an important aspect of the housing policy discussion and these are the basic points –

    • Public funding – To create new homes, the HDC has to spend public money for land acquisition, professional fees and cost of construction – these are ‘first costs’ for new homes, but there are other significant costs of getting a needy family to move in.
    • Housing subsidy – For example, if the market value of a new HDC home is $900,000 and those homes are sold to applicants for $425,000, the housing subsidy in that case is $475,000.  Please note that I am not relating the sale price to the cost of production of the new home – that is a mistaken approach, because it ignores the opportunity cost of the investment decision to sell at that reduced price.  Effectively, this ignores the market to the detriment of the taxpayer.  Even in the case of rented housing, the same basis would apply, with the difference between the market rent and the actual rent being the weekly housing subsidy.
    • The allocation of Housing Subsidy – Fidelis Heights at Bates Trace in St. Augustine is a new HDC development of townhouses near to UWI – in my view, the homes there are middle-income units which should not have been built by the HDC.  In that case the housing subsidy per unit is in excess of $850,000.  In view of the desperate national housing shortage and the scarcity of resources, it was a grievious mis-allocation of both public capital and housing subsidy to have embarked on this scheme.  In the examples cited by the new Minister, the housing subsidy is far lower.  The people who purchased units at Fidelis Heights got them at between $780,000 to $900,000.  I am also aware that those homes were allocated without reference to housing need – i.e. some of them went to single people, without children.  To put it plainly, there is no case for allocating $850,000 in housing subsidy to a single person, when there are entire families in greater need, who are not catered for by the system.  There is a very poor quality of discussion on the issue of housing subsidy.  That is because of the system of cost-based pricing, as mentioned above, which error is compounded by the sparse references in the official statistics.  I have only been able to unearth a single official attempt to quantify housing subsidy in the ‘2010 Draft Estimates of Development Programme‘ http://www.finance.gov.tt/documents/publications/pub07D7E4.pdf ‘Provision of Housing Subsidies at Greenfield sites’ is stated, at line H 003 to be $3,058,863.  I am not saying that there is a poor understanding of the role of housing subsidy.  That would be untrue, since the people who are manipulating the system all understand the real value of housing subsidy very well.
    • Rent control – ‘Rent subsidies for tertiary students’, also in Sunday’s Guardian – see http://guardian.co.tt/news/politics/2010/06/27/rent-subsidies-tertiary-students – featured a discussion on the housing situation affecting 14,000 UWI students.

      [Minister of Science, Technology and Tertiary Education (MSTTE) Fazal] Karim said while the university has established mechanisms to register landlords “there exist no mechanisms to monitor prices, ensure quality accommodation, minimise security anxiety or seek the interests of the landlords and students.” In the near future, Karim said, the MSTTE and the Health Ministry will establish a committee that will make recommendations to establish mechanisms for the provision of subsidies “on rents to all students residing in the region and who are registered at tertiary institutions in the area.”

    It seems from his statements that the MSTTE is proposing a rental subsidy to all tertiary students, whatever their means.  In a situation of scarce resources, that type of policy can have inequitable consequences, since some of these students are not needy at all.

    The Minister of Legal Affairs, Prakash Ramadhar, attending as MP for the area, said –

    …what adds to the problem is the lapsing by the Rent Assessment Board. “We nationally had to debate the issue if this country would go into a free market in terms of rent or rent restriction.”

    Ramadhar said he would like to see free market forces determine rents.

    Legal Affairs Minister Prakash Ramadhar, left, Fazal Karim, Science, Technology and Tertiary Education Minister, right, listen attentively to the landlords during yesterday’s discussion. Photo: Jennifer Watson. Courtesy Trinidad Guardian
    Legal Affairs Minister Prakash Ramadhar, left, Fazal Karim, Science, Technology and Tertiary Education Minister, right, listen attentively to the landlords during yesterday’s discussion. Photo: Jennifer Watson

    So here we have the paradox deepening, with the Minister responsible for the rent control system seeming to say that he is against those controls.

    The outlook for the state’s intervention into the housing arena is confusing, to say the least.  Confusion is the ideal atmosphere to breed under-performance and corruption.

    Our needy citizens deserve better.  This entire debate should be to create reasonable, redistributive and  sustainable housing policies for our nation.

    The allocation of scarce housing subsidy must be reported and improved, so that the most needy receive the most subsidy.

    Next week, we expand to include questions as to how many of the HDC houses are occupied by the legitimate tenants?  Are steps being taken to deal with those who have broken the terms of their tenancy?  Also, some discussion on the use of re-purchase schemes as another way to create extra units of housing.

    SIDEBAR: The numbers’ game

    Last week’s column asked Dr. Moonilal to specify how many new homes were empty at this time and it was very disappointing to read that “…approximately 10,000 homes, including defective units, are unoccupied…”.  The new administration has to strive to do better than the one they just replaced and it is just not acceptable that the HDC cannot (or will not?) report on an elementary matter like this.

    Related reading: