CL Financial bailout – filling the gaps, part two


This article provides more details of the games being played in this Information War. It seems that the concealment of the details of the CL Financial bailout is of high importance.

First item is this acknowledgment from the PS in the Ministry of Finance which would be funny, if this entire matter were not so very serious –

Continue reading “CL Financial bailout – filling the gaps, part two”


CL Financial bailout – filling the gaps

This article sets out my ongoing search for all the details of all the payments made under the CL Financial bailout. That includes my recently-concluded litigation and my new requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act.

The Consent Order of 24th January 2018 required the Ministry of Finance to provide these details –

  1. Any unaudited financial statements of CL Financial Limited for the years 2008-2011 in the possession of the Ministry of Finance which were relied upon to prepare the affidavits of Minister Winston Dookeran filed on 3 April, 2012 in High Court proceedings CV 2011-01234, Percy Farrell and Others v Clico and others.
  2. Any list of the creditors of CL Financial existing at the date of the request in the possession of the Ministry of Finance, the names of the EFPA holders of Clico, the dates of the repayment of EFPA holders of Clico and the identities of those whose investments have been repaid.

The Ministry’s attorneys have now stated that they are unable to locate the specified financial statements and the list of CLF creditors has not been provided. My team will be responding to press for those details, in the public interest and in accordance with the Appeal Court’s Consent Order. Continue reading “CL Financial bailout – filling the gaps”

CL Financial bailout – the NIF matter

CL Financial bailout – the NIF matter

The National Investment Holding Fund Co Ltd (NIF) was announced (p.18) on 25th June 2018 by the Minister of Finance, Colm Imbert, as an important part of the endgame of the CL Financial bailout. That announcement, which had been prefaced in earlier statements by Minister Imbert, was stated to be part of the process to recover the public money which had been spent on the CLF bailout.

The NIF is a new State-owned and controlled enterprise into which will be transferred just under $8.0 Billion in shares. About $6.0 Billion of those shares are CLF-owned – Republic Finance; WITCO; One Caribbean Media and Angostura – with a further $2.025 Billion of the State’s shares in Trinidad Generation Unlimited making up the balance. Continue reading “CL Financial bailout – the NIF matter”

CL Financial bailout – the Integrity Query

ic-logoYet another worrying aspect of the CL Financial (CLF) bailout fiasco is the role of the Integrity Commission (IC) in these turbid dealings. I am referring to the apparent failure or refusal of The Commission to carry out its duties in relation to CLF as required by the Integrity in Public Life Act (IPLA).

I first raised the prospect that CLF might well be under the IC’s oversight on 28th May 2009, in an article entitled – Judgment Time – Moral Hazard part 3. I have been pursuing that concern steadily since September 2012 and yet the position of the IC is no clearer. On 9th September 2015, I again put the question – Is the integrity Commission being willfully blind towards CL Financial? Indeed, in my March 28th 2018 interview with the Trinidad Express, I stated, in relation to the governance aspects unearthed by my campaign –

“…What is more, our Integrity Commission also seems to have lost its way in failing to recognise that CL Financial is a company under State control. As a result, the Commission has sought no Directors’ declarations from the largest of the State controlled companies. I tell you…”

Given that these are very serious allegations to level against one of our nation’s Public Institutions, I will give the supporting details.
Continue reading “CL Financial bailout – the Integrity Query”

CL Financial bailout – the EFPA details part two

CL Financial bailout – the EFPA details part two

One of the more interesting issues emerging from these EFPA details is the extent to which companies invested in what was approved as an individual investment instrument.

In the previous article, I detailed the significant investments made by State Enterprises, which prompted questions on the governance arrangements applicable to those companies. We know that companies made the investments in the names of individuals, that much was clear from the JSC’s 5th June 2015 Report on the EMBD. Continue reading “CL Financial bailout – the EFPA details part two”

CL Financial bailout – the EFPA Details, part one

CL Financial bailout – the EFPA Details, part one


I was a Director of the Trinidad Building & Loan Association (1999-2013) when that organisation purchased EFPA investments and also when those sums were recovered during the bailout via the issue of 20-year bonds.

On Thursday, 22nd March 2018, the Ministry of Finance & The Economy, sent details of EFPA payments (in partial satisfaction of the Appeal Court’s Consent Order of 24th January 2018) under cover of a transmittal letter from the Office of the Chief State Solicitor.

The details provided are for payments of $10.8 Billion in Public Money to EFPA account holders between March 2011 and March 2015. That was an average payout of over $220M TTD per month in that four-year period and would correspond with the September 2011 Parliamentary approval for an additional $10.7 Billion to be spent on the CL Financial bailout. This all raises interesting issues as to the timing of these payments, as shown in this table –

PERIOD Minister of Finance statements on bailout costs EFPA payment details from Ministry of Finance COMMENTS
BEFORE 3rd April 2012 affidavit of Winston Dookeran Para 21 “…(a) $5.0Bn already provided to CLICO;
(b) $7.0Bn paid to holders of the EFPA…”
$6,229,920,482 There is an apparent discrepancy between these figures in the amount of $770,079,518
BETWEEN 3rd April 2012 and 1st October 2012 “…The cost to the national community has been substantial—an amount of $19.7 billion or 13.0 per cent of our current GDP $3,144,270,326 Larry Howai’s 2013 budget statement was that $7.7 Billion had been spent on the CLF bailout after Winston Dookeran’s affidavit. The details from the Ministry of Finance show that only $3.144 Billion of that could be attributable to EFPA payments.
AFTER 1st October 2012 Estimates have ranged from $20 Billion to the $27.7 Billion estimate on 10th May 2017 by the current Minister, Colm Imbert. $1,449,184,402 The Public Money spent after that date exceeds an estimated $6.0 Billion, only a part of which went to EFPA account holders.

Continue reading “CL Financial bailout – the EFPA Details, part one”

Afra gets CLICO data…End corbeaux capitalism, he says


This interview appears in the Business Express Newspaper on Wednesday, March 28, 2018.

LAST week, nearly six years after he first requested the data under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Ministry of Finance sent Afra Raymond a compact disc with information on all individuals and institutions who received payments from the State for their investments in CLICO, the insurance company that collapsed in January 2009. The matter went to the Court of Appeal before the parties agreed on an out-of-court settlement with the ministry agreeing to most of Raymond’s demands.

For Raymond, an Express Business columnist, property expert and transparency campaigner, it has been a long but ultimately rewarding road, which began with the May 8, 2012 filing with the ministry. As to cost, he will receive 70 per cent of the cost of the litigation in the High Court.

He answers questions on the issue below:

Q: What in broad terms is the importance to governance and government in T&T of last week’s release of information on the State’s payment to CLICO

A: The need for eternal vigilance is greater than before, with our reduced national resources and I should never have had to make that kind of effort to get these details. Three administrations, between 2009 and now, felt it was proper to hide this huge public spending. Good sense seems to have arrived – for the while anyway! How much Public Money was spent on lawyers’ fees in this sorry affair? Is that a secret too?

This bailout was done via the Central Bank and the CL Financial parent company which formally came under State control by virtue of the June 21, 2009 Shareholders’ Agreement. The State then created new laws to further inoculate the Central Bank from the oversight of the Courts via judicial review and so on. What is more, our Integrity Commission also seems to have lost its way in failing to recognise that CL Financial is a company under State control. As a result, the Commission has sought no Directors’ declarations from the largest of the State controlled companies. I tell you.

Contrast T&T with the Bajan approach to the related 2009 collapse of CLICO in Barbados – The High Court there appointed Deloitte as Judicial Manager in April 2011 and a far more transparent process is taking place – see for an example of how we could have done it better.

If one analyses the data, do you agree that the majority of holders of the investments were individuals who were looking to maximise the return on their investments?

Yes, there were several wealthy investors, but a great many of the accounts and most of the larger ones, were held by companies, including state enterprises! We all know that the EFPA was approved as an individual pension product, yet it was sold to companies, which were later able to obtain repayment.

What do you think accounts for the large number of institutional investors who were able to invest in investment vehicles that were first marketed as being for individuals?

The sheer size of the returns being offered by the EFPA eclipsed good sense and it was the ‘best deal in the country’, quite literally ‘Too Good to be True’, grew and grew until it was ‘Too Big to Fail’ and as we now know, everyone is so closely related that it is now a case of ‘Too Big to go to Jail!’

What, in your view, are the long-term lessons of your fight for information on this state expenditure?

What is sorely needed is for the media and the academy to take their proper role as wellsprings of enquiry, research and debate. The mainstream media (MSM) have not embarked on a sustained campaign to get this information released. The UWI has taken no formal position on this serious issue as far as I am aware. This is a huge expenditure of scarce public money to repay wealthy risk-takers at a time when basic needs are unfulfilled. Chronic shortages in our public health institutions, so how can we find money for this?!

The process by which this outrageous bailout request made its way to the Head Table, was approved by Cabinet, with the sitting Minister of Finance being a shareholder of the beneficiary company, with the public being the last to know.  [CORRECTION: The ‘sitting Minister of Finance‘ referred to here is not the incumbent, Colm Imbert.  That was an awkward and inaccurate choice of words on my part and I apologise for that error.  The ‘sitting  Minister of Finance‘ to whom I was referring was the holder of that office from November 2007 to May 2010, Mrs Karen Nunez-Tesheira, who was recorded as the owner of 10,410 shares in CL Financial Ltd, being the 289th of 325 shareholders listed in its filing with the Registrar General’s Department of 17th February 2009.] Well I tell you. Never again. It is like a recipe for a failed marriage in which the husband is the last to know…

What are the long-term lessons of the CLICO collapse and the length of time resolution has taken?

Publication of the Colman Report into CLF…The need for financial education…We need a Regional Financial Regulator as the late Norman Girvan proposed in the wake of this fiasco…most importantly, the key players must be arrested and face the courts on serious charges…The State locks up ‘suspects’ in various lockdowns to then go look for the evidence and pay damages, after! All that is to send a message, we are watching you, we know who you are. The question is why won’t the State take the same firm action against the financial criminals? Until we see the State being very serious with white collar criminals, as is now happening in so many other countries, we are going to have more of this ‘Corbeaux Capitalism.’